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The Canadian Contingents
and
Canadian Imperialism

SIR WILFRID LAURIER, PREMIER OF CANADA.

[*Frontispiece.*

The Canadian Contingents and Canadian Imperialism

A Story and a Study

By

W. Sanford Evans

Illustrated

And with Six Maps

Toronto

The Publishers' Syndicate, Ltd.

1901

PREFACE

CANADA'S active participation in the South African war was an event of the first importance in Canadian history. Whether we study the conditions that made it possible, the manner in which it was conducted, or the immediate effects, or speculate on the permanent results, we find ourselves face to face with the most interesting and most serious problems in Canadian national life. To take part in an arduous undertaking which all the world watches; to pay the price; to know that sense of comradeship with other peoples which comes as a revelation when common action compels mutual respect; to realise what had been visionary; to feel the strain of anxiety and the rebound of jubilation; to have the deep consciousness of worthiness, tested and proved, is a momentous experience for any people. For a young people such an experience is apt to be of critical significance.

In the following pages I shall endeavour to report the experience of the Canadian people during the months in which the South African war was an agitating cause. The war will be dealt with only in

so far as Canadians participated in it. My object is to present to the reader the characteristic features of what Canadians did and thought and felt on the occasion of the South African war. This book will not be found to be a war history in detail nor a minute study of politics or social conditions, but rather a contribution toward an understanding of the Canadian people as they revealed themselves at home and in the field during a specified period.

For facts about the Canadian Volunteers in South Africa I am particularly indebted to the reports of Canadian officers commanding; to letters of Canadian correspondents with the contingents, such as Mr. Frederick Hamilton and Mr. John A. Ewan, of the Toronto *Globe;* Mr. Stanley McKeown Brown, of the Toronto *Mail and Empire;* Mr. W. Richmond Smith and Mr. H. S. White, of the Montreal *Star;* Mr. R. E. Finn, of the Montreal *Herald*, and others; and to published letters from officers and privates. Several of the photographs reproduced have been kindly loaned by the editor of the *Canadian Magazine.* I would also acknowledge the courtesy of the Department of Militia and Defence in placing at my disposal the information in their possession.

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The Canadian Contingents and Canadian Imperialism

CHAPTER I

THE PEOPLE AND THE WAR

An opportunity to take part in an Imperial war was sure to find many Canadians ready and even eager to serve. The fact of nearly a century and a half of British connection ; the traditions of this connection, which are the only common national traditions ; the new and stimulating prospects opened up by the idea of more active co-operation in the work of Empire ; the sense of obligations not yet fully understood or fully met ; the stirring of national aspiration, which is just beginning to look abroad ; the ambitions of the military class, and the general spirit of adventure and contest—all these things had been a preparation for such a contingency.

The South African war is not the first occasion on

which Canadians have shown their willingness to assist the Mother Country. In 1854 there were many volunteers for the Crimea. The union of British and French in this war made it appeal with special strength to Canadians. The Legislature of the United Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada manifested its deep interest, not only by resolutions, but also by what, in the conditions existing, must be regarded as the substantial vote of twenty thousand pounds sterling "in favour of the widows and orphans of the allied armies of England and France." The money was equally divided between British and French. As the Emperor Napoleon expressed it, in his graceful acknowledgment, "in remembrance of their French descent, the population of Canada were unwilling to separate in their congratulations and offerings those now so nobly connected by a community of dangers."

When the Indian Mutiny broke out in 1857 Canadians again offered in large numbers. The matter was taken up in the press and in Parliament, and the British Government yielded to the popular desire. By Royal warrant in March, 1858, the "100th Prince of Wales's Royal Canadian Regiment" was raised in Canada and embodied in the regular army. This famous regiment was for many years recruited from Canada. It did not, however, reach India, being employed in garrison duty at Gibraltar and Malta, and returned to Canada in 1866 at the time of the Fenian Raid. In 1877 Colonel J. W. Laurie offered to raise a regiment in Canada for active service in Turkey, but this offer was

not accepted. Later, in 1884, he again offered to raise a regiment for the war in the Sudan. In February of the following year he urgently renewed this offer, and Colonel Arthur Williams, M.P., of Port Hope, placed his services and those of his regiment, the 46th East Durham Battalion, at the disposal of Her Majesty's Government for immediate foreign service. These offers apparently antedate all other Colonial offers for this war. There were in the same year many individual applications to the Governor-General, Lord Lansdowne. The Canadian Government were ready to facilitate the raising of a contingent, but did not offer to equip it or bear the expense of its maintenance. Other Colonial offers were made to the British Government, but that of the Government of New South Wales alone was accepted, because it was accompanied by an offer to pay all expenses. Canada was represented only by a company of voyageurs in the transport service. In 1896 there was a distinct disposition to render assistance if it should be needed, but the matter did not go further than resolutions. Some Canadians have at all times been found in the British army. It is the natural field for those ambitious for the military life. There are at present among the officers in the regular army no less than one hundred graduates of the Canadian Military College at Kingston.

What Canadians have done in defence of their own soil and institutions has been done also, in effect, for the Mother Country and for the Empire. As early as 1775, when the great majority of the inhabitants

were French or of French descent, a large proportion actively assisted the British army in repelling the attacks of the forces of Congress. In 1812 the Canadian militia, of both French and English origin, took a most prominent and important part in checking and driving back the greatly superior numbers sent by the United States for the conquest of Canada. In 1837 again, while some Canadians took up arms for the righting of what they regarded as grievances, the majority opposed them for the sake of stability of government. The Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870, and the Riel rebellion of 1869–70, furnished other examples of the readiness with which Canadians will meet any situation demanding force. The North-West Rebellion of 1885 was a still more striking example, for within twenty-four hours over 4,000 men had volunteered and were ready to start for the front. What they accomplished in the way of marching and fighting on this occasion has not been fully appreciated by the majority of Canadians, and by few outside of Canada.

Not only, however, are Canadians willing to fight for their own country or for the Empire, but there is a fighting spirit which leads some to enlist, whenever an opportunity offers, in any cause engaging their sympathy. In the Civil War in the United States thousands of Canadians were found in the Northern ranks, and in the late Spanish-American war there were again many enlistments of Canadian young men, both in the army and the navy of the United States. At the time of the Italian war of independence French-Canadian Zouaves were found among

ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE, KINGSTON, ONT.

the Papal forces. In fact, it never has been, and probably never will be, difficult to raise soldiers in Canada.

Much soldier blood runs in the veins of Canadians. In the early days French soldiers settled in Quebec. Wolfe's soldiers and United Empire Loyalists founded Ontario. After the war of 1812–14 many of the regulars remained in Canada, and, on their discharge, Wellington's veterans came over in hundreds.

Despite what these facts may seem to indicate, it cannot be said that Canada is a military country. In the sense in which European nations know militarism, there is no such thing in Canada. Canada's militarism has no burdens, and its sky is clear of storm-clouds. There is a reasonable amount of military training, and the serious purpose of such training is never overlooked, but those who volunteer do so for the congeniality of the military training, and not to be prepared against crises that are always threatening. The military spirit is strong, but it is not born of necessity nor of bloodthirstiness. It is rather a manifestation of the general spirit of contest. It is for sport rather than for war. Both because of its climate and because of the conditions of life prevailing, Canada should produce plenty of good fighting men. Over large areas the people are still pioneers; living the rough life of the lumberman, with no highways but turbulent streams; prospecting for minerals in new districts all the way from the Great Lakes to the Klondike; clearing farms on the edge of the forest; breaking the virgin soil of the prairie; or herding cattle over its fenceless miles.

In the older settled regions, too, the pioneer days, with their discipline in adaptability and self-reliance, are not so far distant that their influence has been lost in the milder and more conventional ways of comparative wealth. The new towns and cities springing up are fed from the country. And everywhere sport gives exercise to those qualities which the business of life may no longer require; and the favourite sports are the most strenuous.

This fighting and struggling past and active present were part of the preparation Canada had for the Imperial call to arms. In so far as she responded because she liked contest and adventure, she but followed primitive instincts. No political conclusions can be drawn from the mere fact that Canadians went to fight in South Africa; but there were other phenomena besides the falling in step to the bugle. The people as a whole, who, in their capacity as citizens, have not wished for war, nor for additional financial burdens, took up the matter warmly and voted decisively, though informally, that a contingent should be sent; and the Government made the contingent official. The condition of opinion and sentiment revealed in the stand taken by the people of Canada is the thing of chief importance. Its causes are to be discovered only after a study of all the historical influences that have gone to the making of this nation, and its tendencies, modified as they are certain to be to some extent by the events of the last few months, are the problems of Canada's future.

To tell just what Canada thought and felt is not easy, for the condition was far from simple. The

steady flow of debated and accepted policy there was not ; nor is there yet. It was as a contingency, and not as an event fully provided for, that the situation arising in South Africa was met. When the Imperial Government declares war, the people of the United Kingdom are by that act involved in the work of prosecuting and supporting the war. It may be argued that the fact of British sovereignty over the Colonies involves them also ; but the logical deductions of political science have not in recent years been insisted upon, and the Colonies have been left to such a share as they may themselves choose to assume. As a result the whole matter of Imperial defence, as distinguished from the defence of their own particular territories, presents itself to the Colonies as a question of policy, and not as a question of constitutional obligation. Canada, at least, has never formulated its policy upon this matter. Individuals, and groups of individuals, may have made up their minds upon it ; but this is not true of the people as a whole. That it must some day come up for settlement has long been recognised, but with the exception of more or less incidental references by public men and occasional articles in the public press, little attempt has been made to work out a national policy, and secure its adoption by the people.

While the contingents were not sent in accordance with a settled policy, their despatch can be explained only as a natural result. The crisis was but the shock which precipitated what was held in solution. Canadian opinion and sentiment is a solution in which different elements mingle without undue agita-

tion, ready to be combined when occasion provides the stimulus. It is not certain that any other crisis would cause the elements to combine in the same proportions and produce the same product. And it also is not certain that the different elements will always continue to exist in the same relative strength. The two main constituent elements are those which are derived—the one from the great fact of British sovereignty with its traditions and its prospects, and the other from the no less important fact of the self-government of a people who hold a land great enough and rich enough to support a nation, and who, by years of common life and common thought, are becoming a distinct people in themselves. There has always been strong attachment to the British Crown, but the attitude toward British connection has passed through various phases. The present phase is probably more full of hope and vitality than any previous one. There can be no doubt that Canada to-day is thoroughly British in inclination. To the broader and more enlightened views of Colonial policy, held by the Imperial authorities, the development is largely due. And there are other causes. The very existence of the connection for so long a time without serious disturbance has caused the national life to grow around it. The bracing effect of our relations with the United States has contributed to the same general end. Legislation restricting Canadian trade or intercourse with the United States has thrown Canadians more upon their own resources, and the irritations and rivalries arising have made them look away from Washington

to London. More correct conceptions of the state of international politics, with their large combinations of powers, has been another directing influence. Then, the imagination has been powerfully impressed by peaceful demonstrations, like the Jubilee, and by warlike demonstrations, showing the incomparable might of the British navy, and the effectiveness of the army, as in the Sudan. Above and around all has been the respect and devotion paid to the venerable Queen, which has given to the feeling for the "Mother Country" a peculiar quality.

Out of all this has come the new Imperial idea. Its vagueness has been in its favour, for it has left room for aspirations that have their root in distinct nationality, and in a desire for self-determined action in wider fields. Canada has grown accustomed to consolidation, has created general order over half a continent, and is now beginning to feel that she has both the energy and the leisure to seek new interests abroad. This is all called British Imperialism, and as there have been no bonds imposed, there has been no need to differentiate. There is, however, a difference, which should be recognised.

When we come to review the actual events preceding and accompanying the sending of the contingents, we find lighter elements in play and less serious motives; but always below the surface, if not appearing, were the two great commingling elements of Canadian national life. At the beginning of the crisis, Canada did not know enough about the issues to be otherwise than indifferent. South Africa is a long way off, and there is little direct intercourse.

Not until hostilities had actually broken out could it be said that any considerable proportion of the people had enough knowledge of the points in dispute between the Imperial Government and the Government of the South African Republic to qualify them to cast intelligent votes on the justice or injustice of insisting on the British claims. Australia is more closely in touch with South Africa, and probably understood the situation better. Mr. Balfour took comfort because the Imperial Government was supported by "the conscience of the Empire." Ultimately he may have been justified; but at the time he spoke the Canadian conscience was grounded on faith in British statesmen and British policy, rather than upon knowledge. A reasoned conviction was not one of the conscious motives of the actions the people sanctioned. It was a British affair, and it particularly concerned Colonists; and these were sufficient reasons for the steadily increasing interest. Some direct appeals for the support of the Canadian people tended to make the interest more personal. In April, 1899, the South African League cabled to the British Empire League in Canada indicating that the Imperial Government would be greatly strengthened if Canada made known at that critical juncture her sympathy with the Uitlanders' petition then before the Queen. A delegate from the South African League visited Canada in July for the purpose of making further appeals, and if possible to secure a formal resolution of Parliament. An argument commonly heard at this time was that the Imperial Government would welcome some action, because it

would strengthen their hands for peace. The people were not yet aroused ; for when Parliament did pass resolutions of sympathy, which in effect committed the country to the support of the British cause, the incident passed almost unnoticed. Strange to say, it brought forth scarcely a single editorial reference throughout the whole country, and was scarcely mentioned on the street. There was approving indifference. The people are accustomed to occasional displays of "being British," and are not disposed to criticise. If anything seems hasty or ill-considered, it is put down to party politics, for each party is afraid to be outdone by the other. It was known that the League delegate was in Ottawa. When, a few days later, the same delegate visited the reserve of the Six Nation Indians in Ontario, and went away with more resolutions in his pocket, some smiled. Yet these Parliamentary resolutions were destined to play an important part. As war began to appear inevitable, and finally when it was declared, the people insisted that to follow up with material assistance, when peaceful measures failed, resolutions of sympathy with the efforts of the Imperial Government to obtain equal rights for the Uitlanders, was the simple logic of self-respect. The sequence was recognised then, though not before.

One reason why the resolutions created no stir was that they were not concrete. The attention of the people was being attracted by the definite offers of troops by Queensland and other Colonies. The pride of Canadians was touched by being forestalled. Canada's professions had always been hearty, and

she congratulated herself upon her title of "Pioneer of Empire." She did not like to see others taking this place. It had not seriously occurred to her that an occasion existed when troops might be needed and appropriately offered. Some military men had discussed the matter at headquarters, and elsewhere, for several months, but the discussion was confined to military circles. On July 13th Lieut.-Col. Sam Hughes, M.P., drew the attention of the House of Commons to the offer of Queensland, and pressed upon the Government the necessity for taking some action; but even Parliament then considered action premature. As the announcements of other Colonial offers followed each other, a distinct awakening occurred. It began to be asked why Canada was not in line. Parliament had been prorogued early in August, and the people looked to the Government. In September, Sir Charles Tupper, the leader of the Opposition, returned from England, and at once put himself at the head of the movement for the sending of a contingent. He publicly offered to support the Government in such a course. The Opposition press was not blind to the opportunity of obtaining a little party prestige, at the same time that it helped on a popular cause. It entered upon an active campaign. Insistent articles were written and interviews were obtained from prominent men all over the country. Individual Canadian officers took the initiative and offered to the General Officer Commanding, or direct to the Home Government, the services of themselves and their corps. Excitement began. Even those who did not share it acquiesced; because of the

resolutions; because Canadians had professed a great deal, and must show themselves in their true character as men of action rather than of words; because it was a chance to do something out in the world; because Canada had never consented to any set contribution to Imperial defence, and yet it was felt that she was not doing her full share in return for benefits received; or because of the still deeper tendencies of the national life. The reasons freely stated were not always so profound: the other Colonies must not be allowed to take the lead; the contingent would be appreciated in England and would keep Canada prominent, which is not without material advantages; and the trip to South Africa and contact with regular troops would be excellent training for officers and men. Whatever might have been the conscious motives, the growing strength of the movement was unquestionable.

Still the Government did not act. Why? The majority was in no mood to allow for possible difficulties, and the members of the Government did not soon enough come out to try to lead or modify discussion. The idea that the Government might be inclined to oppose the popular will added a new motive for insisting. Why the Government should hesitate was not easy to see, unless it was that the indifference or opposition of the French-Canadian element in the population was given undue weight, or was present in the personal attitude of some members of the Government. If Quebec was opposed, or was not yet convinced, there existed the best possible reason for moderation and tact.

To neither of these, unfortunately, was the majority in the other Provinces disposed. Blame was laid, not on the people of Quebec, but on one or two men who were supposed to be assuming to speak for them and lead them. Since these men were called by name it was thought, by some journalists and others, that they could be charged with disloyalty without running the risk of exciting race feeling. Notwithstanding this measure of precaution and the fact that some French-Canadians came out emphatically in favour of sending a contingent, race feeling was excited. On the one hand it tended to make the majority more determined to persevere, and on the other to throw the minority into a more pronounced opposition than would otherwise have been the case. This development was deplorable. Race feeling is no longer a dangerous element in this country, but it still exists as a sort of sensitiveness, which calls for mutual consideration. When sober judgment was needed, a distorted view of loyalty tended to appear.

Under no correct conception of loyalty can the French-Canadians be charged with disloyalty. They have the welfare of Canada as much at heart as any other part of the population, and have no dissatisfaction with British connection. They have indeed shown themselves perfectly ready to consider proposals for closer union within the Empire. But as compared with the people of British stock, the element of Canadianism is with them relatively stronger and the element of Britishism relatively weaker; and they cherish carefully their own

language and the traditions of their own past. They have not, and cannot be expected to have, the same intimate affection for things British. When the crisis arose in South Africa they were chiefly indifferent. They felt strongly neither one way nor the other. They were even more ignorant of the exact conditions and issues than were their English-speaking fellow-countrymen. There was not, however, the same willingness to accept as right, without inquiry, the policy of the Imperial Government. In the circumstances they did not favour the agitation to send troops. To them it seemed to be the inauguration of the policy of participation in all the wars of the Empire, to which they had never given assent. Some pernicious campaign literature, issued just before the elections of 1896, had warned them that, if the Conservatives were returned to power, they would "send our children to Africa or Asia, whence they will never return." Perhaps on this ground, perhaps almost altogether on others, they had voted against the Conservatives; and yet here was the very thing against which they had been warned. A campaign of education, judiciously conducted, might have removed all difficulties, but it was not systematically attempted. Spokesmen on their behalf asked, at least, that nothing should be done until Parliament had been called. This was not considered necessary by the majority in the rest of the country. When the agitation became more urgent, they began to take an antagonistic position, which prejudiced their views of the war. They saw a race, not English, about to be brought into subjection by the whole force of the

Empire, and suffer the loss of their race ideals. Apprehension could easily draw parallels. These were extreme effects. Quebec is not as articulate as the other Provinces, and it is impossible to judge how deeply moved the people really were. The truth may be merely that the mass were, and remained, indifferent.

In connection with all this, it should be borne in mind that it was not until the siege of Ladysmith began that Canadians believed the Boers capable of resisting even a comparatively small British force. Bravery and determination were conceded to them, but armament was supposed to be lacking, and inferiority of generalship was assumed. A war against the Boers alone was not regarded as a serious undertaking for the Empire. Only in the event of interference by other Powers would contributions from the Colonies have more than a sentimental value. To say, as British statesmen and editors have so often done, that the Colonies came to the help of the Mother Country in her hour of need, may be strictly true; but, when she sent her first contingent, Canada for her part did not believe any need for Colonial help existed. As Mr. MacNeill put it in the House of Commons, when speaking to the July resolutions, it was unnecessary "to render assistance to a 100-ton hammer to crush a hazel nut." So far from the real situation being foreseen, the gathering of representatives from all parts of the Empire was looked upon rather in the light of another piece of spectacular Imperialism, like the Jubilee, except that the parade would be over rough

country, and among unfriendly spectators, instead of through paved streets and applauding crowds. No good can be accomplished by reading into events interpretations derived from later experiences. It renders all parties liable to be wrongly judged, and makes a false basis for inferences as to the future. Those who were hesitating about the right policy to be pursued were weighing sentimentality against such concrete realities as militarism and taxation, or were reluctant to go blindly where the leadings of the road were not known. Had Canada apprehended in September what she knew in December, an entirely different chapter would have had to be written. The contingent would have been sent, but the psychology would have been different.

On October 4th, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in an interview given for the purpose of denying the announcement that the Government had decided to offer a contingent, said that the Government had no constitutional authority for sending a contingent, and even if it had, it could not commit the country to the amount of expenditure entailed without consulting Parliament; and that for these reasons the matter had not been considered. Formal questions of legality and procedure were by this time looked upon as quibbles. When the Boer ultimatum was sent and hostilities actually commenced it would have been dangerous any longer to stand against the tide. The plainly irresistible demand of the majority, and the existence of war, which put a stop to all hope of settlement by diplomacy, cleared the situation, and on October 14th an Order in Council was passed,

followed immediately by a Militia Order providing for the recruiting and despatch of a regiment of 1,000 men. Sentiment won the day; but below the surface were the great tendencies of British Imperialism and national expansion.

The strain of agitation was at last over, and cheerful enthusiasm took its place. The bustling activity of the next two weeks was thoroughly congenial. Volunteers came forward in large numbers. Committees provided for demonstrations, and raised funds for a supply of comforts and for the placing of insurance upon the lives of those enrolled. The people were gratified by the expedition with which the Militia Department did its work, and felt a justifiable pride in the quality of the men who enlisted. The scenes attending the departure of the different units from the recruiting centres, and finally of the whole contingent from Quebec, were most inspiring. It touched deep chords, did this sending forth of sons and brothers. Emotion was unmixed with the anxieties that must bear upon a people directly responsible for a state of war. Canada felt no such responsibility. It was not a going to war as older nations would go. Canada is not old. She is not accustomed to play a part on the foreign stage, with all the world as spectators. It was a new experience and coloured with romance. There were not even great personal anxieties, for all supposed the first successful engagements reported from Natal would discourage, if not discomfit, the Boers, and that the worst would be over before the boys arrived. The anxiety was rather that some chance might be given

them to show their mettle. And so from the heights of Quebec, where her British life began, Canada watched them sail away, as a lady her knight, to do battle in glorious company for the oppressed.

A return to more normal conditions followed the departure of the troops. The war, which would in any case have been watched with great interest because it was British, was now an object of the intensest interest. For the honour of the Canadian contingent there was the warmest solicitude; but toward the war in general the attitude was that of those who have staked their hopes and their pride on the success of one side in a game. As there was no part in the management, no responsibility was felt for the conduct of the war or its outcome. Canada bore no burden such as the people of the United Kingdom bore. She stood by ready to give all the help she could; but she could only lend, she could not dispose. The effect of both successes and failures would, therefore, be different in kind as well as in degree. There was unbounded confidence, however, in those upon whom fell the responsibility of the management, and Canada looked forward to the campaign, as a campaign, with unbroken satisfaction. The opening engagements at Talana Hill and Elands Laagte realised the ideal held of the skill and prowess of British arms. The retreat on Ladysmith was a strategic move, the bearing of which would appear later. Everything was, of course, thought out beforehand and provided for. It was, consequently, with something like dismay that the reports of repeated checks and reverses

were received. Complacency disappeared when the true nature of the task and the state of preparedness to meet it were revealed. But it was no time, then, to give play to the questionings that arose. The war must be won. More troops must be offered—ten thousand, if necessary, or more. There was no hesitation and no flinching. However shaken and perplexed might be the national mind, the temper of Canadians rang clear. They may be trusted to see an undertaking through to the end. So the second contingent was sent; then the Strathconas; and then a regiment was raised to garrison Halifax in order that the Leinsters might go to the war.

The soldiers sent to the front were representative Canadians. Canada will not shirk difficulties in a road she has set out to travel. The gravity of the temporary condition, in so far as it meant that greater sacrifices might have to be made and success might be long postponed, only brought out the more resoluteness. But in that dark period, culminating in Stormberg, Magersfontein, and the Tugela, all glamour faded. With every disposition to make excuses, it was seen that the preconceptions of War Office methods and the competence of British generals must be revised, and there must be a readjustment in accordance with the new facts. From being almost entirely uncritical, Canadian opinion was becoming bluntly critical. But Lord Roberts appeared and changed the whole face of the situation.

A reaction followed; the reverses had been more trying than was realised. That brilliant stroke,

which resulted in the relief of Kimberley and the rounding up of Cronje at Paardeberg, was hailed with an enthusiasm more marked than in England. This was perhaps natural. Mere victories of the field did not produce much external demonstration in England. True pride forbids the flaunting of successes. It was the relief of Ladysmith, and particu-

"PRETORIA DAY" IN TORONTO.

larly the relief of Mafeking, which were not so much defeats of the enemy as rescues of heroic defenders, that let loose in England a riot of rejoicing. Canada was even more a spectator than a participant. She applauded every good move in the game. But news of the gallant conduct of the Canadians at Paardeberg was more quietly received than any other good

news of the war. This was as it should be. It was the deepest experience of the war for Canada, and it will have a more abiding effect than any other. The heavy losses, too, were borne with little sign. The men had done well and the cost must be met.

All demonstrations were, however, as nothing to that which greeted the premature report of the capture of Pretoria and the ending of the war. No other need be described; but to pass over this one would be to miss that in the light of which the whole previous record must be read. Feeling often surged and subsided, and opinion was now positively favourable and now sceptical. There was by no means the same consistency or coherence as in England. It was hard to tell how much was surface emotion, the mere fever of war, and how much was the drawing or propelling of great forces. Canadians had said that the war must be won. Were their hopes really bound up with it? They had shown unmistakably their concern for the conduct and safety of those who were there to represent them, for they eagerly scanned the news daily to see, first, what the Canadians had done, and took to heart every casualty and every deed of courage and endurance. But was this concern so deep that the relief, when all danger was believed to be past, would cause them to forget every restraint out of pure joy? "Pretoria Day" does not answer all these questions, but they cannot be answered without it.

The night of the 30th of May and the day following will be memorable during the life of the present generation in Canada. No one would have been so

bold as to predict what occurred, for no knowledge of the past and no study of the existing condition of public sentiment would have afforded sufficient materials for such a prediction. Unanticipated, unplanned, there was an outburst of jubilation that astonished even the heartiest participants. Canadians had a new revelation of themselves. They had not realised how deeply they had been moved by preceding events, and they had not guessed their own emotional resources. Although not universal, the celebration was so general and was everywhere so nearly of the same kind, that the phenomenon must be regarded as of real social and political significance.

The city of Toronto furnished the extreme expression. It was about half-past eleven at night when the bulletins were first posted. At that time the theatres and places of amusement were emptied and comparatively few were abroad in the streets. How the news spread is not known; but within a quarter of an hour every fire alarm bell in the city was clanging as if for a threatened holocaust, and one by one, as fast as the sextons could reach the ropes, the church bells took up the clamour; and wherever there was steam, in powerhouses, factories, and boats in the harbour, whistles screeched and roared. Sleeping Toronto awoke with a start and a gasp, while waking Toronto was already out of doors. The cause of the disturbance was surmised. In an incredibly short time the streets began to fill with a rapidly increasing crowd of both sexes, more or less fully dressed, hurrying toward the centre.

Here wild scenes were enacted. Flags, horns, and fireworks were produced from somewhere, until nearly all were provided with something to wave, or toot, or explode; bandsmen got instruments, pipers their pipes; impromptu processions were formed, bonfires lighted even in the principal thoroughfares, and fed with anything that could be found—fences, a wheelbarrow, or a cart. Every class was represented. Patriotic songs were sung; the mayor proclaimed a holiday for the morrow. It was the most spontaneous ebullition of pure good spirits the Canadian public ever experienced. After three o'clock the streets cleared almost as rapidly as they had filled, and the tumult ebbed gradually until dawn, when the flood set in again.

Work was out of the question. Many employers did not even attempt to begin the day's operations, but acted at once upon the mayor's proclamation of a holiday; others did try to get something done, but either the employees left without permission or were so distracted that it was useless to continue, and by twelve o'clock work was suspended. The schools and colleges had been dismissed. The City Hall was closed. As business offices and factories were closed the crowd swelled. Flags and bunting were everywhere; business houses and private residences vied with each other in display. The revelry continued till midnight. When, wearied at last, the crowd dispersed, it was yet with a consciousness of enthusiasm still in reserve, for the words heard on all hands were—"But wait till the boys come home."

CHAPTER II

QUESTIONS OF POLICY

THE Government of Canada did not decide to offer a contingent for service in South Africa until they had a clear popular mandate. Even after the demand for action had become clamorous, they still continued for some time to deliberate upon the advisability of such a step. The official offer from Canada was the last of all the offers from the great self-governing Colonies. For their delay, which, it is claimed, placed Canada in a false position, the Government have had to face much severe criticism. In all parts of the Empire there is, no doubt, some curiosity to know the reasons for the long deliberation and the delay. Various explanations are offered. On the one hand, it is said that the course of the Government is to be attributed to considerations of principle, to wise caution, or to concern for domestic harmony; and, on the other hand, to motives of mere party safety, to a failure to understand the temper of the people, to a lack of the qualities of leadership, or to disapprobation of the tendency of the new Imperial spirit.

If the Government did not act promptly simply because they were incompetent to meet the crisis, the

matter is only of local importance ; but if they had reasonable grounds for hesitation, these grounds must be examined. A Government will almost always see things in different perspective from that in which the people see them. They are not in the same degree subject to impulse, and the responsibility resting upon them should make them investigate in a very thorough and practical way all possible bearings of the question before them. The people of Canada did not calmly consider either existing conditions or probable consequences. Their emotions may have been a safer guide than the most impeccable logic ; but there is a chance that some essential factors may have been temporarily overlooked. No one can be sure he understands the situation until he understands the Government as well as the people. The policy of taking part in Imperial wars must be studied, as well as the readiness to take part.

How far would the sending of a contingent commit the country to the acceptance of certain great principles of national policy, which had not before been recognised principles of administration? Were these principles best for the country? Since Parliament was not in session, could a contingent be sent without doing violence to the constitution? In view of the differences of opinion among the people, what course of action would cause the least harmful results? On which side was the majority? Did that majority know its own mind, and would it stand by the Government and make up for the loss sustained by the defection of many in the minority who had been supporters? These were questions any Government

would ask and try to answer, under a heavy penalty for mistakes. They were not even definitely raised by the people.

A treatment of this aspect of the subject is rendered more difficult by the fact that Canadian Ministers have as yet put forward no very comprehensive or exhaustive defence. What they have said has been chiefly in answer to particular criticisms, and is to this extent incomplete and unsatisfactory. If we take all the utterances together, we find references to the consideration of each of the above questions and of others also. By inferences from well-known facts what is lacking could be supplied, if it were necessary, to make the treatment complete. But only a rough outline sketch need here be given, since the only object is to show, in its true proportions, the main subject of Canada's participation in the war.

Speaking in the House of Commons on March 13, 1900, Sir Wilfrid Laurier said: "What would be the condition of this country to-day if we had refused to obey the voice of public opinion? It is only too true that if we had refused, at that time, to do what was, in my judgment, our imperative duty, a most dangerous agitation would have arisen—an agitation which, according to all human probability, would have ended in a line of cleavage in this country upon racial lines. A greater calamity could never take place in Canada." In this statement of the Premier's we find the difficult problem presented by the differences of opinion in Canada, which were more serious because they corresponded in the main with race divisions. Recklessly to sacrifice the harmony

in this country would be criminal folly. The people were reckless.

It will be noticed that the Premier gives the danger of race discord as a reason for sending a contingent, and not for refusing to send it. At the time of which he spoke it was perfectly clear on which side was the majority. According to the reasoning of the Government, it was better to satisfy the majority, and remove its motives for agitation, than to prolong the strife by leaving the question an open one. But why not have offered a contingent sooner and still further have reduced the risk? Why not have taken some definite means to prevent agitation altogether? The explanation most favourable to the Government is that the other considerations before them inclined them to caution, until it was too late to ward off all bad effects. One of these considerations affected in a peculiar way their own party interests. The Liberals were returned to power in 1896 chiefly because of the great gains they made in the Province of Quebec. If they alienate the electors of Quebec, their chances of re-election will be greatly reduced. Party interest would naturally lead them to humour Quebec up to the point at which it became certain that, by continuing to do so, they would inevitably lose the support of all the other Provinces. It is at this point that a charge of partyism is made.

The other considerations before the Government must have been certain great principles of national policy. The formal participation of Canada in an Imperial demonstration due to the imminence of war, and more clearly still participation in actual warfare,

involved the following principles: First, the principle of closer relationship between the different parts of the Empire; second, the principle of sharing in the defence of Imperial interests; third, the principle of militarism in itself, it being possible to regard the event as the inauguration of a policy of greater expenditure and the more frequent occurrence of actual conflict for the people of Canada; fourth, the general principle of taking part in that which Canada had had no voice in determining, particularly as no real necessity appeared at that time for taking part at all. How far these principles had been acted upon by former Administrations, or were consistent with the professed views of the Liberal party, had to be taken into account, as well as their probable influence on future development.

Upon the first principle, that of closer relationship, in so far as it meant a drawing together in sentiment and mutual understanding, there could have been little hesitation. Even if it implied general helpfulness, there was nothing in the past history or in the present tendency of Canadian policy, to raise a doubt. The responsible leaders of Canada have consistently taken a stand upon this principle. It is true that during their long term in Opposition the leaders of the Liberal party inclined toward independence, or toward closer relations with the United States. This may not be hard to explain, when we remember that aspiration toward independence is quite as natural in a self-governing community as is the aspiration toward closer union in a British Colony; and when we remember also that the Conservative party cannot

entirely free itself from the charge of having made "loyalty" a party cry. When trade became the principal issue between the parties, and the Liberal party adopted the principle of freedom of trade, they naturally looked, and perhaps too exclusively, to the nearest and largest market. Since their advent to power in 1896 they have acted upon the principle of closer relationship with the Empire, as is shown by their tariff reduction on goods imported from Britain, their advocacy of Imperial penny postage, and in other ways. They have seemed anxious to remove any ground of attack on this score of "loyalty." Had they remained in Opposition, the discussions that would have taken place when a contingent was proposed, would have been quite different in character, and perhaps more conclusive. As things were, however, they could have had no hesitation over this first principle.

The second principle, of sharing in the work of Imperial defence, has never been either definitely adopted or definitely rejected in Canada. In 1865, just prior to Confederation, a delegation of Canadian statesmen, consisting of Sir John A. Macdonald, Sir George E. Cartier, Mr. George Brown, and Sir Alexander Galt, went to England to arrange with the Imperial Government the matter of mutual contribution for Imperial services. The Imperial Government on that occasion put their views in writing. Although this document has been regarded as confidential, it is known that it was to the effect that if Canada would agree to spend a million dollars per annum on her militia, England on her part was prepared to use her

power to maintain the interest and security of Canada. At that time nothing more was asked.

In the Confederation debates, Sir John A. Macdonald expressed the following views: "It will be year by year less a case of dependence on our part and of overruling protection on the part of the Mother Country, and more a case of healthy and cordial alliance. Instead of looking on as a merely dependent Colony, England will have in us a friendly nation to stand by her in North America in peace as in war. The people of Australia will be such another nation, and England will have this advantage if her Colonies progress under the new Colonial system, as I believe they will, that though at war with all the rest of the world, she will be able to look to the nations in alliance with her and owing allegiance to the same sovereign, who will assist in enabling her again to meet the whole world in arms as she has done before." These views of Imperial relations he maintained all through his life with deepening conviction; but it would seem that he believed the effect of "standing by England" would rather be to prevent wars against the Mother Country than to make additional wars for the Colonies. In 1884 he put the matter in this way: "It has been said we are running great risks in venturing to make common cause with England. If I know the people of Canada aright, they are willing to run those risks. But there really is no risk. When any foreign nation knows that the thirty-five million people in England and the twenty millions in the different Colonies, forming one great nation, will exert all their military and naval power in one common cause, this fact will pre-

vent possible war with England, and England will be in complete moral domination of the world, as was the Roman Empire in the days of old. But we are not, as I said before, going to count the cost."

When an occasion came, in 1885, on which a contingent might have been offered and would have been accepted, as that of New South Wales was, the Government of Sir John Macdonald offered only to provide all facilities for the enlistment by the Imperial authorities of soldiers in Canada. It is only fair to remember that about this time Canada had heavy obligations to meet at home, owing to the disturbed state of the North-West Territories and the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railway. But these obligations were not all that stood in the way. Sir John Macdonald found difficulties in the Militia Act, and in the general powers of the Canadian Government. His interpretation of these powers was, apparently, that the sending of soldiers out of the country was an Imperial act, for which Canada had no jurisdiction. So while he spoke plainly and authoritatively on the general principle, his own action did not throw any light on questions of practice.

Since 1885 Canadian statesmen have had the subject of Imperial defence presented to them in much more concrete form than ever before. On November 25, 1886, the Right Hon. Edward Stanhope, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, addressed a minute to the Governors of the Colonies under responsible government, in which he stated that, "in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the question which is at once urgent and capable of

useful consideration at the present time is that of organisation for military defence." The result of this suggestion was the Colonial Conference of 1887, which settled nothing as far as Canada was concerned, although Australian contributions for naval defence may be traced to it. Definite contributions from the Colonies toward maintaining the army and navy have from that time been more and more strongly urged by a very influential and increasing party in England. To the proposals of the leaders of this movement, among whom are numbered members of the present Imperial Government, no responsible Canadian statesman has ever agreed. Sir Charles Tupper has vigorously combated the idea. He opposed it in England when the Imperial Federation League was organised, and he has steadily continued to oppose it. The position he has taken is that by building the Canadian Pacific Railway, by improving harbours, by subsidising steamship lines, by preserving peace in Canada, by recruiting and drilling a force of volunteers sufficient to insure peace and also to make the nucleus of a force that could defend against invasion, and in other ways by strengthening and improving this country, Canada is already making a yearly contribution to the effective strength of the Empire. He will not accept the principle of taxation for a general defence fund. At the same time he has always held that Canada should, and would, come to the help of the other parts of the Empire in any emergency.

Sir Wilfred Laurier is not publicly on record to the same extent as Sir Charles Tupper upon this

question but it is known that in 1897, at the time of the Jubilee, a more or less complete scheme of Imperial defence, based upon contributions by the Colonies, was laid before him, and that he did not give his assent, on the ground that he did not believe in large specific military expenditure for Canada, and also on ground almost identical with that taken by Sir Charles Tupper, that Canada was already contributing in indirect, but very real ways to the strengthening of the Empire. When in England at that time he, however, on June 18th, stated at the Imperial Institute his position on the general principle as follows: "England has proved at all times that she can fight her own battles, but if a day were ever to come when England was in danger, let the bugle sound, let the fire be lit on the hills, and in all parts of the Colonies, though we may not be able to do much, whatever we can do will be done by the Colonies to help her." This statement he interpreted during the recent debates in Parliament as meaning that the Colonies would come to the aid of England whenever there was a "life-and-death struggle."

As far, therefore, as a policy for Canada upon Imperial defence has been formed at all, it is contained in what has been said by these three leading statesmen, read in the light of their actions. It will be seen that they agree that Canada will be found ready to take her share on any occasion when there is serious danger, but assent has never been given to the proposition that she should contribute as a regular thing, or when great danger was not shown. The war in South Africa was not looked upon as a

serious war; and it was a legitimate ground of hesitation to consider how far Canada's contribution to it would make a new departure in her policy.

The third principle, that of militarism for Canada, coincides in part with the preceding, and is partly distinct. To take part in the South African war, which was not regarded at first as a really serious war, might be to set a precedent for taking part in many other wars, which might be even less serious. So not only was it a question whether Canada should contribute to Imperial defence, but also whether she should begin to take part in any wars that were not absolutely necessary for the protection of the essential interests.

Stated as a general proposition, the fourth principle, that Canada should take part in that which she had had no voice in bringing about, and would have no voice in controlling, might well give pause to those in whom the feeling of nationhood is strong. Canada was not consulted by the British Government at any time during the dealings with the South African problem. Enough was not known to enable a just judgment to be formed, even by members of Parliament. It might be taken for granted that the course of the Imperial Government was wise and right. But actually to go to war in such circumstances was too much like adopting the attitude known in the United States as "standing behind the Administration," whether what was done was right or not, to accord with the dignity of a community that has claimed to be a nation. Either pains should be taken to become satisfied, independently, on the

justice of a cause, or a necessity for rallying to the defence of the Empire, which is quite a different problem, should appear.

It is reasonably certain the Government recognised that all these great principles were at stake, and that the decision arrived at would be of critical importance. That their final action was due to a careful judgment upon questions of principle is, however, extremely doubtful. The insistent demands of a majority of the people, the danger to domestic harmony of longer delay, and the positive state of expectancy of the Imperial authorities, probably made the decision one of expediency rather than of principle.

CHAPTER III

GOVERNMENT ACTION

On July 31, 1899, within a few days of the close of the regular session of Parliament, Sir Wilfrid Laurier asked leave, with the unanimous consent of the House of Commons, to interrupt the regular course of business in order to offer certain resolutions, which he believed were rendered appropriate by the state of things existing in a distant country under the suzerainty of Her Majesty. These resolutions were as follows:—

"1. Resolved, That this House has viewed with regret the complications which have arisen in the Transvaal Republic, of which Her Majesty is Suzerain, from the refusal to accord to Her Majesty's subjects, now settled in that region, any adequate participation in its government;

"2. Resolved, That this House has learned with still greater regret that the condition of things there existing has resulted in intolerable oppression, and has produced great and dangerous excitement among several classes of Her Majesty's subjects in Her South African possessions;

"3. Resolved, That this House, representing a people which has largely succeeded by the adoption of the principle of conceding equal political rights to every portion of the population, in harmonising estrangements and in producing general content with the existing system of government, desires to express its sympathy with the efforts of Her Majesty's Imperial authorities to obtain for the subjects of Her Majesty who have taken up their abode in the Transvaal such measures of justice and political recognition as may be found necessary to secure them in the full possession of equal rights and liberties."

On his reasons for introducing the resolutions the Premier said: "If I be asked, What is the reason of this expression of sympathy, what object would it serve, what result would it effect? I simply answer: The object to be sought is that we should extend to our fellow-countrymen in South Africa the right hand of good fellowship, that we should assure them that our heart is with them, and that in our judgment they are in the right; the object would be to assure the Imperial authorities, who have taken in hand the cause of the Uitlanders, that on that question we are at one with them, and that they are also in the right—and perhaps the effect might be also that this mark of sympathy, of universal sympathy, extending from continent to continent and encircling the globe might cause wiser and more humane counsels to prevail in the Transvaal and possibly avert the awful arbitrament of war."

The Premier also read a letter from Sir Charles Tupper, the leader of the Opposition, in which the

latter stated that he thought we were "bound to give all the aid in our power to Her Majesty's Government in the present crisis." The resolutions were seconded by Mr. Foster, representing the Opposition, and supported in short speeches by Mr. McNeill and Mr. N. Clarke Wallace. There was no discussion. Sir Wilfrid Laurier then moved, seconded by Mr. Foster, "that a copy of these resolutions be transmitted to Her Majesty's principal Secretary of State for the Colonies by the Speaker of this House." The motion was agreed to, all the members rising to their feet, and singing the National Anthem. Similar resolutions were passed by the Senate, the speech of Hon. David Mills, the Minister of Justice, in moving their adoption, being the only one in either House that showed any wide knowledge of the facts.

These resolutions are the beginning from which the course of official action may be traced. As Parliament was prorogued a few days later, and did not meet again until the following February, there is no other Parliamentary action to record previous to the despatch of troops. On July 13th Lieut.-Col. Hughes had called the attention of Parliament to Queensland's offer of a contingent, and had urged the Government to make a like offer on behalf of Canada. At that time the matter was passed over with a few words expressing the hope that the differences would be adjusted without a resort to war. As has already been intimated, a delegate from the South African League then visited Ottawa and approached both parties with a view to securing the introduction of resolutions. Press despatches from England at

about the same time conveyed the idea, which was no doubt correct, that such action would be very acceptable to the Imperial Government. Sir Charles Tupper has publicly stated that he was unwilling to introduce resolutions from the Opposition benches, and instead of doing anything that might prejudice the matter by giving it the appearance of partyism, he went personally to Sir Wilfrid Laurier with one of the above-mentioned press despatches in his hand, and talked the question over with him. Sir Wilfrid Laurier said he was prepared to introduce resolutions on the 31st inst., and as Sir Charles Tupper could not be present on that date a draft was sent for his approval.

What immediately followed belongs rather to popular agitation than to Government action; but the attitude of the public was being brought to the attention of the Government by the newspaper press, by occasional memorials, and also by the offers for service in South Africa, which were made through the General Officer Commanding. Some of the principal offers thus received were the following:—

Lieut.-Col. S. Hughes, M.P., Lindsay, Ontario, commanding 45th Battalion, offering to enrol or command a regiment or brigade of Canadians.

Lieut.-Col. Roland W. Gregory, St. Catharines, Ontario, commanding 2nd Dragoons, offering services of that regiment; this offer was made on June 20th.

Lieut.-Col. T. H. Lloyd, Newmarket, Ontario, commanding 12th Battalion York Rangers, offering services of that battalion.

Lieut.-Col. J. Hughes, Port Hope, Ontario, com-

manding 46th Battalion, placing the services of that corps at the disposal of the Government.

Major George Thomas Cooke, of the 28th Battalion, Stratford, Ontario, offering to raise a Company in the County of Perth.

Lieut.-Col. J. P. Cooke, Montreal, commanding 1st Prince of Wales's Fusiliers, offering services of that corps, which he was ready to increase to 1,000 men.

Major W. A. Weeks, commanding Charlottetown (Prince Edward Island) Engineer Company, offering that company.

Lieut.-Col. C. S. Ellis, Sarnia, Ontario, commanding 27th Battalion, offering his battalion.

Lieut.-Col. C. W. Schaffner, Melvern Square, N.S., commanding 69th Battalion, offering his services as well as those of the other officers and men of his corps.

Lieut.-Col. H. M. Campbell, Sussex, N.B., commanding 8th Hussars, offering to raise a volunteer squadron from his regiment.

Lieut.-Col. J. B. Checkley, Prescott, Ontario, commanding 56th Battalion, offering services of that corps.

Taking them at their full value, according to the establishments of the various corps or the definite number stated, these offers aggregate 4,500 men; and there were many other offers from individual officers and men, and from smaller groups.

Toward the end of September Sir Charles Tupper put himself at the head of the movement, by coming out unmistakably for the sending of a contingent by the Government and tendering his support in Parlia-

SIR CHARLES TUPPER.

ment for a ratification of anything it might be necessary to do. He had just returned from England. While in England he had been in correspondence with Mr. Chamberlain, and could state with assurance that the contingent would be 'warmly welcomed by the British Government." The July resolutions were pointed to as sufficient preliminary authorisation. Unfortunately, nearly everything in Canada is taken up in a partisan spirit, and even this important national subject did not escape on either side some partisan admixture.

So far the Government had been silent. They did not attempt to lead public opinion. The situation was difficult, not only because of the principles involved, but also because of uncertainty as to the attitude of some sections of the country. But an official utterance was precipitated by the publication, on October 3rd, of an article in the *Canadian Military Gazette*. The *Gazette* is a military paper, under private control. Special pains were taken to give publicity to this particular article. Advance proofs were sent to the daily papers, which published the article simultaneously with its appearance in the *Gazette*, prefacing it with some such remark as that the *Gazette* was "in close touch with the Headquarters Staff at Ottawa." The article began: "If war should be commenced in the Transvaal—which seems most probable—the offer of a force from the Canadian militia for service will be made by the Canadian Government." There followed details of the composition of the force and the methods of organisation. Was this article merely the guess of

the editors of the *Gazette*, who then wished to make the most of a startling piece of "news"? Did it represent the intentions of the Government? Or was it prompted by some one at headquarters, or elsewhere, for the purpose of forcing the issue? As Sir Wilfrid Laurier, on behalf of the Government, immediately disavowed it, the conclusion gained ground that it represented the views of Major-General Hutton, the Imperial officer holding the position of General Officer Commanding. If this was the case and the latter was responsible for the publication of the article, it carried the suggestion of a conflict between the Imperial element in the administration of the Militia and the Canadian Government, which if followed up might lead to interesting discoveries.

At this point an inquiry as to the attitude of the Imperial Government and the representatives of that Government seems pertinent. It may be said at the outset that no direct or circumstantial evidence is obtainable to connect Major-General Hutton with the article in the *Military Gazette*. The article may have been a rendering of what was believed to be Major-General Hutton's opinion. To imagine, however, that he would deliberately arrange for the publication of such a statement is to imagine him ready to resort to very daring, and rather questionable measures in order to force the hand of the Government. This explanation is quite untenable. But there is no doubt that Major-General Hutton had plans all ready for the raising of a contingent. Like a good soldier, he was prepared beforehand. If a knowledge of this

fact transpired, journalistic enterprise would account for what followed. It may be thought that this is giving prominence to a trivial incident, but it was far from trivial in its effects. It caused an important Government declaration ; and because it was supposed to make an exposure of differences between the Government and the G.O.C., it helped to bring to a head the differences that really existed, which ultimately resulted in Major-General Hutton's resignation.

At a farewell banquet tendered him by the Militia officers of Ottawa, after mentioning encouraging features, Major-General Hutton said : "I should, however, feel more hopeful of the future of Canada if the Government had ever shown active interest in our recent efforts for a higher efficiency, or indicated their approval of the principles upon which our efforts are based. I would ask you, however, in all seriousness, not to suppose that a severance of my ties with you is due to petty misunderstandings with the Minister of Militia upon minor issues of appointments or disciplinary matters, but that it is due to broader, deeper, and vastly more important issues." What were these issues? Undoubtedly, as he saw them, they were the principles underlying the new doctrine of co-operative Imperial defence. As the Government saw the issues between them, they related rather to the methods adopted by the G.O.C. in attempting to apply this doctrine in practice.

To create a comprehensive system of co-operative Imperial defence is one of the chief objects of the present British Colonial policy. The Colonies are

often congratulated upon taking the lead on Imperial questions; but if this is true in anything, it certainly is not true in Imperial defence. In his Birmingham speech of May 13, 1898, Mr. Chamberlain said: "We stand alone, and we may be confronted with such a combination as that I have indicated to you. What is the first duty of a Government under these circumstances? I say, without hesitation, that the first duty is to draw all parts of the Empire closer together, to infuse into them a spirit of united and of Imperial patriotism. We have not neglected that primary duty. We have pursued it steadfastly, and with results that are patent to all the world. Never before in the history of the British Empire have the ties which connected us with our great Colonies and dependencies been stronger; never before has the sense of common interests in trade and in defence and in war—never before has the sense of these interests been more strongly felt or more cordially expressed." Firmly believing for years that this is the first duty, Mr. Chamberlain and others have set themselves to fulfil it. The common interests "in defence and in war" have been especially engaging their attention. The magnificent display of the naval and military resources of the Empire, given in 1897, was partly for a warning to the foreign world and partly for an arousing of the Colonies. Mr. Chamberlain eloquently applied the lessons in his speech, on June 24th of that year, to the Colonial Premiers. He made diplomatic suggestions. Upon one point he said: "That, however, is a matter which, like everything else which I am putting before you, is not a recommendation

which has any pressure behind it; it is merely a suggestion to be taken up by you voluntarily if it commends itself to your minds." But the Imperial Government is too wise and too much in earnest to have waited passively ever since for entirely spontaneous responses.

As far as Canada is concerned, the matter was followed up by the sending out, in the summer of 1898, of a committee of military and naval experts to study conditions and consider questions relating to the organisation of the militia and the improvements of the defences as factors in the defence of the Empire; to consider also how to obtain that uniformity in the training, equipment, and terms of service of Militia which would fit them to co-operate with the Imperial forces in cases of emergency; and to report upon the possibility of recruiting in Canada for the Imperial army and navy, and also upon the advisability of an interchange between Canadian and Imperial troops for service outside of Canada. In fact, they were sent out to investigate just the plans of co-operation which Mr. Chamberlain had suggested to the Premiers. It may not be without significance that the new Governor-General, Lord Minto, appointed in July of that year, was a soldier. It was then, also, that Colonel Hutton was selected for the post of General Officer Commanding.

Major-General E. T. H. Hutton has proved himself a man of exceptional capacity. That he is a thorough soldier he had plainly demonstrated, even before the South African war. But it would seem that he is more than a mere soldier. He has large purposes

before him. If we may judge by his record in Australia, as well as in Canada, the great object to which he has devoted himself is co-operative Imperial defence. In a paper he read at a meeting of the Royal Colonial Institute in April, 1898, he indicated the lines upon which he thought it wise to work. A study of this paper and the discussion it evoked leaves the impression that Major-General Hutton is one of the most practical of all who are engaged upon this problem. He thought his audience would hold him justified in treating of such a subject if, "by explaining a system which has been officially recognised as sound, I have even in a small degree shown how the words of the Secretary of State for the Colonies (on Imperial patriotism and the presenting of a united and unbroken front to all the Empire's foes) may be brought into practice, and how the varied streams of our National and Colonial existence may be conducted into one channel, where their mingled waters can flow on together with regenerating strength and grandeur to the end of time."

With this object in view, and in this spirit, he undertook his duties in Canada. He was in a sense a political agent and not only a drillmaster. Every opportunity was taken advantage of to forward the cause, by methods of organisation and by personal influence. Yet he was so far from being an agitator that few, if any, realised the work he was doing. The Government would naturally feel, if they did not see, that he was aiming at more than the mere carrying out of any policy they might lay down. If they began to resent this, on principle, few Colonials

would wonder at it. It was in the line of his work to note everything that could affect just such a crisis as arose over the South African trouble. He might even know better than the Government what the Militia were ready to do, and how far public opinion in some quarters had been prepared. If, in the circumstances, he not only desired that a contingent should be offered, but was positive that it could be raised, and would be approved by a majority of the people, he might easily appear to exceed his functions. A sense of friction there must have been, for Major-General Hutton left Ottawa on a trip of inspection to the Pacific coast on September 26th, and remained away from headquarters during all the time the contingent was being organised, returning only in time to be present when it left Quebec.

Under these conditions the publication of the article in the *Military Gazette* would not help matters. If the Government and the G.O.C. do not agree upon principles or methods, it is a serious matter at any time. But if the opinion of the G.O.C., in opposition to the Government, can appear in print at a critical moment, it is exceedingly serious. This does not mean, either that Major-General Hutton had any intention of letting his views be known, or that the Government thought he had anything to do with it. But the accident would reveal in a new light to the Government the difficulties of a situation in which the Government were responsible to the people for the policy of military administration, and yet the administration itself was largely in the hands of a masterful man with fixed purposes. As soon as

the Government persuaded themselves that this was the situation, the resignation or recall of Major-General Hutton became inevitable. The new G.O.C. has been appointed for one year only. After that a Canadian may hold the office, and the people may approve.

When Major-General Hutton was leaving this country he said, as we have seen, that the Government had not indicated their approval of the principles upon which his efforts were based, and that the misunderstandings were upon large issues. In October, 1898, shortly after his arrival in Canada, he was interviewed by a representative of the Toronto *Mail and Empire*, who directed his attention to reports cabled from London that the appointment of Lord Minto as Governor-General, and his own appointment as General Officer Commanding, were due to the desire on the part of the British authorities to develop a scheme of Imperial defence in Canada. His answer was discreet: "Any change, alteration, or development which may be conceived or carried out as regards the Canadian forces is purely one for the Canadian Government. The General Officer Commanding carries out the policy indicated to him by the people speaking through their representatives." If we compare this statement with the former one, we see how far he had travelled in his view of the nature of his work in this country. When leaving, he admitted having worked upon principles which the Canadian Government had never approved. In order to understand this, it is necessary to realise that he considered the object before

him as supremely important, and the scheme upon which he was working as one officially recognised in England as sound. It would appear that the Government were not conscious of having any quarrel with him upon his ultimate object. Presumably they would be ready, as every Colonial Government would be, to consider any scheme he might present, although their official representative had not fully accepted the principle when in London in 1897, and although no responsible leader in Canada had ever accepted it. But if in promoting the object to which he was devoted the G.O.C. both insisted upon the strict letter of his powers and assumed greater ones than the Government thought consistent with their right of control, a breach would certainly be made. Several instances of such assumption were brought up during the last session of Parliament. Since then General Orders have been issued to prevent their recurrence in some classes of cases. Because these methods seemed necessary to him to carry out his purposes, and secure the highest military efficiency, the G.O.C. would regard the differences as being upon principles and issues; while the Government would refuse to accept the methods, no matter what the principles and issues might be.

In answer to a question in Parliament on February 19, 1900, Sir Wilfrid Laurier stated the position of the Government as follows: "Yes, the attention of the Government has been drawn to that portion of Major-General Hutton's speech mentioned in the question, and to other portions also, equally repre-

hensible. There have been differences of opinion between the Government and General Hutton. The Government were disposed, now that he had been recalled for service in Africa, to let these differences pass without any comment. The Government had reason to believe that this was in accordance with General Hutton's views, and therefore when the subject was brought up in the House a few days ago the Government refrained from making any statement on the subject. There is now no reason to follow that course any further. General Hutton in his speech has insinuated that his differences with the Government are due to a desire on the part of the latter to exercise improper political influence on the militia organisations of the country. I desire, on the part of the Government, to say that there is absolutely no foundation for such a statement. The causes of difference between the Government and General Hutton were not over any broad questions of general policy; the causes of difference were that General Hutton was insubordinate and indiscreet, and deliberately ignored the authority of the Minister in the administration of the department. The Government desire to state that while they will, at all times, be prepared to give the most careful consideration to any representations which may be made by the Officer Commanding the Militia, it must be distinctly understood that any such officer, on accepting the position in question, becomes, from that time, an officer in the employment of, and subject in all respects to, the Government of Canada, and that he is to be regarded as the adviser, but not

as entitled to control the Department of Militia. The Government are responsible to the Parliament and people of Canada for the due administration of each and every branch of the public service, and they would be derelict in their duty if they were to permit any subordinate official, under any circumstances, to take upon himself to disregard the instructions he may receive from the constitutional head of his department."

It has not been the intention here to enter into the particulars of the differences between the Government and Major-General Hutton, but only to point out what were the latter's standpoint and attitude as one of the representatives of the Imperial authorities.

But this was not all. On October 3rd Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed to Lord Minto as follows: "Secretary of State for War and Commander-in-Chief desire to express high appreciation of signal exhibition of patriotic spirit of people of Canada shown by offers to serve in South Africa, and to furnish following information to assist organisation of force offered into units suitable for military requirements. Firstly, units should consist of about 125 men; secondly, may be infantry, mounted infantry, or cavalry; in view of numbers already available, infantry most, cavalry least, serviceable; thirdly, all should be armed with ·303 rifles or carbines, which can be supplied by Imperial Government if necessary; fourthly, all must provide own equipment, and mounted troops own horses; fifthly, not more than one captain and three subalterns each unit. Whole

force may be commanded by officer not higher than major. In considering numbers which can be employed, Secretary of State for War, guided by nature of offers, by desire that each Colony should be fairly represented, and limits necessary if force is to be fully utilised by available staff as integral portion of Imperial forces, would gladly accept four units. Conditions as follows: Troops to be disembarked at port of landing South Africa fully equipped at cost of Colonial Government or volunteers. From date of disembarkation Imperial Government will provide pay at Imperial rates, supplies and ammunition, and will defray expenses of transport back to Canada, and pay wound pensions and compassionate allowances at Imperial rates. Troops to embark not later than 31st October, proceeding direct to Cape Town for orders. Inform accordingly all who have offered to raise volunteers."

As we have seen, up to this time there had not only been no Government offer, but all that came before the Imperial Government was the offers of some individuals. Major-General Hutton, as was quite proper, insisted that all these offers should be transmitted through him to the Governor-General in Council. Acknowledgments from the Home authorities were made to Lord Minto, and through him along the regular channels of communication. The incidental effect of this procedure was to keep the movement within the national military system. When Mr. Chamberlain telegraphed that the Secretary of State for War would "gladly accept four units," he addressed the acceptance to the Governor-

General. This again was quite proper. But the Governor-General could act only through his advisers, the Canadian Ministers. The interesting effect of all this was that the Canadian Ministers were called upon to act. They had only three courses open to them: to undertake the work of organisation and equip a contingent; to decline to do so, that is, to decline to give effect to the acceptance formally transmitted; or to resign. Another course might be thought possible, that of notifying the individuals who had offered and advising them to unite their forces and agree upon the number of men each should raise and upon the positions each should occupy. This course is suggested by the last sentence in the telegram, "Inform accordingly all who have offered to raise volunteers." For obvious reasons this was, however, out of the question. If the Government went so far as formally to approve of organised military forces going out of the country for a particular purpose, and notified individuals that they were at liberty to organise such forces and lead them, and gave instructions as to how to proceed, they would have to go farther. The Imperial Government might directly notify British subjects that their services would be accepted; but if the Canadian Government, as a Government, appeared at all, every consideration of policy would force them to undertake the whole work. It was quite another matter to use the machinery of the Militia Department to raise the contingent provided for by the munificence of Lord Strathcona, for when this was done the Government had already

established its position by sending two official contingents.

The despatch was in effect a request for an official contingent, and the Government so understood it. Writing on October 14th to Sir Charles Tupper, who had objected to allowing the Imperial Government to bear such a large share of the expense and pay of the men, Sir Wilfrid Laurier used these words: "You will see by reading this despatch that the Government has faithfully accepted the request and adhered to a plan of campaign prepared by the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief." Again, addressing a public meeting at Bowmanville on October 17th, Sir Wilfrid Laurier said of the same despatch: "The other day we received a despatch from the Colonial Secretary embodying the expectations of the British authorities as to what we should do in respect to the aid that the Colony should give." In a published letter, dated November 1st, Mr. Tarte spoke more plainly: "It is very well to say that the people of Canada, or of other Colonies, have this time made a voluntary offer. In point of fact the Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a circular to all the Colonies, the meaning of which is an invitation to send troops. In my opinion such an invitation means practically a request." It should be added that, later, in the House of Commons in March, 1900, Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, in answer to Mr. Bourassa: "No, we were not forced by England; we were not forced by Mr. Chamberlain or by Downing Street to do what we did. . . . We acted in the full independence of our sovereign power. What we did

we did of our own free will." Of course the Government exercised its free will. It need not have complied with the invitation. But a different shape was given to its field of choices, and different consequences were attached.

An uncertain factor, too, was introduced; for it was doubtful what the Governor-General might consider to be his duty in the circumstances. Some remarks made by him to the contingent as it was leaving Quebec, and a few days later, at a meeting of the Caledonian Society in Montreal, show his attitude. To the contingent he said that they "represented the manhood of the Dominion from west to east, and above all represented the spontaneous offer of the people of Canada, British-born and French-Canadians, to the Mother Country. The people of Canada had shown that they had no inclination to discuss the quibbles of Colonial responsibility. They had unmistakably asked that their loyal offers be made known, and rejoiced in their gracious acceptance. In so doing surely they had opened a new chapter in the history of our Empire. They freely made their military gift to the Imperial cause, to share the privations and dangers and glories of the Imperial army. They had insisted on giving vent to an expression of sentimental Imperial unity, which might perhaps hereafter prove more binding than any written constitution." To the Caledonian Society he is reported to have said: "As regards the Canadian contingent for the Transvaal, it goes out because you insisted upon its going, and I am very glad you did so. Its going forth marks a

new epoch in the history of this country, and I am proud that Canada is to be represented along with the troops from the Motherland and the Empire's Colonies at the seat of war. The contingent is a credit to the Dominion. It is a capable force, and will undoubtedly give a good account of itself. If an emergency should arise in the near future demanding the despatch to South Africa of another detachment of troops from Canada, I am sure that I am but voicing the sentiments of every one here when I say that Canada will willingly supply it."

It would be unfair to jump to the conclusion that the War Office and the Colonial Office deliberately tried to force the Canadian Government. But such a splendid opportunity for making a beginning of Imperial co-operation could not be neglected; and official contingents were required, and not the services of individual volunteers, in order to constitute real Imperial co-operation. And it cannot be supposed that, even in the rush of business and while preparing despatches for all the Colonies, some of which had offered and some had not, Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Chamberlain did not appreciate what would be the effect of putting the matter in the shape they did. In a memorandum to the Colonial Office, upon which Mr. Chamberlain's telegram to Lord Minto was based, the War Office said: "From Canada no definite offer has, as yet, reached Lord Lansdowne, but he understands that 1,200 men are anxious to volunteer. From Canada Lord Lansdowne would be glad to accept four units of 125 men each." Mr. Chamberlain sent a copy of this memorandum to

Lord Minto by mail on October 5th, with a short covering letter, in which he said: "I have now the honour to transmit to you, for the information of your Ministers, copy of a letter from the War Office on which that telegram was based." He was sending, "for the information of the Canadian Ministers," a copy of the memorandum which recorded the fact that they had made no offer; and, sent through the Governor-General, these communications called for action by the Canadian Government.

To point out these things is not to condemn the Imperial Government, nor to suggest that they transgressed the bounds of wisdom or propriety. It means only that Mr. Chamberlain and others are not academical Imperialists, but rather practical men, who use means as well as frame policies. They are statesmen and not idealists. Events may prove that it would have been a stupendous blunder not to clinch the occasion. Perhaps what has already happened has abundantly proved it. At the same time, nothing is to be gained by blinking these patent facts. If the situation is to be looked at at all, let it be looked at with open eyes. English Imperialists have been working for years to bring about Imperial co-operation in defence; they did not stop working just when they had the chance to accomplish something signal.

If hasty conclusions must be avoided in the case of the Imperial authorities, they must be quite as scrupulously avoided in the case of the Canadian Government. There is nothing to show that their decision would have been anywise different, either

in its nature or in the time at which it was reached, if there had been no special conditions such as those to which reference has just been made. The Government did not make any answer to Mr. Chamberlain's telegram until October 13th, by which time the conditions had been simplified. They had the great questions of principle and the equally vexing ones of expediency to settle. If the attitude of the Imperial authorities made some questions of expediency more simple, it would inevitably lead them to weigh the questions of principle more carefully. But this is a break in the current of history.

It was on October 3rd that the article in the *Military Gazette* announced that the Government had decided to offer a contingent in the event of war. On the same day Sir Wilfrid Laurier gave an interview to the Ottawa correspondent of the Toronto *Globe*, the leading Liberal newspaper of the Dominion, on the subject. This interview appeared on October 4th as follows: "There exists a great deal of misconception in the country regarding the powers of the Government in the present case. As I understand the Militia Act—and I may say that I have given it some study of late—our volunteers are enrolled to be used in the defence of the Dominion. They are Canadian troops, to be used to fight for Canada's defence. Perhaps the most widespread misapprehension is that they cannot be sent out of Canada. To my mind it is clear that occasion might arise when they might be sent to a foreign land to fight. To postulate a case: Suppose that Spain should declare war upon Great Britain. Spain has,

or had, a navy, and that navy might be being got ready to assail Canada as part of the Empire. Sometimes the best method of defending one's self is to attack, and in that case Canadian soldiers might certainly be sent to Spain, and it is quite certain that they legally might be so despatched to the Iberian Peninsula. The case of the South African Republic is not analogous. There is no menace to Canada, and, although we may be willing to contribute troops, I do not see how we can do so. Then again, how could we do so without Parliament's granting us the money? We simply could not do anything. In other words, we should have to summon Parliament. The Government of Canada is restricted in its powers. It is responsible to Parliament, and it can do very little without the permission of Parliament. There is no doubt as to the attitude of the Government on all questions that mean menace to British interests, but in this present case our limitations are very clearly defined. And so it is that we have not offered a Canadian contingent to the Home authorities. The Militia Department duly transmitted individual offers to the Imperial Government, and the reply from the War Office, as published in Saturday's *Globe*, shows their attitude on the question. As to Canada's furnishing a contingent, the Government has not discussed the question, for the reasons which I have stated—reasons which, I think, must easily be understood by every one who understands the constitutional law on the question. The statement in the *Military Gazette*, published this morning, is a pure invention."

It is practically certain the Government had not received Mr. Chamberlain's despatch when this interview was given; and so it cannot be read as an indirect answer to it.

On the points of constitutional law we need not linger. They are not unimportant: the Militia Act is a very imperfect instrument and must be revised; and constitutional procedure should be observed. But back of these points there were more momentous ones. Had the Government been united upon the chief points of principle and expediency, they would have called Parliament and have removed, or got around, the constitutional difficulties. The expense would have been fully justified. But to have called Parliament would have been to give the subject a place the Government perhaps hesitated to give it. Public excitement was not yet at fever heat. A special session might have seen the parties outbidding each other, with the result that the country would have been committed farther than the Government, or indeed any one else at that time, thought wise. Besides, Parliament could not have been met without a policy. The Government were unready, and, therefore, Parliament was not called. It was not because Parliament had not been called that the Government were unready. Still, it must be admitted that the burden upon the Government was greater than it would have been if, as in the Australian Colonies, Parliament had been in regular session.

On October 7th Sir Wilfrid Laurier left Ottawa to attend a civic function in Chicago, which had been given an international character, and at which he had

agreed to deliver an address long before difficulties arose at home. Between October 4th and October 12th, when Sir Wilfrid Laurier returned from Chicago, public agitation raged alarmingly. The contents of Mr. Chamberlain's despatch had not been given to the public, and as far as there was argument at all it was concerned with the principles stated in the above interview. Mr. Tarte and other French-Canadian spokesmen held that nothing should be done without Parliamentary sanction; and the majority would concede no sufficient ground for delay, but cried for action. By this time three things stood out above all others: a decided majority of the people was bound to have a contingent go; race animosity was increasing fast; and a state of war existed in South Africa. The last materially altered the conditions; and the two first were then above dispute. It would have been sad irony if the support of Canada, which in its moral form had been considered appropriate in July because of the excellent results in this country in harmonising races, had been allowed to cause rupture. Upon these three points the Government have rested their defence against those who have still maintained that no action should have been taken until Parliament authorised it, and against those who have charged them with weakness and inconsistency. One part of this case has been best put by Hon. Mr. Mills, the Minister of Justice, in his speech in the Senate on February 6, 1900. He said: "Honourable gentlemen know right well that the expenditure for military, as for other purposes, is under the control

of Parliament, not under the control of the Administration. There were two things that presented themselves to the minds of the Administration at the time. One was to call Parliament together and obtain its sanction for a proposition to send troops to South Africa. The other was to await such a development of public opinion as would justify them in undertaking to send the contingent, and to send a second contingent, which we did as soon as public opinion was sufficiently expressed. I say we required one or the other as our justification—either the approval of Parliament or the general sanction of the political sovereignty of this country from which Parliament derives its existence. Now, there was such an expression of opinion in this country as to justify the Government in the course which they took. We knew well that the Government had no legal authority to propose to send a contingent or propose meeting the expenses of the contingent, otherwise than it felt sure that by a bill of indemnity Parliament would hold it harmless from all expenditure which might be so incurred; and so we adopted a rule, which has been adopted in emergencies in England, and that is the constitutional rule of seeking the support of public opinion in anticipation of the approval which will be subsequently given by Parliament."

A Cabinet meeting was called directly Sir Wilfrid Laurier returned from Chicago and after deliberating for the greater part of two days, the following Order in Council was passed, on October 13th :—

"The Committee of the Privy Council have had

under consideration a despatch, dated October 3rd, 1899, from the Right Honourable Mr. Chamberlain.

"The Right Hon. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, to whom the said despatch was referred, observes that the Colonial Secretary, in answer to the offers which have been sent to him from different parts of Canada expressing the willingness and anxiety of Canadians to serve Her Majesty's Government in the war which for a long time has been threatening with the Transvaal Republic, and which, unfortunately, has actually commenced, enunciates the conditions under which such offers may be accepted by the Imperial authorities. Those conditions may be practically summed up in the statement that a certain number of volunteers, by units of 125 men, with a few officers, will be accepted to serve in the British Army now operating in South Africa, the moment they reach the Coast, provided the expense of their equipment and transportation to South Africa is defrayed, either by themselves or by the Colonial Government.

"The Prime Minister, in view of the well-known desire of a great many Canadians who are ready to take service under such conditions, is of opinion that the moderate expenditure which would thus be involved for the equipment and transportation of such volunteers may readily be undertaken by the Government of Canada without summoning Parliament, especially as such an expenditure, under such circumstances, cannot be regarded as a departure from the well-known principles of constitutional government and Colonial practice, nor construed as a precedent for future action.

"Already, under similar conditions, New Zealand has sent two companies, Queensland is about to send 250 men, and West Australia and Tasmania are sending 125 men each.

"The Prime Minister, therefore, recommends that out of the stores now available in the Militia Department, the Government undertake to equip a certain number of volunteers, not to exceed 1,000 men, and to provide for their transportation from this country to South Africa, and that the Minister of Militia make all necessary arrangements to the above effect.

"The committee advise that Your Excellency be moved to forward a certified copy of this minute to the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

"All of which is respectfully submitted for Your Excellency's approval."

While, by grammatical construction, what is not to be construed as a precedent is evidently expenditure by the Government without Parliamentary authority, it is clear on many grounds that the Government considered no principle finally settled by their action, and, therefore, no precedent created upon principle. They met an emergency. The will of the people must prevail; but if new principles of administration are sought, they have yet to be formulated.

Lord Minto cabled to Mr. Chamberlain: "Much pleasure in telling you that my Government offers 1,000 infantry on organisation proposed in your telegram of the 3rd October."

When the decision was thus made and announced

all hesitation disappeared, and the Government threw themselves energetically into the work of preparation for the despatch of troops. No prompting was needed for the offer of a second contingent; and a third and a fourth would have been as readily sent.

Opinions will differ as to the motives of the Government, their wisdom and their competence. They stand to be judged by the people of Canada, by the people of the Empire, and by the course of those mighty movements which pass the final verdict upon individuals who have essayed to lead or obstruct. The occasion has furnished some precedents. It may be that one of the most important of these is the deliberation of a Government in the face of the strongest influences that can arise to sweep along, in a splendid, but unsounded, channel, the peoples of this Empire.

The word of the Government, through the mouth of its Premier, is this: "What we have done, we have done in the plenitude, in the majesty of our Colonial, legislative independence. I claim for Canada this, that, in the future, Canada shall be at liberty to act or not to act, to interfere or not to interfere, to do just as she pleases, and that she shall reserve to herself the right to judge whether or not there is cause for her to act."

CHAPTER IV

RECRUITING AND DESPATCH OF TROOPS

THE enrolling, equipping, and despatch of the first Canadian contingent was a remarkable achievement. Suppose a Government with headquarters at Berlin should undertake to raise an entirely new regiment, and should choose as its recruiting points Dublin, Edinburgh, London, Lyons, Paris, Cologne, Hamburg, Berlin, Dresden, Constantinople, Bagdad, and one other point still nearer the Persian Gulf; suppose this Government had never attempted anything of just the same kind before; suppose it had little in its stores except rifles and ammunition; and suppose it got this regiment of more than 1,000 men together, fully clothed and equipped, and on shipboard, sailing out of the harbour of Hamburg, all within seventeen days of the time it first made up its mind to raise a regiment at all—well, it would congratulate itself. Yet, in terms of European and Asiatic geography, this was the achievement of the Canadian Government.

Until October 13th, when the Order in Council was passed, there was no certainty that a contingent would be sent. The Government did not reach a

decision until the afternoon of that day ; and nothing could be done officially in the way of preparation until a formal decision was announced. Of course, the Headquarters Staff and the Minister of Militia had been discussing plans for a few days and had perhaps started inquiries through local officers as to the feeling of the men in their districts, and had satisfied themselves as to where necessaries could be obtained. It has already been said that Major-General Hutton had some time before drawn up a general scheme, but he was not at headquarters to see to the carrying out of his plans, and the exact conditions could not have been known beforehand. The only other Imperial officer engaged in the work was Colonel Hubert Foster. As Chief-of-Staff and Quartermaster-General, he had a most responsible and onerous position, to fill which he was by experience and ability, as the result proved, splendidly fitted. Credit should be freely bestowed upon these two officers for their very important part in making the undertaking a success. But all the rest of the work was done by Canadians. That our Militia Department is capable of meeting so exceptional a call upon it is a matter of great satisfaction. What was done was altogether outside the regular system. The military problem in Canada is the defence of Canada. Had it been a question of mobilising troops and despatching them to any point in Canada threatened by invasion or insurrection, the Department would be expected to know what to do and be ready to do it. But the system did not provide for a case in which the regular Militia could not be used,

LIEUT.-COL. W. D. OTTER, COMMANDING FIRST CONTINGENT.

special equipment had to be furnished, and transportation to a distant part of the world arranged for. It was a new problem. The way it was solved is a gratifying testimony to the resourcefulness and energy of Canadian military officials, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, Surgeon-Lieut.-Col. the Hon. F. W. Borden, to the Department clerks, and is good evidence that the creeping paralysis of red tape does not afflict our military administration. Our arrangements are inadequate—perhaps dangerously so—but the potentialities exist, both in the people and in the administration.

How was the work done? First a Commanding Officer was selected. All the officers were selected and appointed by the Government. Seniority or priority of application did not determine the choices. The Government listened to advice from the Headquarters Staff, from the Commanding Officer, and from every other source from which a Government is apt to get advice, and then used their own judgment. Political or personal favouritism on the part of the Government was nowhere apparent, the efficiency of the contingent being the paramount object. Dozens of good officers, who were keen to go, were passed over; but the selections made were good. The position of Officer Commanding was given to Lieut.-Col. Otter. This was perhaps the most regular of all the appointments.

Lieut.-Col. William Dillon Otter, fifty-six years of age, was Commanding Officer of the Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry, Commandant of the Royal School of Infantry at Toronto, District Officer com-

manding in No. 2 Military District, and Inspector of Infantry, and A.D.C. to the Governor-General. With the exception of the Adjutant-General, whose position carries the rank of Colonel, there was only one Canadian officer on the active list his senior. He had seen active service in the Fenian Raid of 1866, and in the North-West Rebellion of 1885, when he was commander of the Battleford column; that is, he had seen all the active service he could see in Canada. He is not an amateur soldier, but a soldier by profession. On nearly every ground he was entitled to the position, and the choice was universally approved. He was summoned to Ottawa to consult with the Department on the very day the Order in Council was passed.

Then came the selection of officers to command companies and their subalterns. This took more time, but was completed within a week. The War Office had said that four units would be accepted, each consisting of 125 men, and officered by a captain and three lieutenants, and the whole force of 500 men under command, until Cape Town was reached, of an officer not higher than a major. The intention was to attach each of these units to a regiment of British regulars. But the Canadian Government had offered eight units, or 1,000 men, and the offer had been accepted. The idea of dividing up this force so that its identity would be lost was most unacceptable to the Government and people of Canada. If Canadians went a battalion strong, they should fight as a Canadian battalion, and remain intact throughout the campaign. After some correspondence the War

Office agreed to this proposal. Lieut.-Col. Otter could then go out as a lieutenant-colonel, instead of a major, and could take with him a complete staff, which meant openings for many more officers This point had to be settled before the company officers were all appointed, since many fitted for higher rank would gladly have gone as captains.

In the meantime the Militia Department was busy day and night on general plans and the details of arrangements, which were not to be found in documents already drawn up and pigeon-holed, but had to be worked out step by step; and time was short.

On Saturday, October 14th, the day after the Order in Council was passed, a Militia Order was issued to the following effect :—

"His Excellency the Governor-General in Council having been pleased to approve of the despatch of Canadian Volunteers, formed into eight Companies of Infantry, for active service in South Africa, it is hereby notified that one thousand Volunteers will be accepted, and that their enrolment has been authorised at the places mentioned below, upon the following conditions, viz. :—

"(*a*) Service under the Army Act for six months with liability of extension to one year.

"(*b*) Rations, clothing, and equipment to be provided free.

"(*c*) Pay at the rate laid down in Militia Regulations for the Permanent Corps from attestation until date of disembarkation in South Africa, from which date pay will be at British rates.

"Standard: Height, 5 feet 6 inches, with 34 inches chest measurement.

"Age: Not less than 22 or more than 40.

"The following are the places of enrolment:—

"Victoria, Vancouver, Winnipeg, London, Toronto, Ottawa, Kingston, Montreal, Quebec, St. John, N.B., Charlottetown, and Halifax.

"Men desirous of offering their services should make application in person or by letter at the Office of the Officer Commanding the Military District, or to a Commanding Officer of a Corps of Militia.

"Commanding Officers will at once forward to the District Officer Commanding the names thus received with their remarks.

"By Order,

"HUBERT FOSTER, Colonel,
Chief Staff Officer."

Enrolling points were not taken at random. Canada is divided into twelve military districts, and the twelve enrolling points were selected with reference to these districts, although in one or two cases they did not strictly correspond. The number of men to be raised at each point was proportioned to the relative strength of Active Militia in the District. The Companies were to be designated from A to H.

A Company was to be raised at Victoria, Vancouver, and Winnipeg.

B Company at London.

C Company at Toronto.

D Company at Ottawa and Kingston.

E Company at Montreal.

F Company at Quebec.

G Company at St. John, N.B., and Charlottetown, P.E.I.

H Company at Halifax.

Victoria is 3,162 miles west of Quebec, and Halifax 675 miles east; and all the men were at Quebec fifteen days from the date of the first Militia Order. The men from Victoria and Vancouver spent almost six days of this time in a railway train.

Enrolment for each company began as soon as a captain was appointed. District Officers Commanding assisted in every possible way. They provided accommodation in their own offices, in the drill hall, or other suitable place, for medical inspection and clerical work, and procured the clerks. Volunteers presented themselves in large numbers. They were examined by the medical officers attached to the units of the Permanent Force, or, in places where there were no such officers, by medical officers selected by the District Officers Commanding. The inspection was along the lines laid down in the British Regulations. Then the captains, advised by the District Officers Commanding, and assisted by their subalterns, picked out their men. The instructions were that only the best men, and not necessarily the first comers, should be selected. The points to be attended to were: That the men should be of the very best possible spirit and physique; of good character and temperate habits; and should possess a knowledge of drill, and be fairly good shots. To all such the oath was administered verbally, and attestation papers were handed for signature. When

these were signed, and witnessed by the enrolling officer, the enrolment was complete. The men were then measured, and daily size lists were sent in by the captains to headquarters, for guidance in preparing the outfit. From attestation the men were under pay. Until concentration orders were received the men were quartered with the units of the Permanent Force in the drill hall with straw for a bed, or wherever else accommodation could be secured. All this required special planning, for there are no permanent provisions for the accommodation of even an extra company.

The oath the men took was drawn up for the occasion, for no suitable one was to be found in the records. It reads thus :—

"I swear that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady the Queen in the Canadian Volunteers for active service, until lawfully discharged, and that I will resist Her Majesty's enemies, and cause Her Majesty's peace to be kept on land and at sea, and that I will in all matters appertaining to my service faithfully discharge my duty, according to law. So help me God.

"I hereby declare that I am willing to serve wherever Her Majesty the Queen may direct in the Canadian Volunteers for active service under the provisions of the Militia Act of Canada, so far as it applies, under the Queen's regulations and orders for the army and the Army Act, for a term of six months, or one year if required, or until sooner lawfully discharged or dismissed, at the rate of pay fixed for the Permanent Corps of Canada, until

landed in South Africa, and after disembarkation to serve in Her Majesty's regular forces, at the rates of pay fixed by the Royal Warrant for the pay of the British Army, and I have accordingly taken the above oath of allegiance."

References have been made to the Permanent Force. For the information of any who may not understand the difference between what is called the Active Militia and what is called the Permanent Force in Canada, it may be well to explain. The Militia in Canada consist, as they do in most countries, of all the male inhabitants between the ages of eighteen and sixty, who are not specially exempt, and who are British subjects by birth or naturalisation. The Active Militia consist of the number of these who may be from time to time embodied. A corps of Active Militia may be raised by voluntary enlistment or by ballot. As there are always more volunteers than the Government think wise to put upon the establishment, ballot is never required. There is no distinction between Volunteers and Militia. To provide for the care and protection of forts, magazines, armaments, warlike stores, and for similar services, and to afford opportunity for the proper instruction of officers or candidates for commissions or promotion, it was found necessary, when Imperial regular troops were withdrawn from Canada, to enlist a small force for continuous service. This is called the Permanent Force, and is limited to two troops of cavalry, three batteries of artillery, and four companies of infantry, named respectively, the Royal Canadian Dragoons, the Royal Canadian Artillery,

CANADIAN PERMANENT CAVALRY, ROYAL CANADIAN DRAGOONS.

and the Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry—in all less than 1,000 men, enlisted for three years' continuous service.

Both officers and men of the Permanent Force were at liberty to volunteer. The time spent in Africa was to count as part of the time for which they enlisted. The wives and families of non-commissioned officers and men on the married establishment were to be permitted to retain their quarters and draw rations. But no officer or man could be enrolled until his transfer had been ordered from headquarters, and then the Officer Commanding the contingent apportioned them among the different companies according to his judgment.

Pay for all ranks was to be at the rates prevailing in the Permanent Force until they arrived in South Africa; while in South Africa pay was to be at British rates and provided by the British Government. This was afterward altered, and pay was fixed at the rates laid down for the Active Militia when in camp. Privates in the Permanent Force receive 40 cents per diem; militiamen in camp receive 50 cents per diem. In general it may be said that the rates are double those in the British regular army. In addition to paying these rates until disembarkation in South Africa, the Canadian Government decided to make up the pay for the whole term of enlistment to the Canadian rates. That is, they set aside for every man, while in South Africa, the difference between the pay he received from the Imperial Government and the pay he was entitled to as a Canadian militiaman—in the case of privates 26 cents per diem.

This amount as it accumulated was regarded as a fund to be used at the discretion of the Government for the relief of his family or dependents, or to be handed to the soldier on his return to Canada. Non-commissioned officers and men who were married were granted also a separation allowance, on the British army scale: sergeants 50 cents for a wife, 5 cents for each son and 5 cents for each daughter, per diem; corporals, 35 cents for a wife, and privates 25 cents for a wife, and the same for children as in the case of the sergeants. In the first contingent the numbers of each were as follows: sergeants, 13 wives and 24 children; corporals 9 wives and 15 children; privates 37 wives and 61 children. On this account the Government had to pay, therefore, about $23.00 per diem. This is interesting also as showing the comparatively small number who were married men.

Clothing and equipment for the non-commissioned officers and men was, of course, supplied free; and officers received free two suits of serge and one of khaki—the same as the men—revolvers and ammunition, and a grant of $125, and $60 advance of pay to assist them in properly outfitting themselves. The force was uniformed as Rifles, with a suit of khaki for use in South Africa. The "Oliver Equipment" was supplied. For headgear they had white helmets, to be stained coffee colour when on shipboard, and field service caps. The detail of the necessaries issued to each man comprised a complete list of the articles ordinarily supplied to a soldier.

Some persons, particularly among the French-Canadians, have contended that the Government did

nothing more than "assist volunteers to reach the Transvaal"; and it must strike any one who reads over the official statements and the Militia Orders that the Government most carefully avoided such words as "recruit" and other terms that might give the appearance of a call for troops. But, whatever names be applied, by selecting officers in the way they did, and by arranging for a recruiting or "enrolling," without reference to the offers they had received, they made it more directly a Government work than is any Militia regiment in the establishment to-day, unless it be the Permanent Force. There was no balloting, and the wiles of the recruiting sergeant were not needed, but it was a direct raising of a new battalion by the Government.

Instructions were forwarded from headquarters for nearly every detail of the operations of enrolment and concentration. Local officers had so much thrust upon them, and so little time to get through it, that more planning was done for them than would be necessary in countries whose military system covered the case in hand, or would be necessary in Canada again. Cool heads and ceaseless activity were essentials at headquarters. To overlook any one point might cause a serious hitch. Lists of necessaries had to be drawn up, contractors notified and contracts signed, time tables arranged and special trains procured, advances of money made, and a thousand and one other things looked after. A ship, too, had to be chartered, and its fitting up designed. There would be 1,000 helmets, 1,000 valises, 1,000 rifles, and all the rest of the impedimenta and supplies

to store away. There were no tables to tell how much space any of these articles would occupy. There was nothing for it but to pile half a dozen helmets and measure them, and calculate from this what room 1,000 would take up, and to roll up the sample contents of a valise—for the valises themselves were not at hand—and base the estimates for valises on the size of a parcel, and so with the rest.

Agents of the principal steamship lines called upon the Government as soon as it was known that a ship would be required. The Allan Line steamship *Sardinian*, a cattle ship, was the best available, and a contract was signed for her. She was shortly due at Montreal. Work was not commenced on her until October 21st, and she sailed from Quebec, 175 miles away, on the 30th. For the officers and non-commissioned officers state-rooms and saloons were erected. One-half the number of men were provided with hammocks and the other half with bunks. Special accommodation was provided for officers' baggage, men's kit-bags, helmets, accoutrements, and rifles, which latter were placed in racks. For messing, tables and chairs were so constructed that they could be unshipped between meal-times. A magazine had to be provided for the ammunition, and a Morris tube and revolver range erected. There were precautions, also, in the nature of a prison and a guardroom. On the spar deck there were built stalls for eight officers' horses. Electric light was installed, and special rooms erected for stores, steward's supplies, and the luxuries provided by the people of Canada. Extra

refrigerators and water-coolers were put in. Ship's boats were provided to allow a seat for every soul on board, and were properly fitted up according to the Board of Trade regulations. A life preserver was put in each man's hammock or bunk. A room was set apart for a hospital and dispensary, with berths, shelves, operating-tables, and other hospital equipment. All the fittings were painted. Provision was thus made for 51 officers, 4 nurses, 100 non-commissioned officers, 910 men, and 8 horses.

Upon no branch was there more pressure than upon the stores branch, under charge of the efficient and popular Chief Superintendent, Lieut.-Col. Donald A. Macdonald, R.O. It was not a question merely of taking goods out of store and delivering them at Quebec and there distributing them, for nearly everything had to be purchased from outside, and in many cases manufacture had to be arranged for. No large stock is kept at any time, and when the call came it was just between seasons. The supply for 1898–99 had been exhausted, and the contractors had not yet begun to deliver the supply for 1899–1900. Arms of the required pattern had previously been imported from England for issue to the Militia generally, and so there was no trouble in that particular; and fortunately there was enough of the "Oliver Equipment" in complete sets. Just 1,000 valises were in possession of the Department, and these had been issued to the Permanent Force. They had to be withdrawn. For nearly everything else tenders had to be invited, contracts let, articles inspected, and delivery secured within fourteen days. There was not enough khaki-

coloured material in the country to make 1,000 suits, and some had to be specially dyed before it could be manufactured. The twenty-two straps of each "Oliver Equipment" and every rifle had to be stamped for purposes of identification. Yet everything was on hand, and was put on board before the ship sailed. To describe the work for the first contingent is to describe the work for the other special forces raised in connection with the war—two battalions of Mounted Rifles, three batteries of artillery, Strathcona's Horse, 100 men draft to the first contingent, and 1,000 men to garrison Halifax. Methods were much the same in all cases, although there were differences in arms and equipment. With no increase in staff, the Department, in addition to its ordinary duties in connection with the Militia, accomplished within four months all this extra and unaccustomed work. It would have been the veriest trifle to the British War Office, but, because it was unprovided for in the Canadian system, it was a good deal in Canada. Under the Minister of Militia and Defence, Hon. Dr. Borden (H. W. Brown, private secretary) and the Deputy Minister (Lieut.-Col. L. F. Pinault) the labour and responsibility in the civil branch fell chiefly upon Lieut.-Col. D. A. Macdonald ; Benjamin Sulte, Chief Clerk ; Captain Alphonse Benoit, Secretary ; Lieutenant Paul Wetherbe, Chief Engineer ; and Captain Geo. S. Maunsell, Assistant Engineer ; and in the military branch upon the Headquarters Staff, Major-General Hutton, G.O.C. ; Colonel Hon. Matthew Aylmer, Adjutant-General ; Lieut.-Col. W. H. Cotton and Major R. Cartwright, Assistant

Adjutants-General; Lieut.-Col. F. G. Stone, Officer Commanding Canadian Artillery; Colonel Hubert Foster, Chief of Staff and Quartermaster-General; Lieut.-Col. J. L. H. Neilson, Director-General Medical Services; and Mr. Jarvis, Acting Chief Clerk.

The men received a rousing send-off. A series of ovations marked the successive stages of their departure—as individuals or groups of individuals from their home districts, as companies from the cities where they were enrolled, and as a battalion from Quebec. The practical was quite as prominent as the sentimental. Municipalities made grants of money averaging from $25 to $50 for each private, and $100 for each officer. In very many cases these amounts were largely augmented by purses from employers or from regimental or club friends. Some firms were very generous to their *employés*, offering to retain the men on their pay-rolls, to keep their positions open, to insure their lives, and keep up the payment of premiums, or in other ways to provide for their needs or the welfare of their families. Insurance companies announced that they would not raise the rates on policies already held, and would protect their policy-holders in the contingent during their absence, allowing the premiums to go as a loan upon the policies. They also announced very reasonable rates for new policies. Funds were raised by private subscription to take out policies for the men from different localities; and through Sir Charles Tupper one gentleman undertook the insurance of the whole contingent up to the amount of one million dollars, being $1,000

each for 1,000 men, and covering death in battle, with a proportionate amount for the loss of a hand or foot or an eye. Gifts of books made up a substantial library, and luxuries for the table were sent to Quebec in such quantities that special space had to be provided for them on the *Sardinian*. Money, insurance, souvenirs, articles of use, flags—everything that could manifest the deep interest the people of Canada took in those who were going forth to represent them—were bestowed with a heartiness that quickened the national pulse.

Finally, after inspiring demonstrations all along the route, the contingent assembled at Quebec. Not all the points of enrolment had furnished the full number originally allotted to them. For example, the French-Canadian company to be raised at Quebec did not fill rapidly, owing to lack of enthusiasm, and the standard of size was slightly lowered, in order to secure a fair representation of that element of the population. In other places, too, men with little or no military experience were accepted to swell the ranks. The time was so short that those who wanted to think the matter over lost their opportunity. But deficiencies in some places were more than made up by extra enlistments in other places, and the battalion embarked thirty-nine men over strength. In every respect the battalion was an anomaly. There was no provision in the Militia Act for enlisting a special force of that kind or for sending it out of the country. It was not a regular Militia regiment, and it could not properly be considered a part of the Permanent Force, for the terms of enlistment were

different, and the Permanent Force was already at full strength. Yet it would be a mistake to allow a force which might win honours and would certainly create traditions to go out to war and be disbanded on its return without establishing some connection between it and the regular forces of Canada. Either the Active Militia or the Permanent Force should have the right to feel that they were the custodians of its trophies or its record. The solution reached was the best possible one, under conditions where every solution was somewhat irregular. It was designated a Special Service Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry. It was thus definitely connected with the Permanent Force by being called the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion of the Permanent Infantry. Yet it was uniformed as Rifles—another anomaly.

At ten minutes past four on the afternoon of Monday, October 30th, one day before the time originally fixed, the 2nd (Special Service) Battalion of the R.C.R.I. sailed from Quebec. In the morning the force was marshalled at the Citadel. At 11.30 it paraded on the Esplanade for official inspection by the Major-General Commanding, and then for review by His Excellency the Governor-General. After the formal review the battalion was drawn up in close order on three sides of a square to hear the stirring farewell words delivered by Lord Minto, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Major-General Hutton, and Mayor Parent of Quebec. His Excellency congratulated Lieut.-Col. Otter upon the appearance of his regiment on parade. It was, however, more than a serviceable

regiment on parade; it represented, upon historic ground, the union in loyalty of two great races, and the free military gift of the people of Canada, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, to the Mother Country. Again addressing Lieut.-Col. Otter His Excellency said: "The embarkation of your force to-day will mark a memorable epoch in the history of Canada and the Empire. Of the success of your force we have no doubt. We shall watch your departure with very full hearts, and will follow your movements with eager enthusiasm. All Canada will long to see the Maple Leaf well to the front, and will give her contingent a glorious welcome when it comes home again. And now, as the representative of Her Majesty, I wish you Godspeed and every success."

Sir Wilfrid Laurier followed: "In wishing you Godspeed I pray that God may accompany you, direct you and protect you on the noble mission which you have undertaken. Upon this occasion it is not so much the God of battle as the God of justice whom we invoke. It is inspiring to reflect that the cause for which you men of Canada are going to fight is the cause of justice, the cause of humanity, of civil rights and religious liberty. This war is not a war of conquest or subjugation. It is not to oppress the race whose courage we admire, but it is to put an end to the oppression imposed upon subjects of Her Majesty in South Africa by a tyrannical people. The object is not to crush out the Dutch population, but to establish in that land, of which Her Majesty is suzerain, British sovereign law, to assure to all men

of that country an equal share of liberty. This is a unique occasion in the history of the world; it is a spectacle which ought to make every Canadian feel proud of his country. Who could have believed a few years ago that from this city, which had been the theatre of a bitter conflict between the two proudest races of the world, their descendants, who to-day are a happily united people, would go forth to help carry the blessings of their own institutions to a far distant land? Who could have believed thirty-two years ago that the scattered Provinces of British North America would have reached such a point of development to-day that they would be able and willing, and cheerfully willing, to cement with their blood the unity of the Empire in its most distant part? Men of the Canadian contingent, I have no recommendation or request to make to you, but if I had it would simply be to do your duty. More than this we cannot ask; more than this you cannot do. If you do your duty, and I know you will, you take your places side by side with the Dublin Fusiliers, the Gordon Highlanders, and the Lancashires, who only last week carried the colours of England to the topmost heights of Glencoe, Dundee, and Eland's Laagte. If you do your duty your proud countrymen will share your glory. Should any one of you unfortunately lose life or limb your country will feel that you have fully discharged the duty under which you place her this day by this sacrifice to Canada's glory, the glory of the Empire, and, above all, to the cause of justice, humanity, and liberty."

In his brief address Major-General Hutton reminded

the men that arduous duties lay before them. He adjured them to respect the Queen's regulations and the discipline of the army. Canada's honour and renown were in their keeping. In all times of danger and difficulty they were to ask themselves: "What will they say of us in Canada?" "We expect of you to reflect on the responsibilities resting on your

THE *SARDINIAN*. CANADIAN INFANTRY EMBARKING AT QUEBEC.

shoulders and acquit yourselves as men and as Canadians."

Mayor Parent spoke eloquently for the citizens of Quebec, "the most French city of the new world," and for the French-Canadians whom he represented. In the course of his address he said: "No matter how diverse may be our origin and the language that we

speak, who is there that will dare to affirm that we have not all the qualities necessary for the making of a real nation? Who dare say, upon such an occasion as the present, that we are not all sincerely united and loyal towards the Canadian Dominion and loyal to England, which has given us so complete a measure of liberty? We French-Canadians have loyally accepted the new destinies that Providence provided for us on the battlefields of 1759. Is it possible that anybody can have forgotten 1775 and 1812? On the summit of this proud rock of Quebec, rendered illustrious by Jacques Cartier and Champlain, behold, but a few steps from this place, the superb monument erected by an English Governor to the memory of Wolfe and Montcalm. Why may we not make it the emblem and the symbol of our national unity? Let us leave to each individual amongst us the privilege to retain as a souvenir the rose, the thistle, the fleur-de-lis, or the shamrock, and even the pot of earth that the Irish immigrant brings with him from under distant skies, and let us be united for the great and holy cause that we have in hand—the foundation of a great nation and the development of the boundless resources of a rich and immense country."

Then, with an escort of the city regiments and bands, the march to the ship began, through streets so crowded it was difficult to force a way. The citizens of Quebec had turned out *en masse*, and hundreds had come from other parts of Canada. All were strangely moved. There was a continuous roar of cheers; yet cheering was not enough. Hands

were reached out to grasp the hands of the men as they passed, strangers and friends alike. Feeling was everywhere as near to sobs as to shouts. So on through the gaily-decorated streets, under arches, they marched, upborne, and again almost overwhelmed, by the emotions of the hour. Men who had seen troops embark in many countries say there never was such a scene.

Embarkation itself was well ordered and rapid. Once aboard, the men swarmed the decks and the rigging. The bands on the deck played "Rule Britannia" and "The Soldiers of the Queen." As the ship began to move the first gun of the salute boomed out from the citadel and the refrain of the National Anthem swelled up through the crowd. With answering cheers and the waving of helmets the ship moved on, accompanied by a flotilla of gay river boats, from which the last cheers went up as she slowly rounded Point Levis on her way to the sea.

CHAPTER V

FROM QUEBEC TO BLOEMFONTEIN

GREAT praise has been bestowed upon the Royal Canadians for their work during the first stage of Lord Roberts's operations. In official reports, in the despatches of newspaper correspondents, and in the opinions expressed by their comrades in action, which, travelling from one to another, make the reputation of a regiment in the army, credit has been ungrudgingly given. There has been, indeed, a generosity about this praise which does honour to all concerned. Perhaps much was not expected; perhaps, from Lord Roberts down, the effects upon wider Imperial interests were always present in the mind; but the heartiness of the acknowledgment of sterling qualities can be explained only as the tribute of brave men, without littleness of disposition, to other brave men who were recognised as worthy comrades. And the standard set up in the fatigue duty, marching and fighting between De Aar and Bloemfontein, was preserved to the end of the campaign.

This first period was a very severe test. In one sense the first contingent was composed of picked men. They were young and strong, although in

the haste with which things were done some were admitted who were not quite physically fit. Yet the majority were men of good physique, and bigger men than the average of the British regiments. But they had had no special training for the kind of work before them, and fully one-third were not even proficient in elementary military drill. It was little more than the raw material of a regiment that embarked at Quebec ; unity, solidity, and expertness were to be the products of discipline and experience. Not till after Paardeberg did a perfect regiment exist, with uniform proficiency and an *esprit de corps* in which personal, sectional, and company feelings were merged. For the particular conditions of the campaign nothing in their Canadian experience had prepared them. Certainly they had not been trained for the terrible marching they had to undergo. Walking is not a favourite form of exercise in Canada ; and many a man who could last through a lacrosse or football match, pull a strong oar, or win a canoe race, would find a long march difficult. Leaving Canada at the end of a long summer, they were forced to go through again another summer season more trying than their own. For the men of South Africa and Australia there was not this break in the course of the seasons, and the English summer is less extreme than the Canadian summer. Then, again, there was nothing in the work they had to do in this period which called for the peculiar qualifications a Colonial might be supposed to possess. They did little scouting and had few chances for individual initiative.

In intelligence the average was high. All classes

of the Canadian people were represented, the professional and business classes being fully as well represented as any others. Most were city men. It was no taste for the drudgery or monotony of a soldier's life that made them enlist. Rather they sought adventure, and if there was to be fighting they wanted to fight. Yet they willingly undertook whatever task was allotted and, in general, accepted the situation as they found it, striving to learn, and taking a pride in doing their work quickly and well. Indeed, the spirit of emulation was strong. They felt that they were Canadians on trial, and sometimes in their over-eagerness not to be found wanting they may have wasted energy. A full share of difficult work fell to their lot, and, owing to imperfections in their water-supply system and break-downs or delays of transport, they had quite as much inconvenience and privation to endure as any others. It is a marvel that men could live and do what Lord Roberts's army did in that month between Graspan and Bloemfontein. The Canadians made no record marches, and probably performed no feat that would distinguish them in any particular respect above the others; but in that heroic company they held their own.

Without experience of battle and with no regimental traditions to inspire or coerce them, they faced the enemy cheerfully and steadily. The effect of tradition in determining through centuries, and with a constantly changing *personnel*, the character of a regiment and the manner in which it will meet danger, is one of the most striking of all psychological

and moral phenomena. To the Royal Canadians there belonged no traditions except of garrison duty. The young recruits were given the name of an untried regiment, and were sent out to make traditions for themselves and for their countrymen. One company received its harmless baptism of fire at Sunnyside, but the first time the whole regiment went into action was at Paardeberg Drift. After an all-night march, and without nourishment except a swallow of rum or coffee, and in a few isolated cases a bit of biscuit, they were thrown forward across the open against an enemy they could at no time see, and lay all day in the sun behind anthills or inequalities of the ground, realising all the time that the enemy could see them and that every slight exposure would draw fire, aimed, not promiscuously, but at each as a separate target. Until five o'clock on this day they were left alone in this position without the moral support that comes from direct contact with others. Not only did they endure this ordeal without demoralisation, but they were ready to take part in the charge, and they left their dead nearest the enemy's trenches. Not only so, but many of them spent the whole night in searching for and helping the wounded.

There is a camp story to the effect that when this charge was proposed Lieut.-Col. Otter demurred. The distance was too great, and, after a full day's practice, the enemy knew the range of every part. It is said that an Imperial officer then remarked, "If you don't like to, or don't know how to, the Cornwalls will show you." Lieut.-Col. Otter replied,

"The devil you will. We will lead, and you may keep up if you can." But the Canadians were disappointed at the result. Having once begun to charge, they had the discouraging sense that not even the most murderous fire should have stopped them. They had been decimated, but that night they felt it would have been better that only a tenth should have survived, if they could but somehow have got home with the bayonet. Their conduct did not reach their ideal. But next morning they had the satisfaction of finding that the enemy would not wait a renewal of the attack, and had retreated during the night. The end had been accomplished.

Again, in the early morning of Majuba Day, they stole up within less than a hundred yards of the Boer trenches and obeyed their instructions to the letter, the front rank lying down and covering the rear rank, which set to work to entrench. There was everything in this advance in the darkness to try the nerves and excite the imagination, and when the spirts of flame shot out from the Boer trenches not sixty-five yards distant from one part of the line, the majority were facing fire for the third time only. They held their positions for the twenty minutes of the hottest rifle fire. Two companies held theirs until the white flag flew from the trenches in front of them, and all would have held on had not some one without authority shouted, "Retire, and take your wounded." The captains of G and H Companies either did not hear this shout, or, recognising that it must be a mistake, refused to obey. This action, like that at the Drift, may have lacked in some respects

the ideal perfection of romance, but it completely succeeded. The judgment of Lord Roberts may be accepted without reservation, that it was "a gallant deed, worthy of our Colonial comrades"—worthy of Canadians, and worthy of those who would be comrades with the best of Britain's army.

When the *Sardinian* sailed from Quebec she had on board 1,141 souls. The Royal Canadians mustered 1,039. There were, besides, special service officers, three chaplains, one representative of the Young Men's Christian Association, four nurses, four war correspondents sent by Canadian newspapers, two officers "attached for passage," and a crew of eighty.

For the first week of the voyage, while the contingent was finding its "sea legs" in rough weather, few duties were imposed except those essential to order and cleanliness. By November 6th, however, work commenced in earnest. The narrow spaces of a crowded ship afforded little scope, but good use was made of what there was. The morning began early with a run around the deck in trousers and shirts, followed by a shower-bath in companies at the mouth of a hose; then breakfast; then drill and exercises, and rifle practice; then dinner, and a short rest; then more drill and exercise until supper-time. A Maxim squad was organised and was drilled in its work. For the officers there were daily lectures on theory and practice, and much experience in routine duties. In the short evenings there were concerts and other forms of entertainment, and religious services were regularly held and were well attended.

At sea, on November 3rd, occurred the first death

in the ranks. Private Edward Deslauriers, of D Company, apparently a strong man, died of heart failure. He was buried with due ceremony, and the orders of the day reported that one had been "struck from the strength" of the regiment. To his comrades this first death was more shocking and saddening than any of the long list that was fated to follow.

The health of the rest of the regiment was excellent, and time was not allowed to drag heavily. Still few ever more eagerly looked for land. It was to be the land of their great adventure. As the *Sardinian* did not touch at the Cape Verde Islands, the only news they had of the progress of the war was contained in two or three Cape Town newspapers received on the 15th from a passing ship. In them was chronicled the disaster at Nicholson's Nek. At last, on the morning of November 29th, the dim outlines of Table Mountain were descried, and by noon the *Sardinian* had come to anchor in the harbour. After medical inspection and a visit from a civic deputation, loudly acclaimed by the assembled transports, she steamed slowly to her dock. The excitement on board found vent in cheers, and as the ship drew alongside the dock at six o'clock the boys sang "The Maple Leaf For Ever," and then "God Save the Queen." A cornetist on shore, in answer, lead the united crowds in "Rule Britannia." The voyage of over 7,000 miles had been made in thirty days.

Tantalising though it was, disembarkation did not take place until the following day. By 8.30 on the morning of the 30th the Royal Canadians were drawn up for inspection on South African soil. As they

CANADIAN INFANTRY IN CAMP AT CAPE TOWN.

marched from the dock to Green Point Camp, three miles away, the inhabitants of Cape Town accorded them a soul-stirring welcome. Tents were pitched, and during the afternoon and the following morning preparations for an immediate advance to the front were completed. Men were picked out to remain in Cape Town, and the battalion was thus reduced to its proper establishment. When it was discovered that some of the officers commanding companies had brought more men to Quebec than they had been expected to bring, the Director of Medical Services went through the ranks to weed out the excess number, but the keen disappointment of those set aside led to the decision to send them all on to Cape Town. At 1.30 p.m. on December 1st the regiment entrained for the north. As the Australian contingents, which had arrived a few days sooner, left the same day, the double event was celebrated with the utmost enthusiasm by the people of Cape Town. That tangible evidence of the co-operative spirit among the Colonies touched the Colonists of South Africa as no other event of the war had done. Sir Alfred Milner and the principal civic officials were present at the station.

Just three days before, Lord Methuen had fought the battle at Modder River, and a start for the front raised visions of immediate conflict, but some weeks of very beneficial training were to intervene between these visions and the reality. A forty-hours' journey by train took the Canadians to De Aar, 500 miles north of Cape Town, and in the early morning of Sunday, December 3rd, they marched from the

station to their camp beside the Cornwalls. A fierce sandstorm greeted their arrival. Here they made the acquaintance of British regulars, and saw how the Engineers planned and constructed defence works.

On the 7th they were moved up on open trucks to Orange River. Before tents were pitched a thunderstorm burst over them and they had their first good drenching. On the following day 200 of the men were detailed to build a railway siding and a goods platform. About half a mile of track and a double platform were completed in a day, and the men ceased work just in time to receive the congratulations of Lieut.-Col. Girouard, their distinguished fellow-countryman, who arrived that night on a tour of railway inspection. Their first task showed them able-bodied, intelligent, and willing. The enemy was not far off, and when they took their share of picket duty they had their first responsibility of the war.

Two days only were spent at Orange River, the right half of the battalion moving to Belmont on the 9th, and the other half following on the 10th. With Belmont and the surrounding country the Royal Canadians became thoroughly familiar, since it was their headquarters for two months. It was here they were exercised in all kinds of military operations they might afterward have need to perform. They were not spared in any way, but were given good hard work, and they left Belmont ready to be brigaded with the Gordons, the Cornwalls, and the Shropshires without lowering the average usefulness of the brigade. Two such months as they spent at

Belmont had hardly entered into their calculations, but they had always before them the hope that soon they might have an opportunity to prove themselves in actual conflict, where the skill they were then cheerfully acquiring would visibly affect results. One break there was when C Company was selected to take part in an expedition to Douglas. But Christmas passed before this first chance came—a hot Christmas, with a sandstorm, a shower of rain, and a bath in a sheep-wash, instead of the bracing natural conditions of a Christmas at home.

It was then the darkest period of the war. On December 10th General Gatacre was repulsed at Stormberg, 150 miles to the south-east of Belmont; on the 11th Lord Methuen fought the disastrous battle of Magersfontein, only twenty miles to the north; and three days later, in Natal, General Buller failed to force a passage of the Tugela. All along the line the British had suffered. Not only did the Boers themselves greatly gain in confidence, but the Dutch in the British Colonies were encouraged to take the field. Just west of Belmont, along Lord Methuen's line of communications, the most formidable uprising occurred. The loyalists were notified that by January 1st they must either join the ranks of the rebels or flee from their homes. It was in these circumstances that the expedition to Douglas was planned. It was essentially an affair of the Belmont camp, and Lieut.-Col. Otter is credited with suggesting it, although the command of the force fell to Colonel Pilcher, who carried the undertaking through with brilliant success.

Every precaution was taken to prevent any intimation of the movement from reaching the Boers, and on December 31st, at two o'clock in the afternoon, a force left camp, composed of some 200 men of the Queensland Mounted Infantry, with two Maxims, 40 men of the Royal Horse Artillery, with two guns, 50 men of the Imperial Mounted Infantry and Royal Munsters, two companies of the Cornwalls, and 101 men of C Company Royal Canadians, under Captain Barker and Lieutenants Marshall, Wilkie, and Temple, with two Maxims and 23 men under Captain Bell. The Canadians and Cornwalls rode in buck-waggons. The rest of the force were mounted. Twenty-two miles were covered, and Thornhill reached, before dark. At six o'clock next morning the column started again. Scouts soon brought word that they had located a Boer laager at the north end of the ridge that ran from north to south across the road and right ahead. At 9.45 the order came to form for attack. The Canadians were part of the right flanking force. A brisk march of an hour and a quarter brought them just opposite the enemy, and a capital shot from one of the guns, which burst directly over the laager, conveyed the first intelligence to the Boers of the presence of the British. Hastily taking cover they replied with rifle fire. In the face of this the Canadians were ordered to double across 700 yards of open space and seize a small ridge running parallel to the main ridge. This was done in dashing style and without losing their formation. Then for the first time in the war the Canadians fired with the enemy as a target.

Wasting no ammunition, their rifle and Maxim fire soon had an appreciable effect in subduing that of the Boers. Under cover of this diversion and the fire of the guns, mounted men were pushing round to the north, and, skirting the southern end of the ridge, around to the west, while the Australians advanced astride the ridge. Then the Canadians joined hands with the Australians and a charge with the bayonet ended in the capture of forty-two prisoners and the complete camp and supplies. The exultation of victory was known. The Canadians had, unharmed, played their part with coolness and precision in the first notable success after long weeks of British depression. The Boers were defeated at their own game.

Leaving a guard in charge of the prisoners, the column on the following morning pushed on to Douglas, which the Boers evacuated. The loyal inhabitants received them enthusiastically, and next day accompanied them on their return march. The Canadians shared their waggons with the women and children, and appeared in the genial *rôle* of entertainers and comforters. Where the roads were heavy, both going and coming, the men marched, and 102 miles in less than five days, with a brisk engagement thrown in, was not a bad record.

Nothing else of much importance occurred until February 12th, when the regiment was moved to Graspan, some seven or eight miles up the railway, to take its place in the great march to Bloemfontein. Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener had then been in South Africa one month. After studying the situa-



ROUTE OF R.C.R. BETWEEN DE AAR AND BLOEMFONTEIN.

tion at all points, Lord Roberts decided to strike first at Commandant Cronje's force, which barred the way to Kimberley. Concealing as well as possible his immediate objective, he concentrated at Graspan an army of 40,000 men. Suddenly he sent General French with a Cavalry Division and Horse Artillery on a wide flanking movement to the right. The intention was to follow up this movement so rapidly with infantry that Cronje's retreat to the east would be cut off, while General French relieved Kimberley. But Cronje quickly grasped the significance of the tactics he evidently had not fully anticipated, and in the nick of time began his desperate retreat along the banks of the Modder. General French had passed northward, and General Kelly-Kenny had not yet arrived. General Kelly-Kenny altered his course and set off in pursuit. Cronje did not believe the British could leave the railroad in this way or make such good time. He was mistaken, for the British caught his rearguard on the 17th, and before he could extricate himself other British divisions arrived, General French swept down from Kimberley, and he was surrounded at Paardeberg. Lord Roberts knew that the commissariat and the transport would not be adequate, but he knew also that British soldiers would march and fight on a biscuit a day for a leader they loved.

It was on February 13th, two days after General French set out, that the Canadians left Graspan. They were entered in the 9th Division, under Sir Henry Colville, which consisted of two brigades. One of these, the 19th Brigade, was composed of the

2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the 2nd Shropshire Light Infantry, the 1st Gordon Highlanders, and the Royal Canadians; the other was the Highland Brigade. The 19th Brigade was commanded by Major-General Smith-Dorien. The effective strength of the Royal Canadians was 895. They formed the rearguard of the column, and delays in the transport train and deficiency in the water supply made the march of fifteen miles to Ram Dam very tedious and trying. In some respects the Canadians were not as well equipped as the other regiments, and their water-cart was an old one captured from the Boers at Sunnyside.

Next day they made a good march of twelve miles to Watervaal Drift as advanced guard, but as the regiment had to find all the duties for the day they had plenty of hard work besides. The heat was intense. Two hundred of the men won great praise for the way they took the big naval guns through the Riet River. Here Lord Roberts joined them, and the Canadians furnished his guard of honour. He complimented the regiment on its physique and appearance.

For three days more the steady progress continued, and then, on the night of the 17th, the Brigade was rushed forward. Cronje had been brought to bay at Paardeberg. Again the Canadians formed the rearguard, and again they had worries and delays on account of the transport. But they covered twenty-one miles during the night, and reached the Drift at six in the morning. As soon as it was known that Cronje was attempting to escape, the men had been

put upon half rations. Hungry and tired, they stood waiting for breakfast, when the order came that thrilled every man of them—they were to go into action at once. A swallow of rum or coffee was all they could get, but fresh life had come with the thought of battle. Fording the Modder River, which at this point flowed very swiftly, the water up to their armpits, they formed up on the north bank. The 9th Division was to attack the headquarters laager of the enemy, and the 19th Brigade was detailed for the left attack on the north side of the river, while the Highland Brigade kept to the south side. The Boers occupied a bend in the river-bed and some ravines about two miles from the Drift. For over half this distance the regiment advanced rapidly, and then, reaching the crest of a slight ridge, it came under fire. It was the first time the whole regiment had ever been under fire. Before them for 1,500 yards there was a sandy plain with a few inequalities, a few anthills, and a few bushes. On the right, by the river, were trees, and on the left a ridge running parallel with the river. Part of the Cornwalls were to the right, the Gordons and Shropshires to the left, and on the left rear some guns and one of the Canadian Maxims—the only Maxim got across the river that day. But the Canadians were practically alone in that part of the field, and until late in the afternoon received no orders or instructions from any one, their actions being guided altogether by their own officers. Around a circumference of twenty miles the fight raged.

By 9.30 a.m. they were fully engaged. A and C Companies formed the first firing-line, D and E the

support, and B, F, G, and H the reserve; but the firing-line was reinforced from time to time by the other companies. Major Buchan (Lieut-Col. on the Permanent Force at home) had charge of the firing-line, which he directed in the coolest manner all day. Major Pelletier (Lieut-Col. Canadian Staff), an excellent officer, was with the support. Lieut-Col. Otter had his station for the greater part of the time in the centre, scanning the field and giving orders as if on a field-day at Niagara camp. Taking advantage of every bit of cover, by crawling, by short rushes, the men moved forward, until their right was within 400 yards, and their left within 800 yards, of the Boers. The enemy were perfectly concealed; but whenever there was the least exposure on the part of the Canadians a fire was attracted which showed that every movement of theirs was observed. The men deliberately and carefully returned the fire. "The fire discipline of the several companies engaged was excellent, and perfect coolness as well as accurate shooting was maintained throughout." This was Lieut-Col. Otter's report. One after another men were hit, two men in the reserve being struck first. Lieutenant Marshall, unable to attract the attention of the stretcher-bearers for the first man wounded near him, arose and carried the man off the field himself, assisted by Private McGwerin. The private was wounded. Captain Arnold, of A Company, one of the bravest and best, standing up the better to observe the position and direct his men, was struck twice and fell mortally wounded. Two stretcher-bearers came up, but had not carried him far when both were struck

down. Two more volunteered and one fell. Surgeon-Captain Fiset came out and dressed his wounds on the field. So the hours passed. About three in the afternoon a heavy shower fell, succeeded by a cold wind, and the men shivered as they lay. Still they fought on, creeping ever closer.

Shortly before five o'clock three companies of the Cornwalls arrived, and Colonel Aldworth, their gallant commander, informed Lieut-Col. Otter that he "had orders to finish this business" and "proposed doing so with the bayonet." He asked information as to the disposition of the force and the position of the enemy. The order was passed along the line and bayonets were fixed. It was one of the last instances in the war of a straight charge across the open over a long distance. At 5.15 the line rose. In the words of Frederick Hamilton, correspondent of the Toronto *Globe*, who was on the spot: "Instantly a deadly fire rose from the Boer trenches. Hundreds of men whom our watchers on the left had not seen sprang to the lip of the bank and began firing over it. The air back at the 800-yards range resounded with a long fusillade of whip-cracks, as the Mausers went in flight overhead. The bullets smacked overhead like a package of fire-crackers ignited and allowed to explode in one *feu-de-joie*. Of course they could not keep running long. No charge, as a matter of fact, can be made over a distance greater than 100 to 150 yards, for men's wind will not stand a longer run. Remember that our men at that moment had been an exact twenty-four hours under arms, had marched twenty-four miles, and had had no sustenance in all

that time, except a drink of rum, perhaps a biscuit; in some cases a cup of coffee. So they ran on a bit, laid down, fired, ran on again, fired yet again, got another bit forward. They dropped all over the field. The colonel of the Cornwalls was among the first. "Five pounds to the man first in their lines!" he shouted, and fell. Our men pressed on. Lieutenant Lawless led a group on the right and called for buglers. Little Douglas Williams, C Company's bugler, stood in the open and blew the charge—blew it all. Codner, bugle-major of the Governor-General's Foot Guards at home, sat down, his bugle strings tangled with his rifle, and blew the charge. It was courting death, but the two escaped. Grim, too, that charge was, for almost every pace spelt death. . . .

"It was a very ragged fringe which reached the Boer trenches. Walter White of B Company, from Windsor, was close to them when he fell. Lester of E Company, the tallest man in the regiment, died a few feet from the pits. Far up in the rush fell Manion of C Company, formerly a Grenadier. Jackson of D Company, who enlisted in C Company and was transferred, had his head blown to pieces a few paces from the objective. Lewis of B Company was so far ahead that no one saw him fall. Muir of H Company was well to the front, when Ollie Burns, the life of D Company, died in the charge, after jesting his way that far in the fight. Johnson went down near him, and he carried the wounded man away. Handcock, stretcher-bearer of H Company, went along the line in the hottest moments to give aid. Munroe, G

Company's ammunition-carrier, plied his work up to the edge of the farthest fight."

The ground gained was held, and night fell. Then Lieut.-Col. Otter gave the order to collect the dead and the wounded and withdraw to the bivouac at the Drift. He is not given to overpraise, but he reported that "the greatest possible steadiness and bravery was shown by the men, while their keenness and readiness to bring in and care for the wounded was most exemplary—not only for their own immediate comrades but for those of other corps." Several officers and men were mentioned for conspicuous bravery. Father O'Leary, the Roman Catholic chaplain, was on the field all day, and even in the firing-line, cheering and consoling, and at night he joined in the search for the wounded, and in the early morning officiated at the burial of the dead. The casualties, 75 per cent. of which occurred in the charge, were twenty killed and sixty wounded. The regiment had gone into battle 872 strong.

During the night the enemy also withdrew. The object of forcing a concentration had been accomplished. This fact roused lively satisfaction, for in their utter weariness the men thought they should have done more, although they did not know how.

Yet even in the morning the enemy's trenches were not a safe place. Private Hornibrook went out to view them unarmed. He suddenly came upon an armed Boer. Pretending to reach for a revolver and calling upon imaginary assistance he demanded his surrender. The Boer yielded, and Hornibrook led back into camp one of Cronje's trusted adjutants.

OFFICERS OF THE FIRST CONTINGENT.

Commandant Cronje had been brought to a halt and surrounded, and his outposts had been driven in. But he looked for help from the outside, and even if none came he determined to resist to the utmost. He at once set to work to strengthen the position he occupied by trenches, rifle pits, and embrasures. This work was carried out with consummate skill. When completed he was in possession of a really strong defensive position, oval in shape, about two miles long from north to south across the river, and about a mile and a half wide from east to west. From both east and west the British began to sap toward his lines, while from north and south the artillery hurled within the lines an appalling mass of shot and shell.

After burying their dead on the morning of the 19th the Canadians waited all day at their bivouac, but in vain, for the arrival of food. About five o'clock the order came to move and take up a line of outposts in front of the new Boer trenches, some three miles forward. The position was reached at about six o'clock, and a meal arrived two hours and a half later. On the morning of the 20th the whole regiment, as an outpost line, advanced some 2,000 yards toward the Boer laager, and the firing-line advanced 1,000 yards still nearer. In this position the men were all day subjected to a hot fire, the nerve-shaking pom-pom being directed against them several times. The firing-line was protected by a ridge, but four casualties happened in the reserve. The day was very hot, and the men suffered much from thirst and hunger. About six o'clock they returned to their

position of the night before, pretty well done out. For twenty-four hours after that no call was made upon them, and, as they had had in the meantime at least one good meal, they were ready for duty again in the line of outposts at six o'clock.

The next day at 1.30 they were ordered to occupy a kopje about a mile to the left, in view of a report that a large body of the enemy was approaching from the north. This kopje they occupied for two days. Being relieved by the Shropshires on the 24th, they marched back to the Drift and went into bivouac. It had rained for a great part of the three days and nights, and a day of rest was most welcome, as was also the sun, which dried clothes and blankets.

In the meantime the British had succeeded in making trenches nearer and nearer to those of the Boers. The nearest of all was then occupied by the Cornwalls. It was within 500 yards of the Boer trenches and ran from the bank of the river, about 240 yards north. Yet, because of the conformation of the ground, the fire from the British trenches did not render any of the Boer trenches untenable. Cronje, however, realised that surrender was inevitable. His followers were even then insisting upon it, and he was holding out only until the anniversary of Majuba was past.

On the morning of the 26th, the day before this anniversary, the Canadians were ordered to relieve the Cornwalls in their advanced trench. They did so, and spent the day in deepening and extending it, firing whenever an object presented itself. It is said that Brigadier-General Macdonald sent from his bed

a note to Lord Roberts reminding him that the next day was Majuba Day, and Sir Henry Colville suggested a plan of attack. That defeat had rankled in British breasts for nineteen years. Strange, and yet not strange, was the overmastering wish that it be avenged. The exhibition of incompetence at Majuba did not fairly represent the British people. They felt that they were not inferior to the Boers, but they had failed to prove it. Vengeance is the diseased form of the motive of vindication; but the desire for vindication there must be and should be. The capture of Cronje on Majuba Day would dramatically reverse the affair of 1881, and the army felt that it could accept that reversal as a vindication. It was for sentimental satisfaction that the attempt was to be made. There was no strategical need for it: Cronje must surrender within a day or two.

The trench held by the Canadians did not command the Boer enclosure. But if a trench could be established 400 yards nearer, the protected angle of the position would be entered and they could command alike the rifle pits in the banks and the embrasures on the north. It was from their trench that the attempt should be made. They were eager to try. So the order was given, and at 2.15 a.m. on the morning of the 27th the Canadians rose from the trench and stole softly forward. B Company was in reserve to the rear of the trench, and A Company had been sent to occupy a post across the river; but all the rest of the regiment participated. Some Gordons had been placed in the north end of the trench and stood with bayonets fixed, ready to act



THE BATTLE-GROUND AT PAARDEBERG.

in support, but under strict orders on no account to fire a shot. A little to the rear and 1,500 yards to the left was the trench of the Shropshires, running north-east. The Shropshires were to fire and distract the enemy's attention as soon as the Canadians' advance was discovered. There was a faint light from the stars, and later from the waning moon.

The front ranks of the six companies, forming a long line with an interval between the men of one pace, moved forward with fixed bayonets and magazines charged. Fifteen paces behind them, with rifles slung, came the rear ranks, carrying shovels and picks. Thirty men of the Royal Engineers formed the extreme right of this line. When the front rank could go no further it was to throw itself flat and return the Boers' fire, while the rear rank began to entrench, taking its base line from the Engineers. Orders were passed along by a pressure of the hand.

Cautiously, step by step, they advanced—100 yards, 200 yards, 300 yards, 400 yards. Yet every nerve stood the strain. G Company was within 65 yards of the Boer trenches. Some foot struck a tin—a shot rang out; then two or three; then a volley. For fifteen minutes a furious fusillade continued. At the first shots the front rank had dropped down, but not before some had been hit. They returned the fire so accurately that the Boers could not show above the trenches, but raised their rifles and fired at random. Thus protected, the rear rank worked desperately at the trench. For twenty minutes they held to their work, and the Boer fire was slackening; and then some one unknown called out to retire, and

four companies dropped back to the trench they had left. But G and H Companies, under Captains Macdonnell and Stairs, held on, and behind them the Engineers did great work. By daylight they were thoroughly entrenched. They commanded the Boer position, and the Boers knew it. The white flag went up on the trenches, and 200 of the enemy came over and surrendered. Cronje could hold them no longer, and he tendered his formal surrender to Lord Roberts.

In his official despatch to the War Office Lord Roberts said: "At 3 a.m. to-day a most dashing advance was made by the Canadian Regiment and some Engineers, supported by the 1st Gordon Highlanders and 2nd Shropshires, resulting in our gaining a point some 600 yards nearer to the enemy and within about 80 yards of his trenches, where our men entrenched themselves and maintained their positions until morning—a gallant deed, worthy of our Colonial comrades, and which, I am glad to say, was attended by comparatively small loss. This apparently clinched matters, for at daylight to-day a letter signed by General Cronje, in which he stated that he surrendered unconditionally, was brought to the outposts under a flag of truce."

The Canadians shared with the other regiments the praise contained in the orders of the following day: "The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief desires to express to the troops under his command his high appreciation of their conduct during the recent operations. By the endurance they have shown through long and trying marches and the

gallantry they have displayed during engagements with the enemy, they have worthily upheld the traditions of Her Majesty's army." Seven Canadians were killed and thirty-six wounded. The dead were buried where they fell by Father O'Leary. In the afternoon Lord Roberts addressed the men in most complimentary terms, and the regiment moved a mile and a half up-stream to be free from the stench of the Boer camp and the tainted water.

It was about a week later that the march to Bloemfontein was continued. Before they left the men found time to mark and decorate the graves of their comrades. Engagements took place on the way, but the Canadians did not again get into the firing-line, and for them it was a repetition of the experiences between Graspan and Paardeberg, except that more rain fell and boots were worn through. Finally, at 10 a.m. on Thursday, March 15th, the regiment marched into Bloemfontein and went into camp on the west side of the town.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND CONTINGENT

On November 7th the Canadian Government made the offer of a second contingent. At this time not only were Mafeking, Kimberley, and Ladysmith besieged, but in Natal the British garrison at Colenso had retired before General Joubert's advance, and the Boers had invaded Cape Colony. Public opinion in Canada had been sobered. There was less excitement and more conviction. The grounds of conviction were somewhat changed, for it was not then a question of acting upon an indefinite principle, when no immediate practical utility was apparent, but rather of supporting action already taken, when the usefulness of that action and the need for support first began to appear.

Before accepting the British Government decided to await the results of the first operations under Sir Redvers Buller. When no striking success had been gained, and, indeed, when striking reverses had fully demonstrated that more men by thousands would be required, and probably also a change in methods, the British Government, about the middle of December, offered the chief command to Lord Roberts and the

position of Chief of Staff to Lord Kitchener. These appointments were announced on December 18th, and on the same day a cable was received in Ottawa accepting the offer made nearly a month and a half before. This time, instead of expressing a preference for infantry, the War Office expressed its preference for mounted men, but the composition of the force was left largely to the judgment of the Canadian Government which decided to send a regiment of Mounted Rifles and a brigade division of Field Artillery. At a Council meeting on December 18th the necessary order was passed, and the work of organisation began.

What kind of men would prove of most use was clear from the developments of the campaign. The mounted men must ride well and shoot well, must be thoroughly self-reliant, know how to take cover, follow a trail, find their way without a map, must have the wariness and persistence of old hunters, and be clear grit to the backbone. In a word, they must have, in a high degree, the typical qualities of pioneers in a new country. A few hundreds of such men could scout for any army corps and give the Boers lessons in their own style of fighting. Canada has many hundreds of men whose daily life is a preparation for that kind of work, and thousands more who would take to it naturally. And in the North-West Mounted Police, and in those who have passed through its ranks, she has not an insignificant number, perhaps 4,000 in all, who, in addition, are drilled men. In the case of the artillery it was clear that experienced gunners were needed. Since the

Boers were showing themselves such effective artillerymen, it would not do to send against them men who had not learned how to handle their guns.

When the Militia Order was issued on December 20th, it was seen that the Government intended to send just the men who would be most serviceable.

NORTH-WEST RECRUITS FOR THE MOUNTED RIFLES.

The Mounted Rifles were to consist of two battalions of two squadrons each. One battalion was to be recruited from the Permanent Cavalry, from members of cavalry regiments in the Active Militia, and from others, all over the country, who would meet the requirements; and the other battalion was to be

recruited under the special direction of the Commissioner of the North-West Mounted Police. As about one-third of the 750 men of the North-West Mounted Police were on special duty in the Yukon district, the whole battalion could not be recruited from the active list of that force, but the Commissioner was to accept as many as could be spared and fill up the required number with ex-policemen and others who in his judgment were fully qualified. Both these battalions were to be known as Mounted Rifles; but the name of the first battalion was afterward (August 24, 1900) changed to Royal Canadian Dragoons, so as to connect them with the Permanent Cavalry, which bears that name. The honours of the 2nd Battalion will be claimed by the North-West Mounted Police. One-third of the artillery was to be recruited from the Permanent Artillery, and the remainder from those who had had at least one training in camp with an artillery corps in the Active Militia. This was to be the rule, although others might be admitted. There were to be three batteries, designated C, D, and E, to follow the A and B of the Permanent Artillery. The name was to be the Royal Canadian Artillery, which is the name of the Permanent Artillery. Qualifications as to height, chest measurement, and age were to be the same as in the case of the first contingent. Counting nurses, chaplains, and attached officers, the second contingent left Canada just 1,320 strong. Pay for the force was fixed at the rates prevailing in the North-West Mounted Police, and ranged from $7.12 per diem for the Lieut.-Col. down to 75 cents. per diem for privates. This was to

hold until the force arrived in South Africa, when pay was to be at Imperial rates, but, as in the case of the Royal Canadian Infantry, the Canadian Government afterward provided that the difference between the rates of pay should be made up for the whole term of service.

The points of enrolment for the 1st Battalion of the Mounted Rifles were: for A Squadron, Toronto, St. Catharines, Peterborough, Ottawa, London, and Kingston, in Ontario, and Montreal in Quebec; for B Squadron, Winnipeg, Portage la Prairie, Virden, Brandon, and Yorkton, in Manitoba and the North-West; Montreal, Quebec, and Cookshire, in Quebec; Sussex and St. John, in New Brunswick; and Canning, in Nova Scotia. The 2nd Battalion was enrolled at posts of the North-West Mounted Police. C Battery was enrolled at Kingston, Gananoque, Hamilton, St. Catharines, and Toronto, in Ontario, and Winnipeg in Manitoba; D Battery at Guelph, Ottawa, London, and Port Hope, in Ontario; and E Battery at Quebec, Montreal and Granby, in Quebec; at Woodstock and Newcastle in New Brunswick, and Sydney in Nova Scotia.

More time was allowed for enrolment and concentration than had been possible with the first contingent. The Orders allowed a full month for concentration at Halifax, but, because of the delays in securing transports, it was two months before the last detachment sailed. On account of the number of horses, three ships were required. The *Laurentian* and *Pomeranian*, of the Allan Line, sailed on January 20th and January 27th respectively; and the *Mil-*

waukee, of the Elder-Dempster Line, which was not handed over to the Government until February 6th, sailed on February 20th. All three were fitted up after the style of the *Sardinian*, with necessary changes to accommodate the horses and the greater amount of ammunition.

Both branches of the force went complete in every respect—personal equipment, regimental equipment, horses, guns, ammunition, and waggons. There were four Maxims on galloping carriages for the Mounted Rifles, six twelve-pounder field guns for each battery, and 500 rounds of ammunition per rifle, 500 rounds per field gun, and 10,000 rounds per Maxim gun. Down to picketing gear, axle grease and a three months' supply of horseshoes, the equipment was as complete as the Government could make it.

With regard to the officers of this force it may be said that those of most experience were selected. In the 1st Battalion of the Mounted Rifles all the principal officers and about half the total number were taken from the Permanent Cavalry. Lieut.-Col. Lessard, commanding the Permanent Cavalry, was given the command. As he had gone to South Africa as one of the special officers attached to the first contingent, he assumed command when Cape Town was reached. In the 2nd Battalion nearly every officer was taken from the staff of the North-West Mounted Police. Commissioner Herchmer was in command. About one-half of the artillery officers belonged to the Permanent Artillery. Lieut.-Col. Drury, commanding Field Division Royal Canadian Artillery, who, like Lieut.-Col. Lessard, was already

in South Africa attached to the Royal Canadian Regiment, was given command of the division.

As the enrolling points were more numerous than in the case of the first contingent, different parts of the country had a chance to indulge in demonstrations. The places which had witnessed the greatest enthusiasm over the departure of the men for the first contingent sent off the men for the second more quietly, but, on the whole, there was quite as much enthusiasm, and quite as much practical interest in the men. And there was no lack of volunteers. Real hard fighting appealed to even more men than did the Imperial parade into which the campaign was at first expected to resolve itself. But, of course, possible recruits had had more time to make up their minds and arrange their affairs. At Halifax, where all three detachments embarked, were repeated the scenes which had made the departure of the first contingent from Quebec so profoundly impressive.

On the *Laurentian*, which reached Cape Town on February 17th, went D and E Batteries, a small detachment of the 2nd Battalion of the Mounted Rifles, and fourteen attached officers, nurses, and men. Among those attached was a postal corps of five men. At the time the first contingent was being organised the Canadian Post Office Department had offered to the Imperial Government a postal corps for the special work of handling the mail for the Canadians in the field; but the offer was not accepted until just before the second contingent was sent. Canada's example in this respect was followed in Australia and India. After the corps had been two

months in South Africa Major Treble, commanding Army Post Office Corps, wrote to Hon. Mr. Mulock, Canadian Postmaster-General, that "the Canadian staff, under the supervision of Captain Ecclestone, has proved very efficient, and besides relieving me of all work in connection with the Canadian troops, has rendered valuable assistance in the work generally."

The *Pomeranian* landed the 2nd Battalion of the Mounted Rifles on February 25th, and these, with the two batteries, spent some days at Green Point Camp. By March 4th, however, began their despatch northward in sections. The uprising in the north-western part of Cape Colony had not been crushed at Sunnyside. That defeat had imposed a temporary check, and the successes that attended Lord Roberts's first aggressive movements had had a discouraging effect; nevertheless the movement had attained considerable proportions, and was alike a menace to the line of communications and a most dangerous example and centre of influence for the whole Dutch population of the Cape. The area of overt rebellion had spread from Douglas in the north to Carnarvon in the south. So serious was the situation deemed that Lord Kitchener returned from the front to direct the operations of a punitive force. While he struck at the centre of the disaffected district, a column was organised to march from its southern limits northward and co-operate. To form this column the 2nd Battalion of the Canadian Mounted Rifles, D and E Batteries of the Royal Canadian Artillery, the West Australian and New Zealand Mounted Rifles, and a detachment of Imperial Yeomanry, were con-



ROUTE OF MOUNTED RIFLES AND D AND E BATTERIES.

centrated at Victoria West, a station about 400 miles north of Cape Town on the road to De Aar. Sir Charles Parsons was given the command. Preceded by an advanced guard, the column left Victoria West on March 13th for Carnarvon. From Carnarvon they proceeded north-west toward Kenhardt. Everywhere the rebels dispersed as they advanced. On no occasion was a shot fired, and the function of the expedition proved to be that of overawing and disheartening the disaffected community. As Sir Charles Parsons was with the advanced guard, and it happened that the Canadian officers outranked, in nearly every case, the other officers in the main column, the responsibilities of the march fell very largely upon the Canadians, and particularly upon Lieut.-Col. Drury as senior officer with the main column. The district traversed was noted for its small rainfall, and one of the difficulties feared was the obtaining of sufficient water. But, instead of drought and dry watercourses, the column encountered the heaviest rainfall in ten years and rivers in flood. With the wet and the heat and the long marches, both men and horses suffered considerably at times, but they stood the hardships remarkably well. Some sickness there was, but not much. Lieut.-Col. Herchmer, unfortunately, received a slight sunstroke, which incapacitated him for the remainder of the campaign, and Major Howe took command of the battalion.

Strange it was that, in an ordinarily parched country, the first death in the second contingent should be from drowning. The advanced guard, which included a section of D Battery and a squadron

of the Mounted Rifles, had crossed the Haartebeeste River on its way to Kenhardt; but when the main column arrived the floods had so increased that it was quite impossible to take waggons across, and the column halted at Van Wyk's Vlei. Gunner Bradley here rode his horse to water, when the horse stumbled and threw him into the river. His companions dived for him and pulled him out, but, although he was brought back to consciousness, he died a few hours afterwards. He was buried near the camp, and his grave covered with wild flowers.

When word was received from Sir Charles Parsons that even at Kenhardt the rebels had laid down their arms, the order was given to return to Carnarvon. Reaching that place, Lieut.-Col. Drury was ordered to march to De Aar and report there on April 14th. It was then April 8th, and the distance was 130 miles. Such good time was made, however, that in the afternoon of the 13th the column encamped in sight of De Aar, and on the following morning came into camp, where the Royal Canadian Infantry had made their first stop north of Cape Town. About 400 miles, up to that time the longest march of the war, had been covered in a month. Men and horses were well seasoned and fit for anything that might follow.

In the meantime the *Milwaukee* had landed at Cape Town C Battery and the 1st Battalion of the Mounted Rifles, together with a few men belonging to the 2nd Battalion and the other batteries, for whom room could not be found on the *Laurentian* and *Pomeranian*. One of the first duties allotted to

this portion of the contingent was to act as escort to the Boer prisoners captured at Paardeberg, on their way from their camp to the dock, where they embarked for St. Helena—part of them on board the *Milwaukee*, from which the Canadians had just landed. They wondered that those rough, undisciplined farmers—old men, middle-aged men, and boys—could have held against picked British troops Magersfontein and the dongas at Paardeberg. The white flag of their surrender had flown first at a point gained by the Canadian Infantry on the morning of Majuba Day, and Canadian Mounted Rifles formed their last escort on South African soil.

Rather than keep the men in camp at Cape Town until a place in the great field of the operations was assigned them, Lieut.-Col. Lessard and Major Hudon obtained permission to march out on April 4th to Stellenbosch, thirty-three miles up the line. The distance was covered in a day and a half. If either the men or the horses were to be in condition to do their share, when this last detachment of the contingent was united with the two other detachments, which had been on the move for weeks, they must be given as much route marching as possible.

Lord Roberts had then been a month at Bloemfontein. Preparations for his overwhelming advance on Pretoria were almost completed. He needed all the mounted men he could get, but he had batteries enough. Both battalions of the Canadian Mounted Rifles were, therefore, ordered to Bloemfontein, but not the three batteries. The welcome order reached the 1st Battalion at Stellenbosch, and they there entrained

in sections for the north. B Squadron was the first to go forward, and the whole battalion passed through De Aar *en route* to Bethulie just a day or two before the 2nd Battalion rode into De Aar, after their month's heavy march. Almost immediately, however, the latter followed on. At Bethulie, on the northern border of Cape Colony and 120 miles south of Bloemfontein, the different sections were forced to detrain, as the railway bridge over the Orange River had not yet been restored. Separated by a day's march or so, the sections marched up through the Free State as escort to transport and ammunition waggons.

The line of communications had been kept clear, but the Boers were pressing as close as they could on the east. They had driven in the British outposts from Thaba Nchu and had occupied the Bloemfontein waterworks, and, besides, they held the eastern strip of the Free State almost down to Cape Colony. At Wepener, in the south, they were even then besieging a small British force. As long as his communications were safe Lord Roberts made little effort to check them until he was ready not only to sweep them out of his way, but to sweep right on to Pretoria and to fit in with the other operations the relief of Mafeking. Just as B Squadron, the first of the Mounted Canadians, rode into Bloemfontein, the movements of troops had commenced which resulted in clearing the enemy from their positions in the east and south. General Pole-Carew and General French had gone out toward the waterworks, and a few hours after their arrival B Squadron, under Major Williams, was

sent out with Colonel Alderson's corps of Mounted Infantry in General French's Brigade. They were not long kept waiting for a fight. Reaching Leeuw Kop on the following day, April 22nd, they were posted on the extreme right of the British lines, and found the enemy occupying a range of kopjes to their left. The Canadians, 250 of Roberts's Horse, and two batteries were moved up to attack Leeuw Kop. At 3 p.m. the batteries opened fire, and the Boers replied. The Canadians were then ordered to move around the Kop, cross the river, and go forward until fired upon. They succeeded in finding a ford, and pushed on towards a farmhouse, from which flew a white flag. Lieutenant Van Straubenzee's troop was in advance. Believing that the white flag signified an absence of danger at that particular point, the men rode on, but, when within 700 yards of the farmhouse, they were met by a volley from Boers concealed around the farm buildings. Lieutenant Van Straubenzee at once gave the order to dismount and take cover. His horse was killed as he dismounted. Recognising by the accuracy of the fire that it would be most dangerous to withdraw, he sent back word of his position to Major Williams, who at once moved up the second and third troops to his support, retaining one troop in reserve. The three advanced troops were all under fire. Major Williams's horse was struck. Lieutenant Young's troop dismounted and worked near enough to the enemy to draw their fire and engage their attention. Seizing the opportunity, Lieutenant Van Straubenzee gave the order to his troop to mount and withdraw at

a gallop. The whole movement succeeded admirably and without a single casualty. The Boers retreated, as they did all along the line before the British advance.

This was the first time the men of the second contingent had been under fire. Unless it was a mistake to trust in any degree to the good faith of a white flag, no mistake seems to have been committed. It was a situation which put to the test the coolness of the men and their ability to take and keep cover, and gave a chance to the officers to show their capacity for leadership. It was a battle on a small scale, and the Canadians, left to their own resources, met its exigencies with good nerve and good judgment. Major Williams was complimented upon the manner in which he handled his squadron. As a punishment for the treacherous use of the white flag the Canadians burned the farm buildings.

On the 23rd and 24th of April B Squadron was again under fire, although it played no prominent part in the operations of those two days. The Boers were dispersed and the squadron returned to Bloemfontein. The Canadian Infantry was also, of course, near at hand. With the exception of the batteries all the Canadians were now with Lord Roberts. The batteries had been bitterly disappointed when the orders to the front did not include them. D and E Batteries were consigned to the work of guarding the lines of communication between Victoria West and Belmont, and except when a portion of E Battery took part in Sir Charles Warren's expedition to Douglas about the middle of May, were destined for weeks to see no active service. But better luck

was in store for C Battery. In accordance with an old agreement the British Government had concluded an arrangement with Portugal by which British troops could land at Beira on the east coast and proceed through Portuguese territory into Rhodesia. More troops were needed in that district to render it secure, and, above all, Colonel Plumer needed reinforcements in order effectually to co-operate with a flying column from the south for the relief of Mafeking. The British heart yearned for the relief of the heroic garrison of Mafeking as for no other achievement, and Lord Roberts was equal to planning its accomplishment. He had telegraphed Colonel Baden-Powell to hold out till the 18th of May. The relief involved large operations and nice calculations. Colonel Plumer must be strengthened on the north, and troops must travel 2,000 miles to reach him. Before Colonel Mahon could dash up from the south, the Boer flank must be turned at Fourteen Streams. Before General Hunter could accomplish this Lord Methuen must threaten the Boer lines at some point near Boshof; and the whole operation depended upon the main army of the Boers being occupied by Lord Roberts's advance. C Battery, under Major Hudon, was specially selected by Lord Roberts, because it was Colonial and because it was near Cape Town, to make an attempt to reach Colonel Plumer by way of Beira. It was to go with the force under Sir Frederick Carrington.

Early in the afternoon of Good Friday, April 14th, C Battery was ordered to strike camp and proceed

OFFICERS OF C BATTERY, R.C.A., WHICH WENT TO THE RELIEF OF MAFEKING.

from Stellenbosch by forced march to Cape Town. By 8.30 on the following morning the battery arrived at the ship's side, having covered the thirty-three miles during the night. All guns, waggons, horses, harness, and ammunition were on board by noon. It was smart work. Sergeant Kiely wrote home that "when the Staff Officer arrived at 12.15 he gave orders to go on loading guns. 'All loaded, sir,' was the reply. 'Go on loading horses, then.' 'All loaded, sir,' was again the reply. 'Then go on with the ammunition.' The same reply was given. 'Impossible,' said the officer; but the fact remained, and he reported the feat to Lord Roberts by wire, who sent a message congratulating the men. It was read out by the Staff Officer on parade at 2 p.m."

An hour later the transport *Columbian*, on which they had embarked, steamed out of Cape Town on its trip of 1,500 miles through the Indian Ocean. A week's sail brought them to Beira. Two hours after disembarking they had boarded a train on the narrow-gauge railway for Marandellas Camp in Mashonaland. From this point to Bulawayo the regular means of passenger transport is stage coaches drawn by mules. The distance is about 300 miles. The owner of the coach line notified his agents in Rhodesia to suspend the mail service and dispose all the mules as relays along the road. Mules were then hitched to four guns of the battery, while their squads rode in coaches. The other two guns followed as escorts to the transport and ammunition waggons. Changing mules every few miles the four guns were rushed through to Bulawayo at the rate

of 60 to 100 miles a day. From Bulawayo they took the railway south to Ootsi, which they reached on the 12th, just seven days after leaving Marandellas. They were then seventy miles north of Colonel



HOW C BATTERY GOT TO MAFEKING.

Plumer's column, which, by forced marches through sand and bush, they reached on the 15th. On the 17th Colonel Plumer and Colonel Mahon joined forces, and the Canadian Artillery helped to win

that stubborn five hours' fight nine miles from Mafeking, which opened the road into the beleaguered town by which the relieving force entered in brilliant moonlight at four in the morning.

For seven long months that little garrison had watched and fought and endured because they would not yield. They never lapsed into carelessness and never weakened in determination. And they finished, not like spent men, but with a display of full powers. A few days before they had outwitted and confounded the Boers in their last desperate assault, and on the 18th of May they marched out, with the relieving force as supports and reserve, to fire the last shots at the fleeing enemy. That the Canadians contributed by their remarkable march and by their spirit and steadiness in their first artillery action to the final relief of such men will remain one of the proudest traditions of Canadian arms.

Colonel Mahon reported to Lord Roberts that the Canadian Artillery, "by a series of forced marches, reached him on the morning of the fighting and rendered very valuable assistance"; and Colonel Baden-Powell reported that they had joined Colonel Plumer "with incredible rapidity." To the Canadian Government Colonel Baden-Powell sent this telegraphic message: "Mafeking relieved to-day, and most grateful for invaluable assistance of Canadian Artillery, which made record march from Beira to help us."

CHAPTER VII

STRATHCONA'S HORSE, AND OTHERS

CANADA did more to help the British cause in South Africa than send out two official contingents. Besides reinforcements for the Canadian Infantry in the field, the Government raised another complete battalion of infantry to garrison Halifax, and thus enabled the War Office to send the Leinster Regiment to the front ; and Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal furnished, as a private contribution, three squadrons of Mounted Rifles ; and many Canadians fought in South Africa whose names were not to be found on the rolls of the Royal Canadian Infantry, the Canadian Mounted Rifles, the Royal Canadian Artillery, or Strathcona's Horse. In the first place, there were the Canadians who held commissions in the regiments of British regulars engaged—twenty or more. Captain Carrington Smith, Captain Hensley, and Lieutenant Cory were with the Dublin Fusiliers when they charged the hill at Glencoe ; Captain Morris and his company of the Devonshires were first at the enemy's guns at Eland's Laagte ; Lieutenant Osborne, of the Scottish Rifles, was killed at Spion Kop, and Lieutenant Wood at the battle of

Belmont; Lieutenant MacInnes was one of the Royal Engineers in charge of the defences at Kimberley; Lieut.-Col. Girouard was director of railways in South Africa, and Captain Nanton his deputy-assistant.

Among the Uitlanders in the Transvaal were a few Canadians. When the Canadian Government passed the July resolutions of sympathy and moral support, these men met together and expressed their gratification thereat; and when the war broke out most of them joined the irregular forces organised in Cape Colony and Natal. And they were not the only Canadians in those forces. Many officers and men, who could not find places in the regular contingents, sought enlistment in England, and not succeeding there, paid their own passages to the Cape and joined the irregulars. For example, Major William Hamilton Merritt, of the Governor-General's Bodyguard, went out in this way, and was appointed second in command of Brabant's Horse, and served in that capacity in all the hard fighting of that force; Wasson, one of the Canadian team which, in England in 1897, won the prize in the bayonet competition for the Empire, paid his own way from Dawson City in the Klondike and joined Roberts's Horse, and Jackson went with him. Pullen, of Toronto, disappointed at not being enrolled in the Royal Canadian Infantry, at his own expense followed the regiment to Bloemfontein, and was there enrolled and posted to C Company. Wallbridge did likewise. Charlie Ross, a well-known scout during the rebellion of 1885, went out, and, enrolling a troop, was given a lieutenancy in Roberts's



LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL.

Horse. So with many others. There were Canadians in Roberts's Horse, Kitchener's Horse, Brabant's Horse, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, Natal Volunteer Ambulance Corps, and the Cape Mounted Police. Indeed, there was hardly an irregular force in South Africa in which Canadians were not to be found.

Lieut.-Col. Sam Hughes, M.P., was another Canadian who did good work in South Africa. His fighting blood led him into encounters with Major-General Hutton and with the military system generally long before he met the Boers. If there was any principle underlying his "quarrel" with the G.O.C., it would seem to be this—that a Canadian was at liberty to volunteer directly to the Minister of Militia and to the War Office without sending his application along the regular channel of communication. Either because it was considered better for reasons of discipline that strict military procedure should be adhered to, even in exceptional circumstances, or because there was a deliberate purpose to keep the Canadian offers for service in South Africa within the regular military system, so that the contingent would be official, the military authorities quietly but firmly insisted on the observance of the regular order. Lieut.-Col. Hughes had more than once before offered to raise a regiment or brigade of Canadians for the Imperial service, and in April, 1899, he had moved a resolution in the Canadian Parliament on the general subject; and he had been the first to call the attention of Parliament to the offers for South Africa made by the other Colonies. His offers on other occasions had, he believed, been pigeon-holed,

and he also believed that there was a disposition on the part of the British officers in Canada to underestimate the capabilities of the Canadian Militia, with the exception, perhaps, of the Permanent Force. So, when a new occasion presented itself, he offered directly to Mr. Chamberlain as a British subject, and to the Minister of Militia as a Canadian officer, and he shortly afterward issued a circular calling for volunteers. The War Office accepted the loyal and patriotic offer through the Colonial Office, and the Colonial Office through the Governor-General, and the Governor-General through his Military Secretary, who pointed out that the offer should have come through the G.O.C. The G.O.C. instructed the D.O.C. in No. 3 District to secure an explanation of the irregularity. Such an amount of red tape was verily a red rag to a bull, and the impetuous officer and politician fairly ran amuck. He rent and tossed the Horse Guards, the average British officer, and particularly British General Officers Commanding in Canada, Governors-General, some Canadian Militia officers, and other persons and institutions. As for some time he refused to retract or modify his words, Major-General Hutton was forced, in the interests of discipline, to threaten him with suspension from the command of his regiment. The G.O.C. all along recognised his "military zeal and anxiety for employment on active service," and a partial adjustment was reached by which Lieut.-Col. Hughes was allowed to go to South Africa as a passenger on the ss. *Sardinian*. In South Africa he obtained a position on the Staff of General Settle on the lines of communi-

cation, and afterwards on the Staff of Sir Charles Warren. He was indefatigable in the field, and was more than once mentioned in despatches. Sir Charles Warren reported that "Lieut.-Col. Hughes is proving himself an excellent intelligence officer and leader of irregular mounted troops."

The battalion raised by the Canadian Government for garrison duty at Halifax was, in effect, a battalion added to Lord Roberts's army, for it set free for service in South Africa a battalion of regulars. It happened that the regiment stationed at Halifax was the 1st Battalion of the Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment. This regiment inherits the traditions of the old 100th Royal Canadians. When the old 100th returned to Canada in 1866 it remained for about two years quartered at Montreal and Ottawa, during which time there were few recruits and very many discharges, so that when the regiment returned to England it was very much reduced in strength. The ranks were filled by recruiting in the British Isles, and the regiment ceased to be Canadian in anything but name. When the old system of regimental numbers was superseded by the territorial system in the British army, the 100th became the Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians).

Many times during the last few years it has been suggested in Canada that this regiment should be repatriated. It would seem that the Canadian Government was in correspondence with the Imperial Government upon this very point during January and February, 1900. No plan for repatriation was agreed upon, but the more immediately useful scheme of

raising a Canadian regiment to take the place of the Leinsters at garrison duty was proposed, and on March 2nd Sir Wilfrid Laurier announced in the House of Commons that the Imperial Government had accepted Canada's offer in this matter.

Constitutional and technical difficulties had to be met. The number of troops to be enlisted for continuous service in Canada is fixed by statute. As it was not possible out of 1,000 men of all arms to garrison Halifax and keep up the necessary services in the rest of the country, either the statute would have to be changed or some circumvention would have to be discovered. To change the statute would give a permanency to the arrangement for what might be only a temporary requirement, and so circumvention was resorted to. The Militia Order issued on March 5th contains the following paragraph: "The formation of a Provisional Battalion of Infantry from the Active Militia (the Permanent Corps, Cavalry and Field Artillery, and Active Militia of the City of Halifax, which is already allotted to the defence of Halifax in the Imperial Defence Scheme, excepted) is authorised to replace temporarily the 1st Battalion Prince of Wales's Leinster Regiment (Royal Canadians) at Halifax, N.S." That is, it was to be regarded as a provisional battalion, and was to be recruited from among Active Militiamen. To be eligible every man must belong to a corps in the Active Militia and be carried on the strength of that corps; he must have performed one annual training; and he must re-enlist in the Active Militia for three years. Any ex-member of a corps

desiring to join the new battalion must first re-enlist in the Active Militia. The fiction was that men enlisted for three years in the Active Militia might be specially enrolled for "general service" in a "provisional battalion" for a period of one year out of the three, without doing violence to the constitution. It would have been illegal, of course, to add to the force enrolled "for continuous service" by enlisting men from the citizens at large, even for one year of such service. Yet this provisional battalion was afterward designated the "3rd (Special Service) Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry." It was made the 3rd Battalion of the Permanent Infantry, just as the first contingent to South Africa had been made the 2nd Battalion. The Militia Act is in need of amendment.

The various companies were apportioned among the different military districts very much as were the companies of the first contingent. The age limit was slightly extended, and the standard of height slightly lowered. A full battalion was secured, but volunteers were rather slow in presenting themselves. In this respect there was a significant contrast between the volunteering for the contingents and that for the garrison battalion. The prospect of active service in the field was lacking, although many, perhaps most, of those who volunteered did so in the hope that ultimately the battalion might be sent to South Africa. When danger threatens, and there is an opportunity for actual contest, any reasonable number of Canadian recruits can be obtained; but, under present conditions, it would seem that the

routine life of the regular soldier is not attractive. The battalion was ready for service when the Leinster Regiment sailed. Not quite the whole battalion went to Halifax, for the right half of A Company, which had been enrolled at Victoria, B.C., was detailed to assist the Imperial troops in the garrisoning of Esquimalt.

Although nothing came of it, an offer made by the Government of the Province of British Columbia should be mentioned. In January this Provincial Government offered a contingent of 100 Mounted Rifles. The Imperial Government accepted the offer, and undertook to "defray the expense of transport of any further contingent if enough to ship." The number offered by British Columbia did not make up even one squadron, and it was not supplemented by others to complete the shipload. No doubt British Columbia would gladly have increased the number, at least to 160, and transportation charges would have been met, had these been the only difficulties. It is probable, however, that it was recognised as unwise to establish a precedent for contributions by Provinces.

In the Speech from the Throne, read at the opening of the Canadian Parliament on February 1, 1900, was the following paragraph: "It is a matter of pride and gratification to the people of this Dominion that, in addition to the contingents sent by the Government, another Canadian force is being organised and despatched at the personal expense of the High Commissioner of Canada. This generous and patriotic action upon the part of Lord

Strathcona reflects high honour on him and on the Dominion he represents."

This language is but a moderate expression of the feeling with which Canadians regarded the act of Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal. By birth a Scotchman, he, when eighteen years of age, came to Canada in the service of the Hudson's Bay Company, and spent many years at its posts in the Canadian wilderness. He is now the head of that ancient Company, and a man of wide interests and large wealth; and he holds the responsible position of High Commissioner for Canada in London. His career furnishes a notable example of what is possible to energy and ability in Canada. Public-spirited he has always been, and his wealth has been freely given for the benefit of educational and philanthropic institutions.

In all respects his gift of a corps of Mounted Rifles was a splendid act. Already wealthy and full of honours, he was beyond the suspicion of attempting to buy publicity or any of its indirect gains. He desired only to contribute to the success of a great public undertaking, and, with wealth made in Canada, to enable more Canadians to devote their personal services to that end. Not only was this spirit and its inevitable effect in raising the tone of public life in Canada appreciated by Canadians, but there were circumstances which still further appealed to sentiment. He had been a pioneer, and he chose to send out pioneers; and it was from the North, which is the region of natural romance in Canada, and from the West, which is the region of the

nation's greatest hope, that these pioneers were to be selected.

On January 11, 1900, he offered to equip and land at Cape Town at his own expense 500 rough-

OFFICERS OF THE STRATHCONAS.

Lt. Laidlaw. Capt. McDonald. Lt. Falle. Lt. Leckie.
Dr. Keenan.
Lt. Magee. Lt. Christie. Adjt. Harper. Lt. Tokin. Lt. Snider. Lt. Parker. Lt. Courtney. Lt. Strange.
[Lt Ketchen. Lt. Pooley. Adjt. Mackie.
Capt. Howard. Capt. Cartwright. Major Snider. Lt.-Col. Steele. Major Belcher. Major Jarvis.
[Major Laurie. Capt. Cameron.

riders from the Canadian North-West, as a special service corps of Mounted Rifles. Two days later his offer was accepted by the Secretary of State for War.

The Canadian Government was glad to undertake the work of organising this force, and on February 1st

authority was granted for the formation of the corps. It was to have the strength of a regimental staff and three squadrons. In all respects the work of enrolling and concentrating this force was done as it had been for the second contingent. Subject to the approval of Lord Strathcona, the Minister of Militia arranged everything and made all appointments. No limit was placed upon the amount of money to be expended, and the corps was the best equipped of all that left Canada. By that time the Militia Department had had so much experience that all the arrangements proceeded swiftly and smoothly. The force was enrolled at twenty-three points between Winnipeg and Victoria. Any man of the regulation age and size who could ride well and shoot well was eligible, and members of the Permanent Force and the North-West Mounted Police were admitted on just the same terms as they had been in the two official contingents. Lord Strathcona paid the officers and men at the rates prevailing in the North-West Mounted Police until disembarkation in South Africa, from which time they were paid by the Imperial Government. The term of service was six months, with liability of extension to one year. Nothing was overlooked that the Militia Department officials considered necessary for the complete equipment of the corps, and even 500 rounds of ammunition per rifle and 50,000 rounds per Maxim gun were supplied. The force went into action with three Maxims and one pom-pom. Eight of the officers appointed were from the staff of the North-West Mounted Police, and the command was given to Inspector S. B. Steele.

Lieut.-Col. Steele is a man of splendid physique and an ideal scout and leader of scouts. No one who knew the North-West but felt that the very man for the position had been selected. In his command were all the kinds of men to be found in the North-West—owners of ranches, cow-punchers, miners, men of the towns, men of the country, rich men, poor men, immigrants and native-born. The detachments concentrated at Ottawa and were there outfitted, and both at Ottawa and at Montreal and Halifax, through which the force passed, the people received them with enthusiasm; for no higher expectations were entertained for any force, nor was more pride felt in any, than in Strathcona's Horse.

Lord Strathcona is a citizen of Montreal, and on March 12th Montreal received the corps officially. It was Montreal's greatest celebration. The occasion was peculiarly significant, for on Ladysmith Day the exuberance of the students of McGill, the English University, had precipitated trouble with the students of Laval, the French-Canadian University, and in other quarters; and smouldering race feeling had temporarily flamed up. On both sides there was a disposition to wipe out the memories of that affair by uniting in an expression of enthusiasm for the men who were off to the front, and more still for Lord Strathcona himself, who was their fellow-citizen and one of the city's greatest benefactors. The city was gaily decorated and, although it was a cold winter day, thousands were upon the streets to witness the parade. Everywhere the soldiers were cheered. When, passing Laval, the students cheered

them, the McGill students cheered the Laval students, who answered in their turn.

A civic luncheon was given to the men. In his reply to the toast to the force Lieut.-Col. Steele said of Lord Strathcona: "He has been a pioneer like ourselves; he has been in the fastnesses of the Wild West and the extreme north and east, and he has gone through the same hardships as we have gone through, and far more. Therefore we are, as it were, fairly following a man of ourselves. The men you see before you have come, I know for a certainty, from over 1,000,000 square miles of this country of ours, which is one of the family of great nations representing the British Empire. There are men here from the far Yukon; there are men here who have travelled on foot 600 miles on the ice of the Yukon River to come here to volunteer; there are men who have come from Peace River to go to South Africa to fight for our Queen, who were disappointed, when they arrived at Edmonton and other points, that the 2nd Battalion of Mounted Rifles had gone, who when they heard of Lord Stathcona's magnificent offer—that magnificent offer that has not been equalled in the history of this great Empire—hurried forward. I arrived at Calgary on the 5th, and notified the country that recruiting would be commenced that day, and on the evening of the 6th 180 men were enrolled. The horses had been collected by Dr. McEachren over 300 square miles of territory, and they had been collected with great judgment, and are as good as were ever ridden by Western men. We shall endeavour to stay with them."

That the men appreciated the cordiality and kindness of their reception in the East was later shown, as far at least as Ottawa was concerned, in a practical form. At Cape Town they learned of the terrible conflagration that had almost annihilated Hull, and had swept over a large section of Ottawa. A subscription list was at once started. On the subscriptions of the men a limit of $1 was placed, but the limit was raised for the officers. Over $700 was in this way contributed and forwarded to Ottawa. The people of Cape Town and other parts of South Africa, in token of their appreciation of Canada's help in their trouble, contributed liberally to the same cause, and the ends of the earth were drawn still closer in sympathy.

The steamship *Monterey*, of the Elder, Dempster Line, had been chartered for Lord Strathcona and converted into a transport, and on the 16th of March the force embarked at Halifax. The strength of the force was 28 officers and 512 of other ranks, and 599 horses. On the same transport sailed a detachment of infantry, sent out by the Canadian Government as reinforcements for the first contingent. Sickness and casualties had seriously depleted the ranks of the 2nd Royal Canadians, then at Bloemfontein. The Government did not undertake to keep the battalion up to its full strength, but advantage was taken of the sailing of the *Monterey* to send out one draft of three officers and 101 non-commissioned officers and men. Lord Strathcona assented to their travelling upon his ship as soon as it was found that the ship would not thereby be

overcrowded, and the same permission was given to three officers who were attached for special duty. After the quickest passage of all the transports the *Monterey* arrived at Cape Town on April 10th. The passage had been very hard on the horses, no less than 163 dying at sea. This was 25 per cent., while of the previous shipments only about 6 per cent. died on the passage. This heavy loss of horses had to be made up at Cape Town. On account of the urgent need for horses at the front, it was some time before enough could be obtained. But lack of mounts was not the reason why the Strathconas were kept for six weeks at Cape Town; nor was it that they might be thoroughly trained. A daring plan had been devised for them to carry out. It was no less than a dash through Zululand up to Komati Poort, to cut the railway to Delagoa Bay. While the Boer forces were engaged with General Buller in Natal, with Lord Roberts in the Free State, and with General Hunter and General Baden-Powell in the west, a small, rapidly moving force might possibly slip around behind them and sever their communications with the coast. It would have been a brilliant coup. That Lieut.-Col. Steele and his men were selected to make the attempt was the highest mark of confidence in their ability.

Preparations were all completed, and on the 24th of May the Strathconas embarked at Cape Town and put to sea. Two squadrons were to land at Durban and the third was to proceed up the coast to Kosi Bay in Tongaland. The two detachments were then to march across country and meet on the

borders of Swaziland. A and C Squadrons accordingly disembarked at Durban and took the railway north-east to the Tugela River, where they were



ROUTE OF STRATHCONA'S HORSE.

halted. Lieut.-Col. Steele with B Squadron reached Kosi Bay and prepared to land. There being no dock, surf-boats and hawsers had been provided, and

the horses were to be made to swim ashore. The hawsers had already been secured to the shore when H.M.S. *Thetis*, which had escorted the transport that far and had then gone on to Delagoa Bay, returned with a despatch. Some one at Cape Town had conveyed to the Boers intelligence of the proposed expedition, and a change of plan was necessary. Lieut.-Col. Steele returned to Durban, and joining the two squadrons at the Tugela set off by another route. He got as far as Eshowe, in Zululand, when he received orders to return by forced marches to Durban. From information as to the counter-movements of the Boers or for strategical reasons the idea of the expedition had been abandoned. Instead, the Strathconas were to join General Buller's command.

With a full camp outfit Lieut.-Col. Steele made the march of 110 miles to Durban in three days. Entraining there he reached Newcastle after twenty-seven hours' travelling. Remaining at Newcastle one day, he set out to join General Buller. Two days of forced marches brought the Strathconas to Volksrust in the Transvaal, where they were posted to the 3rd Mounted Infantry Brigade under Lord Dundonald, in General Clery's Division. The Brigade was on the move next day, but the enemy made no stand, and on the following day they reached Standerton, where they remained for a week.

On the 1st of July, Dominion Day in Canada, the Strathconas had their first engagement. It was only a sharp skirmish, but for weeks sharp skirmishing

was to be the work of the Strathconas. Of the first fight Lieut.-Col. Steele wrote: "We marched from Standerton on the 30th ult., and on the 1st of July the corps formed the advance guard and scouts of General Clery's column. We had arrived at Waterval Spruit when the advanced scouts reported a commando of Boers on our right front. We crossed the Spruit and halted, while the rest of the column passed the Spruit. Lieutenant Tobin, on the right flank three miles out, reported being fired upon. He was in command of his troop. I sent orders to see that the force of the enemy was ascertained. Jarvis reported a strong force, so I sent out a support, and the General sent Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry. Kirkpatrick's troop, in rear of Tobin's, also got under fire and had one man killed (Private Jenkins, of Red Deer). Sergeant Nichols, of the N.W.M.P., had his horse shot and killed; Jenkins's horse was also killed. Captain Howard and Private Hobson were, no doubt, taken prisoners, but no one saw it occur. The men were fired at from a farmhouse flying the white flag. Four Boers were killed on the spot, and probably more. The artillery opened and the Boers fell back. They were part of the commando of Ben. Viljeon *en route* to Swaziland, and 300 were engaged with our scouts. We buried poor Jenkins at Wachout Spruit, and gave orders to the farmer to respect the grave."

At the end of the first week at the front, during which the Strathconas had been engaged on two or three occasions, and had suffered fifteen casualties, occurred a pleasing incident. The forces of General

Buller had come into touch with those of Lord Roberts, and a conference between the generals was arranged to take place at Pretoria. As escort to Heidelburg General Buller chose 150 men from Strathcona's Horse. During the journey General Buller recalled the days he had spent in Canada, and particularly the part he took in putting down the first Riel rebellion. The rough-riders of the Strathconas were touched by this interest, and by his thoughtfulness for their comfort, and were also struck by the fact that the General set a fast pace for the trip. They voted him a "hustler" in the saddle. With reference to his experiences in Canada General Buller had cabled to Lord Strathcona some days before: "Your fine regiment joined my force during march to Standerton. I am very glad to have them; it is like meeting with old friends, and they are most useful."

Not content with having sent three full squadrons, Lord Strathcona determined to send out a draft of fifty men to help keep the force up to strength. On April 10th he cabled the Minister of Militia asking that such a draft be at once raised and equipped. This was more than six weeks before the Strathconas went into action, but Lord Strathcona would not wait until the need for reinforcements existed before taking steps to supply them. Although it was pointed out to him that this draft could be ready more quickly if it were recruited in Eastern Canada, Lord Strathcona decided to preserve the western character of his force, and again the recruiting was done in Manitoba, the North-West Territories, and British Columbia. Under

STRATHCONAS AT OTTAWA—CHEERING THE QUEEN.

command of Captain Agar Adamson, of the Governor-General's Foot Guards, the fifty men left Canada, on May 1st, on the SS. *Vancouver*, for Liverpool. At Liverpool they took train for London, and embarked on the transport *Assaye*. Lord Strathcona went down to bid them farewell, and was most enthusiastically cheered by the men.

With no more delay at Cape Town, Durban, and Pietermaritzburg than was unavoidable, the draft was sent on to Newcastle, and began a six days' march to Standerton as escort to a convoy. There was just enough danger to keep them alert and observant, but no conflict occurred. At Standerton they learned that the Strathconas were many miles ahead, and they were temporarily attached to the South African Light Horse. A few days later they came under fire. Together with 150 of the Light Horse they were on patrol duty, when scouts discovered the enemy. The plan of attack adopted was that Captain Adamson and his men should advance to the front and engage the Boers, and then retire and draw the enemy after them, while the troop of Light Horse divided as flanking parties. But the Boers began to retire after the Strathconas had fired a few shots, and the Canadians followed them up so fast that they got completely out of touch with their supports, and, mistaking parties of Boers for the Light Horse, were nearly surrounded; but a bold dash brought them out safely with a loss of two troopers captured. Several horses were struck, and it was only because their horses had been killed that the two men were captured. Three troopers were wounded.

In all that hard campaign up to and through the Lydenburg district the Strathconas scouted and skirmished, and occasionally engaged in stubborn fighting. They earned a name for dash and enterprise, and for an aggressiveness which made them work ever toward the enemy. They could locate the enemy, but they had no disposition to return with the news, for they were fighters and not only intelligence men. Their casualties were many, but the men claimed that they made the Boers pay six lives for every one they took. Nor was their record unmarked by deeds of that kind for which the Victoria Cross is bestowed. At Wolve Spruit on August 5th Sergeant Richardson earned that coveted honour when he rode back under a heavy cross-fire to within 300 yards of the enemy and rescued a trooper who had been twice wounded, and whose horse had been shot. Not only did the Strathconas "stay with their horses," as Lieut.-Col. Steele said they would do, but they stayed with General Buller's tried regiments, and they stayed with the enemy.

CHAPTER VIII

ON TO PRETORIA

WHILE Lord Roberts halted at Bloemfontein to obtain supplies and organise his further advance, the Boers largely recovered from their demoralisation. The seat of the Free State Government was established at Kroonstadt, 127 miles north of Bloemfontein, new plans of defence and of offence were adopted, and fresh life was infused into the burghers. Very many had given up their arms and had sworn not to take the field again, but the disposition to surrender gave place to a renewed fighting spirit, and columns sent out to scatter Lord Roberts's proclamation and collect arms were resisted. Disaster resulted in two cases. Faced by superior numbers at Thaba Nchu, Colonel Broadwood retreated toward Bloemfontein. A portion of his force was ambushed at Sanna's Post. Following up their advantage the Boers occupied the Waterworks, from which Bloemfontein received its supply, and the town and garrison were rendered dependent on the local wells. In the south a small British force was captured at Reddersburg, after a gallant but futile resistance.

From Thaba Nchu the Boers swept southward,

occupying Leeuw Kop and Dewetsdorp, and finally besieging Colonel Dalgety at Wepener. They were thus in control of the eastern strip of the Free State almost down to the borders of Cape Colony, as well as of the country north of Bloemfontein. To remove the menace to his line of communications with the south, to relieve the garrison at Wepener, and in general to clear his flank in preparation for his advance, Lord Roberts, about the middle of April, began to take energetic measures. General Brabant was at Aliwal North, in Cape Colony, due south of Wepener. He was ordered to advance, and, joining hands with General Chermside, under whom the 3rd Division of Infantry was mobilised at Springfontein, in the Free States, hurried forward to the relief of Wepener. At Edenburg, about half-way between Bloemfontein and Springfontein, the 8th Division was mobilised under General Rundle and sent north-east to threaten the rear of the Boers at Wepener, and if possible cut off their retreat. But General Rundle was checked at Dewetsdorp. To aid him and enable the movement to be carried out, Lord Roberts despatched south-east from Bloemfontein the 11th Division under General Pole-Carew and two brigades of cavalry under General French. The first work of this column was to dislodge the Boers at Leeuw Kop. It was here that B Squadron of the Canadian Mounted Rifles first came under fire.

The checks thus inflicted on the British gave the Boers time to effect a safe retreat from Wepener. The only chance of cutting them off then lay in sending a column to force the positions around Thaba

Nchu, and push across country until it blocked the road to Ladybrand. Even if this column were not able to head off the retreating Boers, it could, by driving the enemy from Thaba Nchu, turn the left flank of the main army which was opposing Lord Roberts's advance toward Pretoria. In any case it was necessary to clear the hills around Thaba Nchu, and the 19th Brigade, in which the Canadian Infantry had been since leaving Graspan, together with Mounted Infantry under Colonel Broadwood and some artillery, was sent to clear them. General French hurried back from the south to join them, and another brigade was sent against Waterval, some miles to the north, to co-operate. The command of the operations was given to General Ian Hamilton.

On two previous occasions since reaching Bloemfontein the Canadian Infantry had marched out in the same direction. On March 31st they went with their Division as far as Boesman's Kop to cover the retreat of Colonel Broadwood from Thaba Nchu, but the enemy avoided an engagement, and on April 3rd they returned to Bloemfontein. On April 4th the 19th Brigade had been sent to Rietfontein, twelve miles out. Again the enemy avoided them, and on April 5th they returned. On April 21st the 19th Brigade was sent to Springfield, eight miles from Bloemfontein, to take the place of the 18th Brigade, which was to form part of General Pole-Carew's Division, on its way south; and two days later began the movement against Thaba Nchu.

On April 23rd, at eleven in the morning, they set out, and that night bivouacked at Klip Kraal.



CANADIAN MOUNTED RIFLES AND CANADIAN INFANTRY ON THE MARCH TO PRETORIA.

Colonel Broadwood had reached the Waterworks, but finding the position commanded by one of the enemy's guns had fallen back again, to wait for the main column. In the morning the Waterworks was occupied with comparatively slight resistance, and the force moved on without delay, drove the Boers across the Modder River, and occupied Mamema Kop.

So far the Boers had been content to retreat after firing a few shots; but on the 25th they made a stand at Yster Nek. With the Canadians as advanced guard, the Brigade at two o'clock in the afternoon arrived opposite their strong position on two hills. The plan of attack adopted was that the Canadians should advance straight against the hills, while the rest of the Brigade executed a turning movement to the left and the Mounted Infantry worked around both flanks. It was not the intention that the Canadians should storm the hills if they were strongly opposed, but they were assigned the extremely important work of holding the enemy while the other movements were being carried out. As they moved off under the fire of the artillery General Hamilton expressed to General Smith-Dorien his anxiety lest they might fail to follow out their instructions, and the latter answered that he had yet to ask the Canadians to do anything which they did not do properly. They advanced steadily for an hour, so steadily as to win the unqualified praise of the Imperial officers who watched them. By that time the left of the line had reached an exposed position where the enemy had the exact range. To

remain there or to advance would prove costly, and the instructions were to avoid unnecessary loss. So the company officers ordered their men to withdraw by twos and threes to a sheltered position fifty yards in the rear. The difficulty of making men ten paces apart understand what was wanted resulted in a temporary unsteadiness in the line—perhaps the only case of the kind reported of the Battalion. Lieut.-Col. Otter and Adjutant Ogilvy went forward and took charge of the line at that point, and Lieut.-Col. Otter, who always fearlessly exposed himself, was wounded in the throat. The unsteadiness lasted but a few minutes and had no effect on the operations. On the right, Captain Burstall of B Company had, in the meantime, discovered a donga which offered shelter up to within a few hundred yards of the extreme left of the Boer position. He was given permission to advance, with D Company in support. He did so, and, when discovered, ordered a charge, before which the Boers fled. With their left flank turned by the Canadians and their right by the rest of the Brigade, the Boers deserted their whole position and retired in haste.

It was by this battle of Yster Nek that Thaba Nchu was won. Private Defoe of H Company was killed and, besides Lieut.-Col. Otter, two privates were wounded. Major Buchan took command of the regiment, and Lieut.-Col. Otter was ordered to the hospital at Bloemfontein. Before he left General Smith-Dorien expressed to him his appreciation of the conduct of the regiment, which had carried out his wishes exactly.

The village of Thaba Nchu was entered the following day, but it took two days of hard fighting to capture Taba Mountain and finally disperse the Boers from the neighbourhood. This battle of Hout Nek began on April 30th and was not concluded until the night of May 1st. The brunt was borne by the Gordons, the Shropshires, and the Canadians. It was the most stubborn fight the Brigade had between Paardeberg and the Vaal. In the opening stages the Canadians were for the first time in their experience exposed to a heavy and accurate shell fire, and only the fact that few of the shells exploded saved the Battalion from serious loss. Of the work on the first day Major Buchan reported: "On approaching Thaba Nchu Mountain, which is 300 or 400 feet high, all the companies had to pass through a zone of about 600 yards wide, which was swept by a direct enfilading shell fire from a large Boer gun, about three-quarters of a mile from our right, as well as a rifle fire from the mountain to our front. This was a very trying experience. It was in the advance of D Company across this zone that Private Cotton (of Ottawa) was killed. The shell fire swept the face of the mountain we had to climb, but the nature of the ground there gave opportunity for cover the plain had not afforded. The rifle fire kept up till late in the night, and finally all settled down to pass the night as best we could, without food, water, blankets, or coats, in the bitter cold. We lay with magazines charged and bayonets fixed, waiting for morning."

The Canadians were on the left, the Shropshires in

MAJOR BUCHAN, SECOND IN COMMAND R.C.R.I.

the centre, and the Gordons on the right, and their attack was directed against the western end of Taba Mountain, which was held by the extreme right of the Boer line. The position gained on the 30th and held throughout the night was the first of three ridges, and on May 1st the two remaining ones were occupied after some hours of steady but uneventful fighting. It had been a careful but irresistible advance. B Company of the Canadians was more often in an exposed position than any other part of the Battalion, and perhaps than any other part of the Brigade, and was the first to reach the crest of the mountain. The Canadian casualties during the day were six wounded. Private Rorison, one of the number, volunteered to explore an eminence which commanded part of the British line, and was wounded while performing this work.

As the Mounted Infantry had held the enemy along the ridges to the east and prevented a threatened envelopment from that direction, the gaining of the crest of the mountain by the 19th Brigade decided the issue, and the enemy withdrew to the east.

The column was now thirty-five miles east of Bloemfontein, but was still thirty-seven miles from Ladybrand. Even with the co-operation of General French there was no chance of reaching the latter place in time to intercept the Boers from Wepener. It had, however, broken through the Boer lines and had prepared the way for Lord Roberts's advance, which at once began. Leaving the Boers in the east to be attended to by the forces under General Brabant, General Chermside, and General Rundle, Lord

Roberts moved his main column north along the line of railway, and sent General Hamilton's column, which was made up to a full division by the addition of the 21st Brigade, directly north from its position at Thaba Nchu, toward Winburg. This column was officially known as the Winburg column. Enteric fever had committed its ravages among the Canadian Infantry, as it had among the other regiments camped at Bloemfontein, and through fever and casualties their ranks were then reduced to less than half their original strength. The draft of one hundred men sent out on the *Milwaukee* with the Strathconas had not yet joined them. It had arrived at Bloemfontein just after they started for Thaba Nchu, and was then following them. But though small in numbers the Battalion was in condition to endure any hardships, and was in excellent spirits.

The 19th Brigade had already won a splendid name for itself for its hard and consistently good work, and it was now to be called upon, as part of General Ian Hamilton's Division, to do more marching and fighting than any other infantry in Lord Roberts's army on the road to Pretoria. The main body of the army marched three hundred miles and fought in six engagements, while General Hamilton's Division marched four hundred miles and was engaged twenty-eight times. Then, too, they had left Bloemfontein before the winter clothing was issued, and were in other respects, also, less comfortably equipped than the rest of the army. In military annals the record of this Brigade will always be mentioned with respect; and that the Canadians

marched as far and as fast as any regiment in the Brigade, and carried out their part in every fight, is the highest testimony to their soldierly qualities. For the future it will be enough to say of Canadian Infantry that they have stood the test put upon the 19th Brigade of the South African Field Force.

At Pretoria General Smith-Dorien issued the following order: "The 19th Brigade has achieved a record of which any infantry might be proud. Since the date it was formed, namely, the 12th of February, it has marched 620 miles, often on half rations and seldom on full. It has taken part in the capture of ten towns, fought in ten general actions, and on twenty-seven other days. In one period of thirty days it fought on twenty-one of them, and marched 327 miles. The casualties have been between four and five hundred, and defeats *nil*."

While the Canadian Infantry in the Winburg column formed the extreme right of Lord Roberts's army, the Canadian Mounted Rifles in General Hutton's Brigade formed the advanced guard and the left flanking force. General Hutton's Brigade in General French's Division was composed of Colonial Mounted Rifles, and their business was to scout in advance of the army, and, when the enemy was located and the main column had arrived, to turn their right flank and endeavour to get in their rear and cut them off. They were nearly always from ten to thirty miles west of the railway, along the line of which the main army moved, whereas the Canadian Infantry were generally an equal or greater distance to the east of the railway. But in the fight

at the Zand River General Hamilton's Division joined General French's in forcing a passage directly ahead of the main army. On other occasions also, as at Kroonstadt and at the Vaal River, the different parts of the army converged upon one point.

It was on May 1st the main advance began. B Squadron of the Mounted Rifles had just returned to Bloemfontein from its trip south with General French, and A and C Squadrons were in camp. D Squadron, which, it will be remembered, had gone the whole distance to Kenhardt, whereas C Squadron and the Batteries had turned back from Van Wyk's Vlei, was still a few hours' march short of Bloemfontein. It, however, followed on, and soon caught up to the regiment.

Of the work of the Mounted Rifles it need only be said that it was several times specially commended. One notable fact was that, although almost constantly engaged in skirmishing and at times in general actions, they suffered very few casualties. There must, of course, have been something of the nature of luck about this comparative immunity, but luck will not fully explain it. The men knew how to take advantage of cover, and they kept their distance from each other. In the work given them they had an opportunity to display the qualities Colonials might be expected to possess, and it is satisfactory to know that they were not inferior to the men of the other Colonies in this work, and that the Colonials as a whole were not inferior in essential qualities to the men of the parent stock.

The Mounted Rifles had their first engagement on

May 3rd west of Brandfort, where they came upon the enemy occupying some kopjes. They were ordered to clear these, and did so through a very heavy fire. One man was wounded and four horses were hit. Next day they were again engaged, and on May 5th they came up with the enemy again at Vet River. Here the men were exposed to a heavy shell fire as well as rifle fire, and a deep gorge through which the river runs had to be passed. Mr. Ewan, correspondent of the Toronto *Globe*, with the second contingent, thus describes the action: "It had been prophesied that the enemy would put up a stiff opposition to the crossing of this ugly gorge, and on the whole they did show a bolder front than they had yet done on their northward retreat. Major Forester, with A Squadron, was assigned the task of escorting the guns. B Squadron was ordered to feel the enemy, draw his fire, and engage him if necessary. A grove of low trees afforded them excellent shelter for performing this operation. The Imperial Mounted Infantry led the way down the steep banks of the river, and Colonel Alderson ordered B Squadron to follow dismounted. They found no Boers on that side, whereupon Lieutenants Borden and Turner, with five of their men, offered to swim across, the river at that point being unfordable. They discovered a kraal with about forty Boers inside, who thought the deep river was a perfect protection for them. The seven adventurous fellows opened fire from a place of concealment, and the Boers, utterly surprised, fled precipitately, taking refuge in a neighbouring kopje. This plucky enterprise has

been much spoken of, and earned for the seven the distinction of being the first British troops to cross the Vet River. B Squadron subsequently found a ford further down the river, crossed over, and drove the enemy from the vicinity." Lord Roberts, in General Orders, complimented the men on their gallant behaviour.

It was on this same day (May 5th) that the 19th Brigade reached Winburg, due east of the position then occupied by General Hutton's Brigade. A summary of the work accomplished by the 19th Brigade since leaving Bloemfontein is contained in the order issued by General Hamilton on the day Winburg was occupied. The Canadians were with the portion of the column which did the greatest amount of work. The order is as follows: "During the past thirteen days a portion of the Winburg column has marched over 100 miles, fighting the enemy on nine separate occasions and capturing two important towns. The other portion of this column has borne at least its full share in the very successful operations which have followed upon the battle of Hout Nek. The General Officer Commanding cannot, therefore, but feel that his column deserves, not only the praises of the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, but also a day or two's comparative rest.

"In the message, however, in which Lord Roberts expresses his high appreciation of the successes we have achieved, he directs us not to slacken our efforts for several days to come. The enemy is hurrying northwards to concentrate, and it is nothing less than of national importance that his movements should

be impeded and his guns and convoys, if possible, captured. Thanks to the good work which has already been accomplished, this column now finds itself better placed to carry out the Field-Marshal's wish than any other portion of the troops under his command. The opportunity is a great one, and General Ian Hamilton appeals to the officers and men of the Winburg column to make the very best of it, regardless of fatigues and privations which will probably have to be undergone before success is secured."

At Winburg the infantry draft sent out from Canada caught up with the Battalion. They had made forced marches, and, as they were still unseasoned, the work had been found severe. A few had dropped out, but they brought an increase in strength to the Battalions of 3 officers and 94 men. On the wings the Canadians were with the lighter and more rapidly moving forces. In the centre the main column, with which Lord Roberts travelled, performed the work of a main column and swept steadily and splendidly onward. But the campaign was at this stage still more comprehensive. North of Kimberley General Hunter had crossed the Vaal, turning the Boer lines in the far west and leaving an opening for Colonel Mahon to dash northward to Mafeking; Lord Methuen was marching from the same quarter eastward toward Kroonstadt; and in Natal General Buller was preparing to force the Biggarsberg range, in order to keep pace with Lord Roberts.

From the Vet River Captain Macdonnell, of the

Canadian Mounted Rifles, with two troops from C Squadron, two troops from D Squadron, and one troop of Australians, with an engineer, was sent on ahead by night to slip through the enemy's lines and blow up a culvert north of Smaldeel Junction with the object of preventing the removal of rolling stock. They succeeded in blowing up the culvert and had begun their return, when Captain Macdonnell discovered that the engineer had not cut the telegraph wires. As it was part of the instructions that these should be cut, he returned alone with a Kaffir guide and cut them, and next day rejoined his corps. The action came in for special mention in the General's report.

On May 6th General French's Division started north-east from the Vet River, and General Hamilton's Division north from Winburg. They drew together toward a point on the Zand River ahead of Lord Roberts's main army, and to these two Divisions was given the work of forcing a passage of the river.

Both Canadian regiments were engaged in this action at Zand River on May 10th, the Mounted Rifles on the extreme left of the British lines and the Infantry on the extreme right. There was some sharp fighting for both. The Infantry were, however, much more strongly opposed than the Mounted Rifles. When they reached the top of a rise about half a mile from the river they were met by a very heavy fire. Captain Burstall, with one half of B Company, was sent forward to scout and feel the way. He succeeded in getting to within 250 yards of the river-

bank, when he was forced to stop by the heavy fire, and the remaining half of the Company and also D Company, under Lieutenant Lawless, were sent to reinforce him and prolong his line. The fire of the enemy steadily increased in strength, and Major Buchan reports that it was only by the splendid pluck and determination of the 100 men in the firing-line that the position was held during the afternoon. The Canadians at this point were unsupported by any other regiment, or even by any guns, for the rest of the Brigade had gone to the left to assist the 21st Brigade in the main attack. Later, however, Major Buchan asked for the assistance of guns, and when they arrived the Canadians occupied the drift and the enemy retreated. The G.O.C. informed Major Buchan that he had been opposed throughout the day by 800 Boers. Both Captain Burstall and Lieutenant Lawless were reported for their gallant and determined conduct. The casualties were light, consisting of Private Floyd of B Company killed and three wounded. One of the Canadian newspaper correspondents, Mr. Stanley McKeown Brown, of the Toronto *Mail and Empire*, was wounded in this fight while close to the firing-line watching the progress of events in the interests of his paper.

From the Zand River the Mounted Rifles skirted to the west, while the Infantry marched straight on Kroonstadt, where both forces arrived on the 12th. A Squadron, with the 17th Lancers, were the first British troops to enter Kroonstadt, which they did from the north; and it was a few hours later that the British Infantry entered from the south. The

Mounted Rifles had been engaged for a week, and yet not one man had been killed and but five wounded.

Kroonstadt is 127 miles by railway from Bloemfontein, and it had been reached and occupied within twelve days. When its fall became inevitable the headquarters of the Free State Government was again moved, this time to Lindley, about forty miles east of Kroonstadt. It would not do to leave the nominal seat of Government behind him as a rallying-point for the enemy, and Lord Roberts accordingly despatched General Hamilton's Division on May 15th to chase the would-be Government still farther afield. This meant extra marching and fighting for a force that had already done much more than the rest of the Infantry, but the men carried through all that was asked of them, and added one more to their list of captured towns. Nor were all the Canadian Mounted Rifles allowed to rest in camp until Lord Roberts was ready to march from Kroonstadt. On May 17th they furnished one half of a force of 200 men who set out on an expedition to attempt the capture of some Boer leaders, said to be at a farm about forty miles to the north-west of Kroonstadt. The little force started at five o'clock in the afternoon, and before off-saddling had covered sixty miles in seventeen hours, and had captured one Boer commandant, nine Johannesburg police, and twenty other prisoners. They reached camp again on the 19th without loss and were warmly congratulated.

Of the other Canadian detachments C Battery was then in Mafeking, E Battery was fighting with

Sir Charles Warren at Douglas, D Battery was on the line of communications in Cape Colony, and the Strathconas were at Cape Town.

From Lindley General Hamilton marched north to Heilbron, still east of the line of railway, and with the Canadians as the leading battalion entered that place on the 22nd. The next morning the column started again, inclining toward the railway, and on May 24th had formed a junction with Lord Roberts's main column. They were then thirty miles south of the Vaal.

It was the Queen's birthday. "Few there were who knew it during the long and weary day," wrote Mr. W. Richmond Smith, of the *Montreal Star*, "for one loses track not only of the day of the month, but of the day of the week also, on these interminable treks. The horses had been outspanned and watered, and the men had built their little wind shelters of blankets, when darkness closed in about us. Soon the veldt was dotted with a thousand camp-fires, as the men cooked their small ration of flour into what is known as 'chepattys,' a sort of griddle cake, made of flour and water. Suddenly, away off in the east, through the intense darkness of the night, came the well-known strains of the National Anthem. It was the little band of Canadians who were the first to recognise that the day which was so nearly gone was the anniversary of the birth of the Queen for whom they were fighting. The effect was marvellous. In a few seconds the welkin rang with cheers, followed by fifteen thousand soldiers singing "God Save the Queen." A new supply of fence-

E. BATTERY, ROYAL CANADIAN ARTILLERY, ON GREEN POINT COMMON AT CAPE TOWN.

posts and the interior wood finishing of near-by houses was added to the little camp-fires, and the heavens soon reflected the glare of a thousand bonfires. This was Tommy's tribute to his Queen. It seems a little thing to kindle a bonfire to celebrate such an event, but the scarcity of wood in this country is one of the greatest hardships the soldier has to endure. The veldt for mile after mile is absolutely bare of anything in the shape of timber or trees. I have hundreds of times seen soldiers carrying a heavy fence-post, dug up after hours of work, for miles at the end of a long day's forced marching, in order to provide fuel enough to cook the scanty evening meal. Therefore the kindling of a thousand bonfires to celebrate the natal day of Her Majesty meant that, after his long day's work, the soldier had carried an additional supply of firewood for miles upon his shoulders. No greater evidence of his loyalty could Tommy give than this; and he gave it cheerfully and without grumbling, as he seldom, if ever, does when called upon to do extra fatigue. It was a scene no one who saw it could ever forget, this great remembrance by so many thousand brave soldiers of the birthday of a Sovereign whom all love and respect. That evening I saw men, lean and hungry-looking from scanty rations, and almost dropping with fatigue from long marching, voluntarily walking miles and working for hours to secure enough wood with which to kindle the bonfire which marked the observance of the day."

On this day General French had crossed the Vaal River into the Transvaal with the advanced portion

of his Division. The Boers had been out-manœuvred, and no opposition was experienced. General Hutton's Brigade did not reach the river until after nightfall, too late to make the crossing until the following morning. It bivouacked on the south side of the river. The transport had not been able to keep up over the rough country, and the troops went supperless to bed. It was on this day, also, that the Strathconas left Cape Town by ship for Natal.

At three o'clock on the afternoon of May 26th the Canadian Infantry, 451 strong, the leading battalion in General Hamilton's Division, crossed the Vaal and cheered on the other side, being the first infantry regiment in Lord Roberts's army to enter the Transvaal. Lieut.-Colonel Otter had rejoined the regiment on the morning of that day, and had brought with him boots and clothing, which were badly needed. For weeks the men had been on half rations, or less, and had suffered severely from lack of sufficient food and sufficient protection from the cold.

General French had pushed on from the Vaal River, and on the 27th had begun an attack on the Boers in the hills south of Johannesburg; but not succeeding in driving them from their positions he, on the 28th, sent General Hutton's Brigade forward to cross the bridge over the Klip River at Olifant's Vlei and hold the enemy, while he, in conjunction with General Hamilton's Division, which had just come up, made a turning movement to the left. Here the Mounted Infantry saw the most serious fighting they had had since leaving Kroonstadt.

They forced the enemy from two advanced ridges, and, although subjected to a heavy shell and pom-pom fire, held them through the night. In the morning they were bombarded with greater vigour and accuracy, and, although the position was clearly untenable, it was essential that the enemy should be occupied until the turning movement had been completed. As soon as possible the men were ordered to withdraw and march around by the left to the support of General French. The retirement was a dangerous operation, since all the troops had to recross the one bridge, and to the Canadians was given the important work of covering this retirement. They did so by constantly exposing themselves, by riding up and down the face of the ridges. It was the severest possible test of discipline and nerve. So well scattered did they keep, however, that they offered no target for the Boer guns and distant rifle fire, and their casualties amounted to only three or four wounded. When the rest of the Brigade had crossed they also, in splendid order, retired.

A few days later, in addressing his Brigade, General Hutton said of this engagement, as reported by Mr. R. E. Finn, the Montreal *Herald's* correspondent with the Mounted Rifles: "Had it not been for the splendid manner in which the Canadians held the positions they were sent to occupy, General French would not have been able to make his turning movement. General French and myself viewed the engagement from a near kopje, and he remarked to me as you (the Canadians) marched under the terrific shell fire that he had never seen

men advance more steadily or obey an order more cheerfully. Since then I have received a letter from General French, which is highly complimentary to you all, and I must say a more handsome letter was never written by a senior general to a junior."

While the Mounted Rifles were holding the enemy in front, General French and General Hamilton were breaking up and outflanking them on the west. It was as the result of this fighting that Johannesburg was captured. In his report to the War Office on May 30th Lord Roberts said: "The brunt of the fighting yesterday fell upon Ian Hamilton's column. I have sent him, as already mentioned, to work around to the west of Johannesburg in support of French's cavalry, which was directed to go north near the road leading to Pretoria. I have not heard from French yet, but Hamilton, in a report which has just reached me, states at about one o'clock in the afternoon he found his way blocked by the enemy, strongly posted on some kopjes and ridges three miles south of the Rand. They had two heavy guns and several field guns and pom-poms. Hamilton forthwith attacked."

The position was at Doornkop, almost on the site of the surrender of Jameson and his raiders, and it was at this spot that the Gordons and Canadians broke through the enemy's right flank. The 19th Brigade was ordered to make a frontal attack on the ridge, while the 21st Brigade, with General French's cavalry, was sent on a wide turning movement to the left. It was not expected that the frontal attack would have to be pushed home, but as the day wore

on, and the turning movement had not yet had its effect, the order was given that the ridge must be taken. The Gordons were the advanced battalion, with the Canadians in support, the Shropshires in reserve, and the Cornwalls as baggage guard; but the Canadians were soon extended to the right so as to form practically one advanced line with the Gordons. A fierce artillery duel opened, and the Gordons and Canadians, only about a thousand of all ranks, began to move forward. Steadily, without haste and without wavering, the long-extended line moved forward. As Mr. Hamilton wrote: "Dramatic in its associations, Doornkop was fiercely dramatic in its circumstances. Frontal attacks were *anathema maranatha* to the theorist after a few expensive failures at the outset of this war; but the splendid 19th Brigade, under Smith-Dorien's handling, and taught by the experience of a score of fights, made a frontal attack and conquered. Boer skill seized the advantage of the dryness of the grass and the set of the wind towards our position and fired the veldt. Thus the hillside to be won was a dead black, against which the khaki showed with fatal clearness, and on which the dropping bullets raised a dust-puff which instantly told the range. Yet across a full mile of this black death-slope our men went on without a check, until the riflemen on the crest saw they could do nothing against infantry so indomitable, and fled. And finally—it sounds like a romance, but it is a fact—the fire was actually upon the hillside when it was stormed, and our men went up against the Boers through literal flame. A belt of fire and smoke 10

QUEBEC QUOTA TO THE CANADIAN INFANTRY, FIRST CONTINGENT.

feet wide, well-nigh of man's height, swept toward our position, and through the flame and smoke line after line of our men leaped, to go with singed eyebrows and beards over the blackness the fire had wrought. It was a battle of the flames."

When the order came that the crest must be won that night, the Gordons made one of the finest charges in the history of the war, losing 20 killed and 76 wounded. On a line with them charged the Canadians, and the two regiments went over the crest together. But fortune favoured the Canadians. Their approach was sheltered by the nature of the ground: the Gordens made their magnificent rush fully exposed. As against the heavy casualty list of the latter the Canadians lost but seven wounded. Johannesburg lay open. The night was very cold, and without food or water the 19th Brigade bivouacked on the height it had gained.

Johannesburg surrendered on April 31st, but the Canadians, in their respective Divisions, were kept to the west of the city. During the two or three days the army was waiting for supplies individuals were afforded the opportunity of visiting it. One man, Sergeant Ironsides, of the Canadian Infantry, was appointed to the regimental police in Johannesburg. Riding back to camp unarmed on the night of June 2nd, he lost his way and got to the north of the British lines. Proceeding cautiously he discovered three men sleeping on the ground. Convinced that they were Boers, he first stole up and took their rifles from their sides, and, using one to arm himself awakened the sleepers and marched

the three of them to a vacant house he discovered near by, where he stood guard over them all night, and in the morning took them and their horses into camp. One of the prisoners was Commandant Botha's cousin.

Just as the fight at Doornkop was ending the Canadian Mounted Rifles had passed by, going north-west. On the 30th the 1st Battalion chased a Boer convoy to within fifteen miles of Pretoria and captured some waggons and prisoners. Only one sharp, brief action was fought between Johannesburg and Pretoria, and in it the Canadians did not participate; for the Canadian Infantry were that day the baggage guard for their Brigade, and the Mounted Rifles were outside the area of the fight.

On June 3rd the 19th Brigade marched sixteen miles to the north, through heavy rolling country, in order to turn the right flank of the enemy, who were expected to make a strong defence at Pretoria. On the 4th, however, the direction was changed straight for Pretoria, since it was found that no further opposition would be offered. In the morning of the 5th the 19th Brigade led their Division and the Canadians led the 19th Brigade up to the outskirts of the city, where, after some hours of waiting, their turn came, and in altered order, with the Cornwalls first, than the Shropshires, then the Gordons, and then the Canadians, the "fighting 19th" moved through the square past Lord Roberts, while the Guards' band played "The Boys of the Old Brigade." On the 6th the Mounted Rifles passed through to follow the retreating Boers.

CHAPTER IX

LATER MOVEMENTS

It was generally expected that the capture of Pretoria would end the war, but it was soon found that this was a mistake. Commandant Botha took up a strong position some eighteen miles to the east of Pretoria, and there offered a more stubborn resistance than the Boers had offered at any point from Bloemfontein north. After he had been driven from this position the British devoted their chief energies to an attempt to corner Commandant De Wet in Orange River Colony, by which name, after the formal annexation on May 28th, the old Orange Free State has been known. The daring and successful raids of this clever commander were not only annoying, but were dangerous to the British communications. Troops and Generals were sent south from Pretoria to participate in the chase. Then Commandant Botha laid bold plans to capture Pretoria and Johannesburg; but first he waited quietly until the defending forces had been weakened by withdrawals, and until his own forces had been strengthened both in morale and in numbers. When he was ready he took the aggressive. His

forces were successful in one or two outpost engagements, but he was quite incapable of effecting his purpose, and the conspirators who were to assist in Pretoria and Johannesburg were arrested. General Buller came up through Natal; communication was opened up between his column and Lord Roberts's army along the Natal-Transvaal railway; and by the co-operation of the two forces the Boers were pushed eastward, through the boasted Lydenburg district, and either driven into Portuguese territory at Komati Poort or scattered.

In the operations succeeding the capture of Pretoria the Canadian troops were often conspicuous; but the Canadian Infantry did not take part in the main advance eastward. The Mounted Rifles were frequently engaged, but principally in the neighbourhood of Pretoria or while guarding lines of communication, and later around Belfast. With the exception of some hard marching in chase of De Wet, the Canadian Infantry were most of the time quietly in camp at Springs and saw only one or two outpost skirmishes. But the Strathconas went right through with General Buller; and C and D Batteries found opportunities for active work.

When the Canadian Mounted Rifles with General Hutton's Brigade moved through Pretoria on June 6th, they proceeded in a north-easterly direction. As in the march from Bloemfontein, General French's Division was to form the left flanking force in the attack on Commandant Botha's new position. General Pole-Carew, with the 11th Division, advanced along the Delagoa Bay railway, and General Hamilton was

in his old position on the right. As usual, General French on the one side and General Hamilton on the other, were to turn the enemy's flanks; but Commandant Botha had by that time learned the game, and he disposed the bulk of his forces on his wings. As he had chosen his position with good judgment, it took two days of hard fighting before the British could dislodge him. The Canadian Mounted Rifles were engaged during these two days, June 11th and 12th, with General French's Division, which did little more than hold its own. The Canadians came under fire in open ground covered with loose stones, out of which they at once built themselves shelters, behind which they leisurely and deliberately fired. Ammunition for General French's guns was delayed on the road, and while waiting for it no assault was made. All the night of the 11th and all the next day the Canadians manned their shelters. Their casualties were two wounded, one mortally. General Hamilton and General Pole-Carew had been much more severely engaged, and during the night of the 12th the Boers abandoned their position and retired to the east. Next morning the mounted men pursued the enemy for ten miles or more, but had little fighting. Returning from this pursuit the Canadian Mounted Rifles were sent to the rest-camp at Derdepoort, near Pretoria. Botha was to be left alone until he assumed the aggressive.

Although General Hamilton's Division was hotly engaged in this two days' battle, the 19th Brigade took no direct part. It had been the intention to disband the 19th Brigade, and General Smith-Dorien

actually issued what he believed to be his final orders, from which his references to the record of the Brigade

Capt. Pearce. Major Evans. Capt. Nelles.

OFFICERS OF FIRST BATTALION CANADIAN MOUNTED RIFLES.

have been quoted. But on June 7th, when Commandant Botha had been located, the Brigade was

reconstituted and sent toward Johannesburg with General Hamilton's Division. From Irene the 21st Brigade, with the rest of the Division, started north-east to attack the Boers' left flank, while the 19th Brigade continued its way towards Johannesburg to guard against possible attack in that quarter. The Canadian Infantry reached Elandsfontein Junction, just east of Johannesburg, on June 10th, and were from there diverted to Springs, twenty miles to the east. Some rolling stock, which was known to be at Springs, was required for transportation purposes, and it was desired also to secure the great coal-mines in that neighbourhood, and protect workmen while the necessary supply of coal was being mined. The Canadian Battalion at that time numbered 27 officers and 411 men.

Lieut.-Col. Otter was made Camp Commandant, and, in addition to the Canadians, he had with him a small force of Mounted Infantry. For some weeks the Canadian Infantry were to go through again the same kind of experiences they had had at Belmont Camp, except that the surroundings were much more pleasant and more comfortable, and the men were this time glad of a long halt, and not, as before, impatient for the word to advance. They fortified their position and did outpost duty. Many Boers came in and gave up their arms. On several occasions forces of the enemy appeared, but only on June 28th was there what might be called an attack, and even this did not reach beyond the outposts.

The 2nd Battalion of the Canadian Mounted Rifles was not destined to remain long at the rest-camp at

Derdepoort, for on June 15th it entrained for Orange River Colony to guard the line of communications threatened by De Wet; and although the 1st Battalion retained that camp as its headquarters until July 4th, it was not for them altogether a period of rest. They were constantly called upon to furnish outposts and patrols.

It was from this camp that a detachment went out with the force under General Hutton and signally distinguished itself by capturing two guns. General Baden-Powell had been marching on Pretoria from Mafeking with a column in which was C Battery of the Canadian Artillery. He had arrived at Rustenburg, and Lord Roberts desired him to come into Pretoria for consultation. So General Hutton was sent out with 300 Mounted Infantry to clear the road along which he must travel. While proceeding on this duty on June 18th General Hutton sent Lieutenant Young, with twelve Canadians and three Remington Scouts, to reconnoitre Klip Kop, where some of the enemy were supposed to be in laager. Hearing that the Boers were on the alert, Lieutenant Young decided to execute a flank movement so as to reach the kopje by the rear. Following the east bank of the Klip River for two or three miles, he came upon a scattered settlement, completely surprised the inhabitants of house after house, and with only a little skirmishing disarmed forty or fifty men. Noticing the track of two guns, Lieutenant Young decided to push on and, if possible, capture them. The guns were discovered so placed that they could easily have been defended if the raid had been less cleverly

executed. Lieutenant Young took possession of what oxen he could find, hitched some of them to the guns, and set off back to camp. He was fired on, but reached camp safely at three in the morning with his prisoners, cattle, and guns.

This incident was brought by General Hutton to the special notice of Lord Roberts. Not only were Lieutenant Young, Sergeants Purdon and Ryan specially mentioned by him, but he reported to Lord Roberts that he "could not allow so exceptional a performance of so difficult, dangerous, and delicate a nature to pass without bringing the whole detachment to your notice." General Hutton also sent an extended account of the affair to Lord Minto in Canada, and said of it: "The whole incident forms a singular instance of what cool daring and steady courage can do. Nothing could better test the finest qualities in British soldiers than to cut out guns under such circumstances from the very centre of the enemy without the loss of a man or horse."

By this date, June 18th, the 2nd Battalion, which had been split up, had become established at the posts assigned to it on the railway north of Kroonstadt in Orange River Colony. A few days later four men of D Squadron gave an exhibition of coolness, indomitable courage, and self-sacrifice that will not be forgotten as long as any deeds of the war are remembered. Troops 1 and 4 of D Squadron, under command of Lieutenant Davidson, two companies of the Shropshire Regiment, and a detachment of Imperial Yeomanry were placed at a little camp three miles south of Honingspruit Station and

between two important bridges. There was another camp at the station itself, composed of 400 British soldiers who had been released from the Boer prison at Pretoria, and who were in poor health and imperfectly armed. This section of the railway required careful guarding, for there were three bridges within a distance of ten miles. The camp in which were the Canadians was situated on the west side of the railway. Three miles away to the east, across the railway, were two large kopjes. By order of the Camp Commandant outposts were placed, during the daytime only, upon these two kopjes, and also an outpost two miles to the north of the camp, and another two miles to the south. On June 22nd the Canadians had this outpost duty to perform. Before daybreak Lieutenant Inglis set out with eight men, four each for the two kopjes to the east, while Lieutenant Davidson placed four men two miles to the north of the camp, and then took four others and placed them the same distance to the south.

No sooner had Lieutenant Inglis and his men reached the first of the kopjes than they caught sight of one or two Boers in hiding and saw signs of many more. De Wet was making a swoop on the railway, and the kopjes had been occupied during the night. Realising the situation, Lieutenant Inglis gave the order to make for the camp with all speed. Boers swarmed out in pursuit. The Canadians had gained a start, but their horses were worked out and could not be spurred into speed. True to their instincts, the men scattered to divide the pursuing Boers. One man was shot dead ; two were wounded

and captured; and Lieutenant Inglis and two men, though wounded, clung to their horses long enough to come under the covering fire of the camp. Two others escaped to the south and turned up the next day at Kroonstadt. The remaining man, Trooper Waldy, or "old man Waldy" as he was called, had the nerve and the eye of the typical plainsman. Two Boers were following him and gaining upon him so rapidly that he saw escape was impossible. Suddenly dropping from his horse to the ground he faced his opponents, who also immediately dropped. In that position neither party could see the other. The Boers had no reason for exposing themselves, since reinforcements would soon join them; but for Waldy the case was desperate. All he needed was a chance to pull his trigger twice. To get this chance he suddenly rose to his knees. Both Boers fired and missed and he shot them both dead and, remounting, ambled back into camp.

At the first distant shots the camp had been aroused and the little force disposed to the best advantage. It was soon subjected to a very heavy fire both from rifles and from two guns which the Boers had posted on the eastern kopjes. So far the attack was from the east, but fifty or sixty Boers began to circle around to the south with the intention of out-flanking the force and gaining some rising ground to the west, from which they would be able to command the camp with their rifles. To reach this ground they had to pass the little southern outpost of four Canadian Mounted Rifles. But this they could not do. The men understood the importance

A TYPICAL PLAINSMAN.

of preventing the Boers from thus surrounding the camp, and with rare spirit they set to work to prevent it. Concealing themselves and firing rapidly they gave no clue to their numbers. At the very beginning one of the four, Trooper Miles, was wounded in the hand by long-range fire, and he was sent back with the horses and with word that no assistance was needed.

The tale of the heroism of the three who were left was thus told by Lieutenant Davidson to Mr. Richmond Smith of the Montreal *Star*: "It was long odds, three men against sixty, but these Canadians from Pincher Creek were stout-hearted fellows who did not know the meaning of the word fear, and rattling good shots into the bargain. For eight hours they fought, the number of their opponents increasing as the hours went by, until there were close to a hundred burghers pouring in a fusillade of rifle shots at the three men who held the crossing over the railway line. Shortly after noon Corporal Morden was seriously wounded with a bullet through the chest. He never gave up, however, and kept on firing until, later on, another Mauser bullet crashed through his brain. About two o'clock another one of the little party, Trooper Kerr, was wounded. At that time the force consisted of two wounded men and Corporal Miles, who was in charge of the outpost. About half-past two Kerr was shot through the heart, and a little later Corporal Miles received a bullet wound in the shoulder. He did not give in though for all that, but continued firing, and used up the cartridges of his dead companions after his own had

been exhausted. About three o'clock in the afternoon a train arrived at Honingspruit Station from the north, and the Boers withdrew and attacked the train. The garrison, however, managed to keep them at bay until a train with troops arrived from Kroonstadt, when the enemy, as usual, retired. Then it was that I had time to go back and see what had become of the little outpost on the railway line south of the camp, which I knew had been heavily engaged all day. I found Corporal Miles lying behind a little mound of earth suffering from a severe wound in the shoulder, and a short distance from him the dead bodies of Corporal Morden and Trooper Kerr, both of whom had been first wounded and afterwards killed by second shots. Though serious, Miles's wound was not by any means a fatal one, and he was at once taken to the hospital at Kroonstadt, from where he was sent to Cape Town later on. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the gallant conduct of these three men. But for their splendid work our position would have been completely surrounded, and the chances are the whole garrison would either have been killed or captured."

On July 6th Lord Roberts telegraphed from Pretoria to Lord Minto: "I have much pleasure in bringing to your Excellency's notice the good work done by the 1st and 2nd Battalions Canadian Mounted Rifles, who have been repeatedly conspicuous for their gallant conduct and soldierlike instincts.

"During the attack by the Boers on Katabosch on June 22nd a small party of Pincher's Creek men of

the 2nd Battalion displayed the greatest gallantry and devotion to duty, holding in check a force of Boers by whom they were largely outnumbered.

"Corporal Morden and Private Kerr continued fighting until mortally wounded. Lance-Corporal Miles and Private Miles, wounded, continued to fight and held their ground.

"On June 18th a party of the 1st Battalion under Lieutenant Young, when operating with a force under General Hutton to the north-west of Pretoria, succeeded in capturing two of the enemy's guns, and brought in a herd of cattle and several prisoners without losing a man."

While these events were occurring at Katabosch the ex-prisoners at Honingspruit Station were doggedly fighting for their freedom against a superior force of Boers who completely surrounded them. Colonel Bullock refused to surrender. Just as the wires were being cut he had flashed a message to Kroonstadt. The way these weakened and poorly-armed men held the Boers at bay all day until help arrived was heroic. This time De Wet failed.

Commandant Botha then began his attacks around Pretoria and Johannesburg. On July 4th the 1st Battalion of the Canadian Mounted Rifles left the camp at Derdepoort with General Hutton's column for Rustfontein, a few miles south of Pretoria, and from the 7th to the 10th they took part in a heavy four days' fighting in that district. The Boers fought with great determination, causing the British to abandon the positions they had at first gained, and

which they regained when reinforcements arrived. The Canadian casualties were Captain Nelles and six or seven men wounded. When the Boers attacked the British outposts at Witpoort, on July 16th, this battalion rendered good service. One detachment of the Royal Irish Fusiliers was very hard pressed and in danger of being surrounded, when two troops of the Canadians, under Lieutenants Borden and Burch, were sent to their relief. Dismounting, the Canadians made a sharp counter attack and put the enemy to flight, but so keen and eager to get at the enemy were the two young officers that they exposed themselves fearlessly, and both lost their lives. They were in the very act of leading their men in a forward dash. A letter sent by the officer commanding the Royal Irish Fusiliers to Lieut.-Col. Lessard, after the engagement, is a testimony to the success of their force :—

"DEAR COLONEL LESSARD,—In the few words I spoke to you last night at the funeral of your two very gallant officers I am afraid I failed to convey the deep gratitude my regiment owes to the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles for their gallantry in going so nobly and fearlessly to the succour of our beleaguered detachment at Witpoort yesterday. The counter attack your regiment made occurred at a most critical moment, and it doubtless saved many of the lives of our detachment. We deplore greatly the losses you have sustained, and we shall ever bear in grateful memory the gallantry and self-sacrifice of the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles on this occasion. I

shall deem it a great favour if you will kindly convey to your officers, non-commissioned officers, and men the purport of this letter.

"Yours very faithfully,

"JOHN REEVES,

"Colonel Commanding 2nd Battalion Princess Victoria Royal Irish Fusiliers."

On July 17th Lord Roberts reported to the War Office: "Yesterday the enemy made a determined attack on the left of Pole-Carew's position and along our left flank commanded by Hutton. The posts held by the Irish Fusiliers and the Canadian Mounted Infantry under Lieut.-Col. Alderson were most gallantly defended. The enemy made repeated attempts to assault the position, coming in close range and calling to the Fusiliers to surrender. The enemy suffered severely. They had 15 killed and 50 wounded, and 4 taken prisoners. The British casualties were 7 killed, including the Canadian lieutenants Borden and Burch, 30 wounded, and 21 missing."

In his despatch of the following day Lord Roberts made further reference to this affair: "The two young Canadians mentioned in yesterday's telegram were killed while gallantly leading their men in a counter attack on the enemy's flank at a critical juncture in their assault on our position. Borden had twice before been brought to my notice in despatches for gallant and intrepid conduct."

Lieutenant Borden was the only son of the Hon. Dr. Borden, the Canadian Minister of Militia and

Defence. He had just rejoined his corps, after spending two weeks in the hospital at Pretoria. Lieutenant Burch was the son of Lieutenant F. O. Burch, of the 2nd Canadian Dragoons. Lieut.-

LIEUTENANT BORDEN.
(Killed in action at Witpoort.)

Col. Evans, who had commanded the 2nd Battalion since it left Bloemfontein, wrote of their burial: "On our return from outpost duty on Tuesday night we buried the two officers by lantern light. All the Canadians, 1st and 2nd Battalions

were there, and representatives from the New Zealanders and Mounted Infantry. The burial service was conducted by the Brigade chaplain, the Rev. Mr. Gardiner, and as the two gallant lads lay there, with a Canadian flag, which I picked up at Johannesburg, covering their bodies, and their Canadian comrades all about them, it was a sad and most impressive scene, and I think all our hearts were turned toward the sorrowing ones in the dear old land we had left a few months ago."

The 1st Battalion of the Canadian Mounted Rifles had been moving south from Pretoria and the 2nd Battalion had been moving north from its posts in Orange River Colony. On July 15th they had come together. After doing duty along the line of the Natal-Transvaal Railway toward the south-east, they followed the main advance along the Delagoa Bay Railway towards Komati Poort. They had frequent brushes with the enemy and did useful work of various kinds. On September 5th, at daylight, a detachment of 125 men of the 2nd Battalion, which was guarding the railway between Pan and Wonderfontein, east of Middelburg, was attacked by a force of Boers with two guns and one pom-pom. Colonel Mahon was sent to their assistance, but before he arrived the Canadians had beaten the Boers off after a very sharp fight, in which Major Saunders, Lieutenant Moodie, and two men were wounded and six men were captured. Lord Roberts called it "a very creditable performance."

On November 1st a column under General Smith-Dorien moved south from Belfast toward the Komati valley. On the 2nd sixty men of the 2nd Battalion

C.M.R. formed the advanced guard, under command of Major Saunders. The guide took a wrong direction, and when they came in touch with the enemy the main column had branched off to the right and was nearly two miles away. Expecting early assistance the small force, although in a most dangerous position, held its ground under severe rifle-fire. In advance was a small party under Lieutenant Chalmers. Learning of the situation the G.O.C. sent orders for a retirement. Lieutenant Chalmers skilfully fell back on his supports, and further retirement was carried out steadily by successive groups. Corporal Schell's horse was killed, and fell on his rider, injuring him, whereupon Sergeant Tryon gave the injured man his horse. Major Saunders rode back and took up Sergeant Tryon, but the saddle turned and both were thrown. Major Saunders, partially stunned by the fall, was struck by a bullet while making for cover. Lieutenant Chalmers went back for his superior officer, but was unable to remove him; he returned to the firing line for assistance, but was shot through the body, dying a few minutes later. To Lieutenant Chalmers's excellent management of his troops in this engagement, as well as to his splendid services throughout the campaign, his commanding officer paid a high tribute.

One of the most notable performances by Canadian troops occurred a few days later, when the 1st Battalion C.M.R., under Lieut.-Col. Lessard, and two guns of D Battery, R.C.A., under Lieutenant Morrison, defended the rear of General Smith-Dorien's flying column on its retirement from the Komati

River. On November 6th the column had started from Belfast. The enemy was soon met and hung on the front flanks and rear until the Komati River was reached, where they defended a strong position until forced to retire by a wide turning movement by the Suffolks and Canadian Mounted Rifles. Strongly reinforced during the night, the Boers pressed the attack in the morning. Lord Roberts reported to the War Office that "the Boers tried to seize the strong position on the bank of the Komati from which they were beaten out November 6th, but were prevented by Lieut.-Col. Evans, the Canadian mounted troops, and two of the 84th guns galloping two miles and seizing it in the nick of time. The rear on the return march was defended by Lieut.-Col. Lessard with the Canadian Dragoons and two Royal Canadian guns, under Lieutenant Morrison. Smith-Dorien says no praise can be too high for the devoted gallantry these troops showed in keeping off the enemy from the infantry and convoys." The following letter from General Smith-Dorien tells in a few words the story of this gallant action :—

"I have much pleasure in forwarding attached statements on the gallant behaviour of officers and non-commissioned officers of the Royal Canadian forces in action of the 7th November, 1900, between Withkloof and Lilliefontein, on the Komati River. I must, in bringing them forward, emphasise the fact that the behaviour of the whole Royal Canadian rear guard, under Lieut.-Col. Lessard, was so fine that it

makes it most difficult to single any out for special distinction. There is no doubt that men sacrificed themselves in the most gallant way to save the guns, which they succeeded in doing.

"These statements, added to what I knew myself, enable me to bring forward five names for special distinction. The first four of them I emphatically recommend for the proud distinction of the Victoria Cross, and the fifth for some special mark of her Majesty's favour.

"Lieutenant H. Z. C. Cockburn, of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, with a handful of men, at a most critical moment, held off the Boers to allow the guns to get away; but to do so had to sacrifice himself and his party, all of whom were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. Lieutenant E. E. W. Turner, later in the day, when the Boers again seriously threatened to capture the guns, although twice previously wounded, remounted and deployed his men at close quarters and drove off the Boers, thus saving the guns.

"No. 135, Private W. A. Knisley, of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, in a most gallant way carried out of action, under a heavy and close fire, No. 172, Corporal Percy R. Price, of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, getting wounded himself in doing so.

"No. 176, Sergeant E. Holland, of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, did splendid work with his Colt gun. He kept the Boers off the two 12-pounders by firing from his gun at close range, and then, when he saw the Boers were too near for him to escape with the carriage, as the horse was blown, he calmly

lifted the gun off the carriage and galloped off with it under his arm.

"Lieutenant E. W. B. Morrison, Royal Canadian Artillery, for the skill and coolness with which he worked and finally saved his guns."

Thus to the end the Canadian Mounted Rifles maintained their reputation for good fighting. In his farewell order, when they started for home General Smith-Dorien said that he "had no words to express how great a loss they would be to the flying column."

By the 1st of July all the Canadian troops, with the exception of D Battery, had been in at least one engagement. The Canadian Infantry has seen nearly forty fights, the Mounted Rifles perhaps half that number, C Battery had fought at Mafeking, E Battery around Douglas, and Strathcona's Horse had just had its first skirmish at Waterval Spruit. But D Battery had not yet fired a shot. The men understood that some must guard the lines of communication in Cape Colony. Still it was with deepening disappointment they watched the weeks lengthen to months, as they kept guard near De Aar.

Sir Charles Warren had taken part of E Battery as his only artillery when he left Belmont about the middle of May to attack the rebels at Douglas. His column numbered over 700 men, and Lieut.-Col. Sam Hughes was his Chief Intelligence Officer. Two guns under Lieutenant Wood had been left at Belmont, and two under Lieutenant Ogilvie were left at Rooipan; but these sections later rejoined the

column, and Major Ogilvie and Captain Costigan went on with the other two guns. Sir Charles Warren made a night march on Douglas, surprised the town on the morning of May 21st, and entered it after a few shots and without casualties. Two or three well-placed shells dispersed the Boers on the other side of the Vaal. That afternoon the Boers returned to the attack and drove in one of the British outposts. When the alarm was given, so keen were the Canadian gunners that they would not wait for their horses but ran their guns into position by hand. Again a few shells dispersed the enemy. On May 26th the column started for Campbell. At Faber's Farm, where they camped on the way, the Boers made a surprisingly fierce night attack, getting right into the British camp. They wanted above all things to get possession of the guns. The Canadian gunners dared not fire in the darkness, at point-blank range, for fear of hitting their comrades, and for them it was a case of waiting until the other arms of the force had cleared the camp and sunlight revealed the retreating enemy. The Canadian casualties were 1 killed and 8 wounded, and the whole force lost 15 killed, including Colonel Spence, and 30 wounded. E Battery was having its experience of war.

From Faber's Farm the column proceeded to Campbell, and during the advance the Battery was again engaged. On June 13th the force left Campbell and marched northward, everywhere dispersing the rebels and receiving the submission of large numbers. A very large section of country was covered before they finally arrived at Kimberley. Later, a section of

the Battery was sent to Warrenton and another to Vryburg, on the road to Mafeking.

During July an opportunity was made for D Battery to see active service. To the great delight of Major Hurdman and his men the three sections of the Battery, which for so many weeks had been on garrison duty at Victoria West, De Aar, and Orange River Station, entrained for the north. At Bloemfontein they were kept for several days, and then part of the Battery marched out to the Waterworks, over ground the Canadian Infantry had trodden in the stirring times two months before, and another part was sent south to Edenburg. Again the men had only garrison duty, and again disappointment took possession of them. But their longing was soon to be satisfied, for the order came which took them to Pretoria in time to join in the resistance to Botha's attacks and in the offensive operations which immediately followed. They were attached to General Hamilton's Division and with it saw sharp fighting and were commended for quickness in getting into action, accuracy of fire and steadiness.

Canadian troops had taken part in all sorts of actions, C Battery completing the list by standing a siege with Generai Baden-Powell's force at Warm Baths. Even service on an armoured train was being performed by a detachment of the Canadian Infantry. On July 8th two subalterns and sixty men had been detailed for that service between Elandsfontein and Kroonstadt.

Until August 2nd the rest of the Infantry Battalion remained quietly at Springs. On that date, however,

CANADIAN NORTH-WEST CORPS AT CAPE TOWN.

they were sent south by train to Wolvehoek, in Orange River Colony, near the Vaal, to form part of a cordon the British were trying to draw around De Wet. That exceedingly clever commander, supplied with information by every inhabitant of the country through which he passed, was actually striking across country to the north-west to join the Boer forces north of Pretoria. From Wolvehoek the Canadian Infantry, with General Hart's Brigade, were marched hither and thither, south and west, north-east and north. Under very trying conditions, such as strong winds and dust, they did the fastest marching they had ever done, averaging sixteen or seventeen miles a day. Yet not a man fell out, and Lieut.-Col. Otter reported that they stood the work better than any others in their column. Their campaign was ending with a record performance. De Wet they did not see, for he slipped through Oliphant's Nek when no one was watching it and escaped.

General Hart's Brigade continued its northward march to Krugersdorp, twenty-two miles west of Johannesburg. Here the Brigade was disbanded, and the Canadians took train for Pretoria, and then marched a few miles east along the Delagoa Bay Railway to occupy Silverton and Eerste Fabrieken. They had completed 1,000 miles of straight marching since their arrival in South Africa.

A desire to return home was then dominating the majority. When Lord Roberts inquired of Lieut.-Col. Otter, on July 16th, how many of the men wished to go back by way of England to

represent the battalion before Her Majesty, the whole number on active duty volunteered. Similar inquiries in the other Canadian corps showed the same result. But when it began to appear that, although the war was practically over and there would be no further work for them to do except to occupy camps at points not likely to need defending, they might be kept in South Africa for months, a great many of the first contingent were anxious to return to Canada within the year for which they had enlisted, rather than wait for the Imperial review.

In the declaration attached to the oath of attestation for the Canadian Volunteers the term of service was stated as six months or one year, if required, or "until sooner lawfully discharged or dismissed." This declaration was drawn up by the military branch of the Militia Department, and is further evidence that even this branch, which included two prominent Imperial officers, believed that the war would be a short one. In the circumstances Lieut.-Col. Otter wrote home for instructions as to the re-engagement of officers and men for a further period; but before he received these instructions he called the attention of the Imperial authorities to the near expiry of the term of service. He explained this by saying: "Though loth to give them any idea that might be construed as a desire to avoid further service, I cannot in justice to the officers and men of the battalion ignore the very strong desire of the majority to return to their several vocations with the least possible delay now that the

campaign is practically over." Lord Roberts cabled the War Office and suggested that arrangements should be made for the re-enlistment of the men for a further period of two or three months. In forwarding this suggestion to the Canadian Government Mr. Chamberlain pointed out that the soldiers from the United Kingdom had been enlisted to serve until the war was ended. The Canadian Government was ready to make the necessary arrangements. On September 14th, in answer to an inquiry, the following despatch was received from Mr. Chamberlain: "Referring to your telegram of the 30th August, The Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief in South Africa has been instructed to despatch from South Africa members of the Royal Canadian Regiment not willing to extend period of service, to arrive in Canada not later than 15th October. In the event of a large number they will be sent direct to Canada by transport specially detailed, otherwise *viâ* England by transport conveying invalids." A majority of the officers and men availed themselves of these provisions for their return, and left Cape Town on October 2nd by special transport *Idaho*, direct for Canada.

From the tone of the references to this subject it is evident that the Imperial authorities would have preferred that the whole battalion should re-enlist. But the City Imperial Volunteers were sent home at the same time as the Canadians, and no appeal or argument was used to induce the men to stay. The desire of the men to return home cannot justly be criticised; and before a comparison is drawn between

ONE OF THE STRATHCONAS.

those who returned and those who elected to remain it should be borne in mind that a large proportion of those who remained were members of the draft whose term of service was only little more than half expired, or members of the Permanent Force in Canada who had enlisted for South Africa on the understanding that the time spent away from home should count as part of the term of their enlistment in the Permanent Force, and who, therefore, had no particular object in returning, since the camp life in South Africa was certain to prove more interesting than barrack life in Canada. But the men who did come back had left positions in Canada to respond to an exceptional call. They had no intention of devoting their lives to military service. They had put in a year of very hard labour and were then anxious to take again their places in the civil community and no longer neglect their chosen life-work. It is upon just such men that Canada's hope and reliance must be placed.

Lord Roberts reviewed the returning detachment at Pretoria on September 26th, and after the march past addressed them thus: "I cannot allow you to depart without expressing my thanks for and appreciation of your loyal services and excellent work, especially at Paardeberg on February 27th. I am sure the people of Canada will be pleased to hear how gallantly and how splendidly you have all behaved in action.

"Deeply I regret the losses you have suffered. I should have been happier if you had returned in your full strength; but no one could expect you to pass through so arduous a campaign without losses.

"I am sorry that some of you are obliged to return sooner than the rest of the regiment, but I recognise the urgency of private affairs. I am confident that the Queen and the British people will never forget your services. If it should ever be my good fortune to visit Canada I hope to meet you all again."

The second detachment of the Infantry returned to Canada a few weeks later by way of England, where they were reviewed by the Queen and received every mark of attention.

Strathcona's Horse was the last body of Canadian troops to leave Africa. Under General Buller they had taken part in the capture of Amerspoort, Ermelo, Carolina, Machadadorp, Lydenburg, Spitzkop, and Pilgrim's Rest. Returning to Machadadorp on October 7th, they received instructions to turn over their horses to General French and entrain for Pretoria. It was apparently the intention to send them home at that time. On October 20th, however, they were rehorsed at Pretoria and sent to assist in opening the railway to Potchefstroom. Here they distinguished themselves by the way in which they carried out their duty as advanced guard on November 10th. They opened the way for the main column, which, however, failed to come up, and when ordered to retire they took back with them six hundred cattle and twelve hundred sheep. Of the operations General Barton thus wrote to Lieut.-Col. Steele: "I cannot speak too highly of the practical and effective manner in which the duty assigned to your splendid corps was carried out by yourself and all under your command yesterday, and

I have specially mentioned this in my report to the C.O.C.I. I only regret that circumstances prevented my supporting your movement by advancing farther with the main body." Trooper Read, of the Strathconas, had been captured after his horse had been killed, but he cleverly and daringly effected his escape during the night and brought valuable information. The Strathconas joined the force under General Knox in his strenuous pursuit of De Wet, and after spending some weeks of forced marching through the eastern part of Orange River Colony, they started for home about the middle of January.

CHAPTER X

INCIDENTS

In a few chapters the skeleton of a campaign may be traced. The reality, clothed with flesh and blood, sentient at tens of thousands of centres, knowing and expressing all human experiences from buoyancy to grim weariness, from hope to despair, from the homely joys of fellowship to the agonies of cruel death, from the fierce lust of blood to the transcendent enthusiasm of sacrifice, is beyond the power of words to reveal. War, the consequence of the actions of rulers or legislators, or of the conflicting aspirations of peoples, is a full and terrible drama for those who go to fight.

None can follow every expression and every development in such a drama. It is too vast and too complex even for the most comprehensive and most sympathetic imagination. All that can be done is to observe, or reconstruct, representative actions or single scenes. As with the fictions of playwrights, so with this intense reality, the effects upon those who watch differ according to character and mood and according to the extent to which one identifies oneself, or is bound up, with those who

act. Some individuals and some nations are elevated and invigorated; some are depressed and unnerved; some are basely inflamed. War is an inspiration, a blight and a provoker of dark passions. For the world it is a mixed good and a mixed evil; for those who fight, whose combined deeds and sufferings produce these effects, it is with them as with other actors, according to their natures and according to their parts; but always terrible.

In the South African drama Canadians played not unimportant parts, and played them well. They, however, did only what others did. In some things and on some occasions they excelled; but, on their record, it cannot be said that they established a claim to more than equality. That they did this, despite their inexperience, is glory enough.

With a sense of the awfulness of war always present, it is yet upon the brighter scenes and more heroic actions the mind would dwell. War is not all fighting, nor is it all drudgery. The work of campaigning is engrossing and exhausting; but never yet has it absorbed the whole energies of British soldiers. There are hours of respite, and it is in them that the abounding nature of British energy manifests itself in a disposition for active play. British soldiers take with them to war the implements of sport. Canadians share with the people of the Mother Country this love of sport. Because of inexperience they did not think to take with them balls or bats; but in South Africa they played with borrowed balls or with those they made themselves. At Springs, for example, the Canadian

Infantry played baseball matches with a home-made ball and the handle of a pickaxe for a bat. Against teams from other regiments the Canadians displayed their prowess at football. While E Battery was in camp at De Aar a team from the corps won an Association football match from the Essex Regiment by the score of two goals to one. As the Essex Regiment had held the championship of the camp the victory was one worth gaining. The Canadian team consisted of Wilson, Rawlings, Reynolds, Byrnes, Evans, Boyce, O'Reilly, Ferguson, Smith Whitton, Hamley, and Creighton.

On Good Friday, at Bloemfontein, the officers of the Canadian Infantry played Rugby football against the officers of the Gordon Highlanders and won. If there were return matches in which the Canadians were defeated, the Canadian correspondents did not report them. In other forms of athletics also, in tugs-of-war, running and jumping, the Canadians had their share of successes.

Battles were, after all, only incidents in the South African war. The Canadian Infantry were engaged some forty times in ten months. The main action was marching. As one of the privates said when invalided home, "It's not the fighting that kills, it's the marching." Bearing a soldier's burden, faint with hunger, with throats parched and lips cracked from lack of water, perhaps in the first weakness of disease, footsore and desperately weary, the men tramped on. But, again, the drudgery of marching was lightened and enlivened by a sense of comradeship; by the jests and flashes of humour; by the occasional

glimpses from an eminence of the vastness of an army corps in motion; by regimental singing; and by all the sounds of war and movement—the swishing of thousands of feet, the click of arms, the rattle of waggons, the yells of the native drivers, the clank of artillery.

At the end of the long day, too, there was the camp-fire, around which, when not too exhausted, the men would gather with their pipes and recount the events of the day or retell the stories of past days. At such times concerts were popular. One of these "camp-fires" was described by Mr. H. S. White, of the Montreal *Star*:—

"As its name implies, the prominent feature of this military social function is a fire. To make the entertainment thoroughly successful this should be as large as possible, illuminating with its soaring blaze the whole wide circle around which the soldiers gather, and within which the performers one after the other take up their stand in full view of everybody. To keep up a fire of this nature on the Karoo means a lot of hard work. The biggest thing in the shape of timber is a low bush, that grows seldom higher than a man's knee. It takes a lot of such fuel to make a big blaze, and it kept several of our boys hustling to produce even a fairly respectable fire.

"Around this fire on the lonely, desolate Karoo—150 miles from a railway, and I don't know how many thousands of miles away from the homes of everybody present—there gathered our boys from the prairie and the older provinces, the bushmen from

Western Australia and their kinsmen from New Zealand, and the cross-country riders from the hills and dales of merry old Derbyshire. With such diverse talent to draw from, it was no wonder that there was much to amuse and interest everybody, much that everybody heard for the first time. Our boys sang the familiar 'Alouette, gentille Alouette,' and the New Zealanders, the Western Australians, and the men from Derbyshire were fairly carried away with delight. They had never heard anything like it before, and, strange as it may appear to you at home, they could not get enough of it, but had to have it over and over again. Then came Australia's turn. One of the boys from the southern continent gave a wild, dashing, bushman's song, with a chorus to it like a cross between a Maori war-whoop and a Red Indian's yell, and it was the turn of our boys to be surprised and delighted. So the entertainment went—with gems of popular songs from almost every corner of the Empire—French-Canadian songs and recitations; college choruses from McGill, Queen's, and Toronto; the songs of the bush and the chase from Australia and New Zealand; and the good old hunting songs from the country-sides of Merrie Olde England—one after the other in quick succession, until 'last post' rang out through the clear, calm air, and after singing 'God Save the Queen,' in a way that would have been a wholesome lesson to any of our rebel friends if they could have been present, the crowd reluctantly separated, and every man groped his way 'home' to the particular spot on the Karoo where his blanket lay spread, into which he promptly

crawled, cheered and inspirited by the simple entertainment."

Another notable "camp-fire" was that which E Battery organised among Sir Charles Warren's column to celebrate Dominion Day.

STRATHCONAS AT CAPE TOWN.

One of the greatest hardships was the lack of sufficient food, which generally had to be borne just when most work was being done, for it was when the men were marching hardest that the transport failed to keep up. One Canadian soldier naïvely wrote

home to his mother: "If a chap got plenty to eat he could do a lot more." If a man had had nothing to eat but one or two army biscuits a day and came to a farmyard in which there were poultry, pigs, or cattle, he was sorely tempted to break the army rules and "loot" a good meal. And it is to be feared that he did not often resist the temptation. Canadians looted with the rest; they were perhaps neither better nor worse than the others. Some of them were caught and punished, as, for example, the man who stole a chicken near Paardeberg and was court-martialled and sentenced to fifty-six days "No. 2." But at that time the penalty for looting was death, and he escaped easily. The full record of the punishments meted out to Canadians for looting and other offences will never be known in Canada, for De Wet captured the train on which the regimental defaulter books and other important regimental records of the first contingent, for the early part of the campaign, were being conveyed north from Bloemfontein, and burned them.

Minor offences of various kinds may be chargeable against the Canadians, but there seems to have been only one deep stain on their good name. Two men of the 1st Battalion of the Canadian Mounted Rifles were guilty of treason in seizing arms from the Boers and selling them back again. They did not act alone, but in conjunction with some men from other regiments. In reporting the affair to Canada, Lieut.-Col. Lessard stated that he could offer no excuse for their act, but he believed that another man was the ringleader. Both men concerned were members of the Permanent Force in Canada, from which they enlisted

for South Africa. The Militia Order issued at Ottawa on August 12th declared that these two men, "having been convicted of collecting arms from the burghers without authority, and selling them back again to the enemy, and sentenced to ten years' penal servitude, are hereby struck off the strength of the Canadian Militia." A member of their troop wrote home: "We Canadians feel the disgrace keenly, and would be quite content to see them shot dead for their offence."

Reference has been made to a few of the acts of individual bravery, coolness, and resourcefulness among the Canadians which came under the eyes of correspondents or were reported by officers. A typical instance of coolness was the "bluff" put up by the three troopers of the Strathconas, who became separated from their comrades when the town of Carolina was reached, and held the town all night by giving it out that they were an advanced picket within hailing distance of assistance. The Strathconas had simply made a raid upon Carolina to capture and destroy any ammunition they could find, and were under strict orders not to attempt to hold the place. They drove the enemy back beyond the town, and, quickly performing their work, retired at once. Three men, who had fallen behind, arrived after the others had departed. As night was coming on they thought it more dangerous to set out in search of their comrades than to remain where they were; so they quietly assumed the *rôle* of a picket, and by preserving a bold and confident attitude completely deceived the inhabitants, and through them the armed Boers in

the neighbourhood. Just before dawn they slipped off and safely regained their corps.

Private Thompson, of the Canadian Infantry, was awarded one of the four scarves which the Queen knitted for the four Colonials performing the bravest deeds. Thompson's action was thus written about in a letter to the *Friend*, the paper published by the Soldiers in Bloemfontein :—

"DEAR SIR,—In answer to a paragraph appearing in your paper of past date under the heading of 'Acts of Bravery Performed during the War,' allow me to quote one which I witnessed at Paardeberg on the morning of Cronje's surrender on the 27th of February. Every one knows of the gallant display made by the Royal Canadians on that never-to-be-forgotten morning, and how, as daylight broke, they had again occupied their trenches, leaving sixty killed and wounded on the field. As the sun came up behind the kopjes, revealing once more to Cronje and his men the exact position of our trenches, they opened a heavy fire upon them, and woe to the man who was indiscreet enough to show his head and shoulders above the earthworks. Between the position and the Boer trenches lay the Canadian dead and dying. About 5.30 a wounded man, about 500 yards away, was seen to be making for our trenches under a heavy fire, but was at last observed to fall. Now and then between the volleys he was seen to wave his hands as if for assistance. Suddenly, from the left of our trenches, a form was seen to climb the earthworks in front of our trenches, and, jumping

down, to make straight for the place where the wounded lay, about 90 yards from the Boer trenches. Utterly regardless of the scathing fire which hissed around him, he ran on and at last reached the wounded man and tried to lift him, but it was too late, for the poor fellow had breathed his last. Seeing it was of no avail, his would-be rescuer walked back over the ground he had covered, and although bullets whistled around him and tore up the ground in every direction, he coolly regained his trenches with a pipe stuck between his teeth. I have since ascertained his name was Private Thompson, of the Royal Canadians, and although I do not know whether his case is one recommended for distinction or not, still I have never during the campaign seen a case of such coolness and pluck as that displayed by Private Thompson. Considering the galling fire that swept the distance of four or five hundred yards, which he covered in his endeavour to reach the wounded man, also his close proximity to the Boer trenches, it seems marvellous that he ever lived to get within four hundred yards of him, not to mention getting back without a scratch. His case is one of the most deserving of recognition, coming as it does from amongst the ranks of the gallant Canadian Volunteers, by whose side we have fought and marched since we left Graspan, and than whom a jollier or pluckier lot of boys never lived.

"ONE OF THE GORDONS WHO WAS THERE."

Marching, fighting, and fatigue work were the operations in which the vast majority of Canadians had their testing, but some of them had opportunities

to show their quality in other kinds of work. The officers, of course, had such directing as officers of battalions, companies and sections do have in war-time, and seem to have carried out what they had to do creditably. At times they were placed in very difficult positions and had to determine their course independently of advice or assistance from Imperial officers.

In a somewhat larger sphere Lieut.-Col. Otter was more than once Camp Commandant, as, for example, for a short time at Belmont Camp and for a long time at Springs. Then, too, in the march toward Kenhardt, when Sir Charles Parsons went forward with the advanced guard, Lieut.-Col. Drury had command of the main column, and as the Canadian officers under him happened to outrank the other officers with the column, practically the whole management was in the hands of the Canadians. Staff duty was also performed by Canadians. For example, Major Denison was on Lord Roberts' Staff, Lieut.-Col. Sam Hughes, Major Dobell, and others on Brigade and Divisional Staffs; the Staff of the Canadian Brigade Division of Artillery, under Lieut.-Col. Drury, who were left without duties when the Brigade Division was broken up into batteries, were appointed to General Baden-Powell's Staff.

In more purely administrative work, also, Canadians found opportunities larger than those afforded by the requirements of their corps. The work of the Post Office corps might, perhaps, be included in this class. Above all the other Canadians in administrative work stands Lieut.-Col. Girouard, the Director of Rail-

ways, and four or five responsible positions under him were filled by Canadians. Lieut.-Col. Gordon had experience with base work and line-of-communication work, as well as Staff work at Divisional Headquarters and active operations in the field. After the capture of Pretoria he returned to Cape Town and took up the duties of Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General for the Australians. Lieut.-Col. J. L. Biggar was for a time D.A.A.G. for both Canadians and Australians, but he afterwards handed over to Lieut.-Col. Gordon the work for the Australians to take up the Red Cross work which Lieut.-Col. Ryerson was resigning. Among other things he saw to it that invalided Canadians, as they embarked for Canada, were provided with a complete outfit of clothing and comforts and ten shillings in cash.

Major J. C. Macdougall became D.A.A.G. for Railway Transport. He had studied the problems of transport at the Royal Military College in Canada. The man holding the position of D.A.A.G. for Railway Transport was responsible for the transport by rail between the base and the army in the field, of all the troops, ordnance, animals, and supplies for the whole British army, and was also responsible for the audit of the accounts between the railway and the War Office. He had been invalided from Belmont to Cape Town, and, after he was able to leave the hospital, entered the office for railway transport in a subordinate position. Changes were made in the staff above him, and he was finally chosen by Lieut.-Col. Girouard as head of the department.

Lieutenant A. Clyde Caldwell was invalided to

Cape Town from Paardeberg. When he left the hospital he was attached to the mapping section of the Intelligence Department, and a short time afterward, when the officer in charge was sent to take up other duties, Lieutenant Caldwell was given his position. Another Canadian, also, Lieutenant McLean, attracted the attention of Lord Methuen by his skill in map-making, and on his recommendation received a commission in the Imperial Artillery. He was only one of several who were for various reasons recommended and given commissions in the Imperial army.

Another office, administrative in its nature, was that of Red Cross Commissioner. Since December 1, 1896, Canada has had a Red Cross Society, with local branches all over the Dominion. The Society is itself a branch of the British National Society. Its first contributions were sent direct to Lieut.-Col. Otter for distribution, according to his judgment, among the members of the first contingent. It was out of the funds of this Society that Lieut.-Col. Otter was able, for example, to provide for the non-commissioned officers and men a good Christmas dinner at a cost of £120, and to provide extra food on other occasions, as well as extra clothing and hospital comforts. By the time he reached Bloemfontein Lieut.-Col. Otter had received over $5,000 from the Society. When Canadian invalids were sent from the regimental to the various base hospitals, or were left behind when the regiment marched forward, it became manifestly impossible for him to oversee the distribution of aid in all cases of need. As the same

condition of affairs would inevitably arise with the other contingents sent out, and would put it out of the power of the commanding officers to properly distribute the supplies, the Society decided to send out its own Commissioner. Lieut.-Col. G. Sterling Ryerson, M.D., Chairman of the Executive Com-

LIEUT.-COL. RYERSON AND RED CROSS STAFF AT BLOEMFONTEIN.

mittee of the Society and its original organiser, offered his services, and sailed on the *Laurentian* with the first detachment of the second contingent.

After spending a few days at Cape Town Lieut.-Col. Ryerson, on Febuary 18th started for Kimberley. At Orange River he was forced to wait until the railway line was opened, and while there acted for the

British Society, at the request of Sir John Furley, the British Chief Commissioner. Getting through to Kimberley on the first train to reach the town after its relief, he was just in time to establish himself and then take supplies of condensed food and other comforts across country to Paardeberg, where he arrived on the day after Cronje's surrender, and was heartily welcomed by the Canadians. Returning to Kimberley he was able to be of service to more than his own countrymen, as the following correspondence shows. On May 24th Mr. Chamberlain wrote to Lord Minto :—

"My Lord,—I have the honour to transmit to you for communication to your Ministers, copy of a despatch which the Secretary of State for War has received from the Field-Marshal the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, respecting the good work done by the Canadian Red Cross Society at Kimberley.

"I observe with great pleasure the high terms in which Lord Roberts and Lord Methuen have reported on the work of the Society. I have, &c.,

"(Signed) J. Chamberlain."

The enclosures were as follows :—

"My Lord,—I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter from Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen, bearing testimony to the excellent work done by the Canadian Red Cross Society at Kimberley. The Royal Army Medical Corps were working at Kimberley at very high pressure, owing to the fact that

our own wounded from Paardeberg were sent in to that place. Had it not been for the exertions of the Mayor of Kimberley in providing accommodation, the kindness of the Sisters at the Nazareth Home and the Roman Catholic community, and the energy and zeal of Lieut.-Col. Ryerson, M.D., and the Canadian Red Cross Society the condition of the sick and wounded would have been different to what I found it on my visit there last month.

"(Signed) ROBERTS, FIELD-MARSHAL."

"CHIEF OF STAFF,—I wish to bring before the Commander-in-Chief the fine and unostentatious work performed by the Canadian Red Cross Society here under the guidance of Lieut.-Col. Ryerson, M.D. The sick and wounded came from Paardeberg in too large numbers and at too great a pace for me to meet the medical requirements. The Kimberley people found halls and schools and as many beds as they could, but three hundred trestle-beds and extra blankets appeared, so far as I could make out, from the skies. Only yesterday I found Lieut.-Col. Ryerson had seen our wants and had got De Beers' men to make the beds, had bought the blankets and hospital requirements, and placed these things in the hospital without saying a word to any one. Here, at any rate, is money spent in a practical manner, the agent a medical man who ascertains the place where aid is required and who uses his own judgment as to what is required. Lieut.-Col. Ryerson leaves to-day, and has left me a cheque to spend as I think best for the sick.

"Four Canadian nurses come here to-day. The Canadian Red Cross Society have taken so much interest in the work that I should be glad if this testimony to good done by the Society, through Lieut.-Col. Ryerson, might be known to the president of the Society.

"(Signed) METHUEN,
"Lieutenant-General Commanding First Division."

While at Kimberley Lieut.-Col. Ryerson was himself laid up for ten days with fever. On his recovery he returned to Cape Town to secure supplies, and then started for Bloemfontein. As the bridges had not yet been restored he spent some days at the hospitals at De Aar, Naauwpoort, and Norval's Pont, and then got through to Bloemfontein on the first train to go north from Cape Colony. Bloemfontein remained his headquarters until July 1st, when he returned to Canada. On April 25th he had been appointed British Red Cross Commissioner, and was from that time in charge of all the Red Cross work in connection with Lord Roberts's main army. He established a branch depôt at Kroonstadt, and great quantities of supplies passed through his hands. The staff he gathered about him—two travelling agents, one sergeant, and six men—were all Canadians. Three times he tried to reach Pretoria, but De Wet each time blew up the railway ahead of him. When he left Lieut.-Col. Biggar undertook his work as far as care for the comfort of returning Canadian invalids was concerned, and Rev. Mr. Almond, one of the

chaplains with the first contingent, remained as travelling agent.

The Canadian nurses were moved from hospital to hospital as the needs of the service demanded, and were kept constantly employed. The Canadian doctors, too, were hard worked. Dr. Fiset, who is a French-Canadian, appeared on one occasion in a quasi-diplomatic *rôle*. On account of illness he had been left behind at Heilbron when the Canadian Infantry marched on toward Pretoria. De Wet shortly afterwards occupied the town, and, although the doctor had recovered the Boers would not allow him to leave. In the course of an interview De Wet expressed surprise that any one with French blood should be assisting the British. When he learned Dr. Fiset was a French-Canadian De Wet inquired in a most interested way how the French were treated in Canada—whether they were allowed to retain their own language, and how the relations between the races had been adjusted under British institutions. The answers given by the doctor were the best of materials upon which to base arguments for an early and honourable peace ; but the approach of General Macdonald with the Highland Brigade spoiled a diplomatic opportunity, and left the doctor free to return to the special duties of his profession.

It may be found that what Canada has accomplished in solving the race problem is not her least contribution towards the South African settlement. Another chapter in her history—the rebellion of 1837—has also been searched for suggestions, as the discussions at Cape Town show.

To relieve the pressure upon the medical staff and hospital accommodations, great numbers of the sick and wounded, as soon as they were able to travel, were invalided to England. Canadian sick and wounded were sent with the rest. The experiences in all cases were very much alike. Having been passed from field hospitals to several different base hospitals in South Africa, the men embarked for England and were there distributed among the English hospitals. When they were sufficiently recovered they were sent home to Canada in detachments. Some were granted furloughs and spent a few weeks in England outside the hospitals before they left for home; and a comparatively small number returned to South Africa to rejoin their corps.

At first there was a lack of system in the way the War Office dealt with the invalided Canadians, and stories of neglect appeared in the English press. It seems that some men on furlough did wander aimlessly about, and a few of them spent a night or two in the open; but if any of them were without money they had no one to blame but themselves, for they had gone on furlough at their own request and had received the regular advance of pay. In a letter to Lord Strathcona, the Canadian High Commissioner, a number of the Canadians then in London protested vigorously that they had nothing to complain of and were most appreciative of the cordial treatment they had received at the hands of all classes in England. By regulations issued on August 1st the War Office laid down a system for the discharge and transporta-

tion to Canada of all who wished to return, and no more delays occurred. Before leaving, a gratuity of £5 was paid to each man.

Many special marks of attention were received by the Canadians in England, especially by the first detachments to arrive. They had practically the freedom of London, and were often entertained by individuals and societies. The Queen visited more than one of the hospitals, and a few of the Canadians will cherish personal words spoken by her. One party of thirty-nine was presented to the Prince and Princess of Wales at a garden party of the Grenadier Guards, and the Prince spoke to the French-Canadians in French.

Of the many who found soldiers' graves, and who lie scattered all along the lines of advance from mid-ocean to Komati Poort—it was their lot to be cast as victims in this tragedy. Their fate is one element in the drama which British people have watched intently and with anxious eagerness, and which they will ponder for years to come. In all its effects for good they have their share. The Canadian heart must often travel the irregular path they mark; and heart will meet heart there.

CHAPTER XI

PHASES OF POPULAR INTEREST

THREE thousand Canadians went to South Africa; five million remained at home. What was the relation of the three thousand to the five million? If the Canadian contingents were no more than fighting expeditions of a few hundred young men who were only adventurous individuals with no representative character, then the subject is interesting, perhaps, but not important. That number of men willing to fight could be found in almost any country; and the addition of three thousand to the British army did not turn the scale from defeat to victory. If, however, the Canadian soldiers went forth as representatives of the Canadian people, their doings are in a high degree important. If they were sent in a representative capacity, then their going marked the decision of a people; it was not merely the impulsive choice of a few restless spirits. If the people who sent them looked upon them as their representatives in the field, then every deed of valour or endurance had its significance and its effect; it is not necessary to consider how far the outcome of the war, or of any battle, was determined by them.

Many Canadians fought with the forces of the United States in the war with Spain; but no lasting effects can be traced to them, because they were not accepted by the Canadian people as representatives. The United States did not need these men; neither did Britain really need the three thousand. Any importance attached to the latter that does not belong also to the former must be derived, not from their superior numbers, but from their representative character.

It is one question whether the South African Volunteers were technically a national force and were despatched as such, and another question whether the people of Canada accepted them as their representatives and so regarded them. There can be little doubt that the Imperial Government desired contingents offered by the Governments of the Colonies, and, therefore, technically representative; and it is certain that the majority of the Canadians who took part in the discussions on the subject were in favour of official action by the Government. But Parliament had no opportunity of voting on the matter, and the Government has been inclined to interpret its action as the assisting of individual volunteers to reach South Africa, rather than as the sending of a national force. It has been pointed out that the Government had no constitutional authority for sending soldiers out of the country for a duty which was not connected with the defence of Canadian territory. Whether or not the position thus taken to quiet the fears of those who did not wish the country too fully committed to

a line of policy is tenable, in the face of the fact that the Government used its official machinery for announcing the enrolment, for conducting the enrolment and selecting officers, and provided the equipment out of the public stores and paid the

SIR WILFRID LAURIER ADDRESSING THE STRATHCONAS.

charges out of the public treasury, may be debatable. On the other hand, there can be no difference of opinion on the question whether or not the majority of the people of Canada accepted the Volunteers as representatives and so regarded them during the

whole campaign. The attitude of the majority was manifest in their anxiety that the Canadian corps should be kept intact and not lose their identity, in their willingness that the Government should meet all expenses, including an allowance of pay beyond the Imperial rates, and, perhaps even more clearly, in their liberal contributions toward the comfort of the men themselves and the assistance of those dependent on them, in the interest with which they followed all their movements in the field, and in the manner in which they welcomed them home.

In reality, even if not technically, participation in the South African war was a national movement. From this point of view any facts relating to the forms in which popular interest expressed itself have more than a passing significance. The extent of this interest compels the conclusion that the majority of the people, at least, looked upon the Volunteers, not as detached adventurers, but as representatives in a cause they did not disapprove. Whether this cause was conceived as the righting of wrongs suffered by men whose conditions and feelings other Colonists could understand, or as a demonstration of a desire for closer union with in the Empire, or as a mere assertion of a national aspiration for more active participation in the world's affairs, does not so readily appear.

Judged by the money they were willing to spend on them, the interest of Canadians in the South African volunteers was very real. Not only was no objection raised to the voting by Parliament of $2,000,000 for organising, equipping, transporting,

and partly paying the men, but popular subscription lists were opened in all parts of the country for objects connected with their welfare. A good deal of money was thus raised before the men sailed, and expended in effecting insurance on their lives, in providing libraries for their entertainment on board ship and dainties for their table, and in filling their purses. As already noted, one gentleman, who would not give his name for publication, undertook the charges on $1,000,000 of insurance on the lives of the first contingent. But contributions of money and materials did not cease when the first enthusiasm had passed. Indeed, additions to the list were announced right up to the end of the war.

As soon as the extent of the disposition to contribute was recognised organisation was brought about for more effective collection and distribution. The little springs of benevolence flowed into two main reservoirs—the Red Cross Fund and the Patriotic Fund. The objects of these two funds were different: the former was devoted to the comfort of the men in the field, and the latter more particularly to the assistance of the families in Canada which were suffering from the absence of the soldiers. As it was found, however, that comparatively little money was required for this latter purpose, the Patriotic Fund became a reserve for the benefit of the returned soldiers or for any other worthy object connected with the war.

As an organised effort the Red Cross Fund holds priority in point of time. The Canadian Red Cross Society, or "Canadian Branch of the British National

Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War," had been in existence for four years. Its Executive Committee issued an appeal for money within a few days after the announcement had been made that Canadian soldiers would be sent to South Africa. The officers of the Society were: Patron, His Excellency, the Earl of Minto; Hon. President, the Hon. F. W. Borden, Minister of Militia; President, Lieut.-Col. the Hon. J. M. Gibson, M.P.P.; Vice-Presidents for the Provinces—Ontario, Lieut.-Col. Ponton; Quebec, Dr. Roddick, M.P.; New Brunswick, Hon. G. E. Foster; Nova Scotia, Hon. W. S. Fielding; Manitoba, Hon. Hugh John Macdonald; British Columbia, Hon. Sir Chas. Hibbert Tupper; Prince Edward Island, Hon. Sir Louis Davies. Executive Committee, Lieut.-Col. G. Sterling Ryerson, M.D., Lieut.-Col. James Mason, C. R. Dickson, M.D., J. George Hodgins, LL.D., and Chas. A. Hodgetts, M.D.

With great energy the Executive Committee threw itself into the work, and before long had some fifty branches established in cities and towns throughout the Dominion as centres for the collection of funds and supplies. As early as October 14th Lieut.-Col. Ryerson had communicated with His Excellency, Lord Minto, with the Minister of Militia, and with the Director-General of Medical Services, outlining the work the Society was willing to undertake. The scheme was approved, and Lord Minto sent a contribution of $100. Fifty cases of clothing, medical supplies, and condensed foods were sent to Quebec to go out on the *Sardinian* with the first contingent;

and from that time on regular supplies of useful materials and drafts of money were forwarded to South Africa, a special Commissioner being sent in January to oversee their distribution.

Committees organised independently of the Red Cross Society, such as Ladies' Committees in various places, affiliated with it, and most of the relief work for the men in the field was carried on in the name of the Society. One of the movements directly due to the war was the formation of the "Soldiers' Wives' League." On November 13, 1899, notice was appended to the Militia Order for the day of the proposal to organise in each Military District in Canada a League of soldiers' wives. A branch of the League had already been founded in No. 5 Military District in Montreal; and Mrs. Hutton, wife of Major-General Hutton, gave an "At-Home" to soldiers' wives in the Drill Hall at Ottawa on Thursday, November 16th, for the purpose of organising the Ottawa district. The object of the League was to "bring the wives of all soldiers, whether of officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, or privates, of the Staff, Permanent Corps, and Active Militia into closer touch and sympathy with one another, so that in sickness and in health they may be able to mutually aid and assist one another and their families in times of difficulty, trouble, or distress." The League at once interested itself in the collection of funds and supplies for South Africa, and acted in conjunction with the Red Cross Society.

From the despatches of Lord Methuen and Lord

Roberts, forwarded by Mr. Chamberlain to Lord Minto, it appears that the good work of the Society and its Commissioner was recognised by the Imperial authorities. It certainly was warmly appreciated by the Canadians themselves, as letters from Canadian officers fully show. From Bloemfontein Lieut.-Col. Otter wrote to convey to the officers and members of the Society "the heartfelt thanks of the officers and men of the Royal Canadian Regiment for your continued and generous efforts for our comfort." He stated that the articles sent had been found most useful; and he acknowledged the total receipt, up to that time, of £997 in cash, as well as many cases of goods. He explained why so large a proportion of the expenditure had been for food by giving as an instance that, owing to the difficulties with the army transport, the men had for four weeks before reaching Bloemfontein been kept upon half rations.

It might be mentioned, in this connection, that a fund for ambulance work among the Boers was also started in Canada. The Consul-General of Holland, in Montreal, was appointed Treasurer in Canada for the "Dutch Ambulance Fund," and he issued an appeal for support on the ground that it would manifest a magnanimity of spirit which would have a salutary influence on the race feeling in South Africa. Although he received many subscriptions, it is to be feared that the responses could not be regarded as encouraging.

The other large organised manifestation of popular interest in the men who went to fight was called the

"Patriotic Fund." That which prompted the donations made to the men themselves on the eve of their departure prompted a steady continuance of such contributions. Organisation soon became a necessity; and Lord Minto, after consultation with a number of prominent men, proposed an acceptable scheme.

This new organisation was not to conflict in any way with the many local organisations which had undertaken to provide for the men for those localities, and was quite distinct from local funds for securing insurance upon the lives of the soldiers; and its objects differed from those of the Red Cross Society. The Queen became a patron of the Fund; Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Chas. Tupper, Lord Strathcona, the Lieutenant-Governors of the different Provinces, and the Major-General Commanding the Militia, were appointed Vice-Presidents, and strong sub-committees were also appointed.

Funds were received through many different channels. Lists were opened by the newspapers, the proceeds of concerts and entertainments of various kinds were handed over, and all sorts of collections were made. The movement extended over the whole country. One contribution was received from the Hudson's Bay Company's post at York Factory on Hudson's Bay. From this far northern outpost of settlement the officer in charge wrote that he and his associates were enclosing a bill for $58, the total of their "small contributions," from "a desire to associate ourselves with the cause; and so we shall be perfectly satisfied if what we give is made to relieve in any way the wants of the sufferers of the

war." Another sum received represented the proceeds of a concert held at Dawson City in the Klondike. The employés of the large railway companies raised very substantial funds among themselves—a thing which required much systematic work when the great extension of these lines is considered. Such cases are typical.

And the movement was not confined to Canada, but extended to Canadians abroad. In New York a very successful concert was held in Carnegie Hall, at which the programme was provided by Canadian artists resident in New York. The "Café-Chantant" organised by Canadian ladies and gentlemen resident in London, assisted by many of the best known artists in the Metropolis, was also brilliantly successful. Even from far-distant places, such as Antofagasta, Chili, where there was only one Canadian, some contributions were received. In the particular instance mentioned a draft was sent for the sum of £54 16s. 9d., contributed chiefly by natives of the British Isles; but on the list were one Canadian, five Americans, one Chilian, one Austrian, one Dane, one Brazilian, and one Turk.

An allied movement was conducted by the Montreal *Star* among the children. The *Star* called it "The Children's Testimonial to Queen Victoria and Patriotic Fund for Families of British Soldiers in the South African Campaign." The money raised was for British soldiers and not for Canadian soldiers, and the testimonial to the Queen took the form of an illuminated address, and also an album containing the photographs of more than one thousand children

who had acted as voluntary collectors for the fund. It was interesting to find that many contributions came from children in the United States, and some also from children in England. The sums ranged between five cents and one dollar, and more than $16,500 was thus raised. When the fund was closed and the album completed they were handed to Lord Minto to be forwarded to the Queen.

When the Patriotic Fund had swelled to $300,000 the Central Committee began to discourage further contributions, and finally declared the fund closed; but contributions were received even after this was done, and the Committee found itself in possession of about $325,000. As the fund has been very cautiously administered, this amount will probably prove amply sufficient for the purpose for which it was raised.

The contributions to these two funds and the many smaller ones, not in a few large sums from the wealthy, but in a great number of small sums from rich and poor alike, made for the present comfort or future welfare of the soldiers themselves or of those dependent on them, speak eloquently of the interest of the people of Canada in the men who went from among them to fight in South Africa. And this interest was not without its touches of romance. It is said that girls employed by the contractors wrote little notes and slipped them into the pockets of jackets and bands of caps. It is said, also, that when some of these were discovered in South Africa they were acknowledged in a way to bring a glow to the heart.

Another noteworthy phase of popular interest is

presented by the demonstrations over signal successes in the field. The capture of Cronje, the relief of Kimberley, Ladysmith, and Mafeking, and the occupation of Pretoria were all celebrated with enthusiasm. The celebration on "Pretoria Day" surpassed all others in magnitude and in heartiness. These demonstrations were evidences of direct interest in the conflict and in British success. While Canadians felt none of the tense soberness of responsibility for the war and did not, therefore, experience the same kind of reactions as did the people of the United Kingdom, and while even the form of their demonstrations was undoubtedly influenced by accounts of demonstrations occurring in England, yet there was sufficient spontaneity in all cases to justify the conclusion that the majority had made the cause their own. There was always a minority which did not approve, and which at times expressed its disapproval ; but others followed the course of the war as an espoused cause, and for them the Canadian Volunteers were accepted representatives. Of course, apart from their particular mission and as representatives of the manhood and spirit of this country, there was no Canadian who did not acknowledge them, or watch their conduct with the hopes and fears, the confidence and the anxiety of national pride.

Because they had done well, because they had set up high standards under conditions hitherto untried by Canada, they were welcomed home with such acclaim as only those hear whose actions are of public consequence. During all the time the soldiers

had been away no demonstrations had occurred which professed to celebrate what Canadians had done. It was not a mere sense of proportion that prevented street shouting over the night advance at Paardeberg or the defence at Honingspruit. The emotions these deeds aroused swelled other cheers or remained pent up against the day of return. With a strong, full chorus of rejoicing the men were welcomed home. Their reception was national in its character and national in its scope. The men were heroes to their friends, but they were also the approved and admired of the people.

To what limits popular enthusiasm would have gone had all the Canadians returned together can only be imagined. As it was, from the middle of July onward there was a series of receptions. At intervals of a few days groups of convalescents arrived from the English hospitals, and by November 1st the first detachment of the Infantry reached Halifax direct from Cape Town. All the earlier landings had been at Quebec. Right heartily did the Ancient Capital respond to the many calls upon her to convey to the returning soldiers the first greetings of a gratified country. Every reception was official. A civic committee, as well as a military committee, met the steamers, either out in the river or at the dock; bands and escorts of local Militia and civic police were in waiting; and through crowds the processions marched up to the Citadel to the Commanding Officer of which all the men were instructed to report. According to the hour of arrival, the number arriving, and other accidental

circumstances, the proceedings varied. Sometimes excursion boats went down the river to escort the incoming steamer; if a British warship was in port a body of marines joined the procession; as the tender conveying one detachment drew up to the dock the soldiers sang "God Save the Queen," and the crowd on shore, with bared heads, took up the strain.

After receiving their discharge and their arrears of pay at Quebec the soldiers proceeded to their homes, everywhere cheered along the route. At Montreal more than one imposing demonstration took place. On one occasion a detachment of the United States Naval Reserve from the U.S.S. *Hawk*, which happened to be lying at Montreal, displayed their brotherly feeling by taking part in the procession. Whenever a returned soldier reached his native place he found a stirring welcome. Particularly in the smaller towns and villages were elaborate preparations made. Even a single soldier would be met by the local Militia, with a band or bands, and nearly the whole population. One soldier was drawn home by a long team of school children. At town-halls or drill-halls there would be speeches and presentations of value, sometimes to the amount of hundreds of dollars. Repeated again and again for months these scenes testified to the reality and depth of the popular interest.

On a much larger scale was the reception tendered to the detachments of troops that came fresh from active service. The first of these detachments to arrive was the portion of Canadian Infantry which had elected to return at the end of the year of

service. Numbering about 300 officers and men, under command of Major Pelletier, this detachment seemed to represent to the Canadian people,

MAJOR PELLETIER.

in a way the returning bodies of convalescents could not do, the actual fighting force. The sick and wounded were individual heroes, but at last there

was a section of the corporate body which had continued to exist and to fight while individuals fell by the way. It stood for the whole record of the Battalion and not for any particular action or endurance. In welcoming it Canadians celebrated their new self-confidence and their gratified national pride. The demonstration differed, also, in important respects from that on "Pretoria Day." When the report was circulated at the end of May that Pretoria had been captured and the war ended, the Canadians then gave enthusiastic expression to their feeling of gratification at the part played by their fellow-countrymen, to their relief that danger for them was passed, and to their general sense of rejoicing over the triumph of the cause they had espoused. Without prearrangement they congregated to exhibit their emotions and to furnish their own entertainment. The same feelings were present when the detachments of troops actually reached home, but by that time they had become familiar. They had entered into a national attitude; and the people provided miles of decorations and of dense crowds, through which an organised pageant was to pass. The people were just as truly participants, but they were also spectators of a formal embodiment of their feelings, and in the soldiers themselves they saw the chief active causes of their enlarged experiences.

At one o'clock on the morning of November 1st the signalmen at the entrance to Halifax Harbour sighted the transport *Idaho*. She had been expected for two or three days, but a damaged propeller had

reduced her speed. Halifax was impatiently awaiting her arrival. Indeed, the feelings of the citizens and the hundreds of visitors could not be altogether restrained, but, on the night of October 31st, had found vent in a premature demonstration. Hardly had the illuminations died down and the people dispersed when a salute of three guns from the Citadel announced the approach of the transport. During the hours of the early morning Lieut.-Col. Pinault, Deputy-Minister of Militia and Defence, and his staff visited the ship, lying at quarantine, and paid off the men and gave them their discharge. With one or two exceptions only, Major Pelletier and his men were found in excellent health, and all delighted at regaining Canadian shores. Only relatives had been admitted to the dockyard enclosure, and, after brief greetings, the men formed up and marched out of the gates to take their position in the great procession of marines, soldiers, and organised societies. Their guard of honour was composed of the 3rd Battalion of their own regiment, the 3rd (Special Service) Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry, which was still doing garrison duty at Halifax. Through dense and enthusiastic crowds they made their way along the principal streets to the Common. Here a short and impressive religious service was held. The men were formed into three sides of a hollow square; Chaplain Fullerton led in the Lord's Prayer; the Te Deum was sung with the fervour of an occasion new in Canadian life.

Luncheon was served to the returned soldiers by the ladies of Halifax, and at dinner they were the

guests of their comrades of the 3rd Battalion. At night Halifax was ablaze with bonfires and fireworks and with all sorts of special illuminations. Another great procession was formed. It was a splendid welcome home.

But it was only the first of many equally demonstrative welcomes. The returned detachment was composed of men from all the companies in the Battalions. H Company had been enrolled at Halifax, and the men of that company, with Captain Stairs at their head, were the objects of special regard in that city. They remained there, but the rest of the detachment entrained shortly after midnight for the West. G Company dropped off at St. John, where they were cheered and fêted with the same heartiness as was manifested at Halifax. The remainder continued on their way, and were presented with addresses and other evidences of welcome at all the principal points on the route to Quebec. For F Company Quebec surpassed its best previous demonstrations. It was the home of Major Pelletier. Father O'Leary arrived from England on the following day, and the demonstration continued long enough to embrace that event.

A pleasing evidence of royal thoughtfulness was the telegrams that awaited the companies at each enrolling-point, to this effect: "Her Majesty the Queen has heard with pleasure of the safe return of the Canadian Contingent, and desires to thank them most cordially for the services they have rendered."

At Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton, Kingston, London, and many smaller place, the

same scenes were re-enacted. Everywhere the same spirit moved the people to the same lavish display. When the general demonstrations were ended local demonstrations in the nature of serenades before the homes of the soldiers took their place. As with the returning convalescents, the residents on a street on which was the home of a soldier made special preparations and engaged a band or in some other way marked their neighbourliness as well as their national feelings. Thus did Canada welcome home her soldiers.

CHAPTER XII

THE SUBJECT IN PARLIAMENT

When agitation was at its height, and when the moment came for decision whether or not contingents should be offered to the Imperial Government, the Canadian Parliament was not in session. There was no opportunity for a simple vote of yea or nay by the regular representatives of the people. In the Australian Colonies it was different, for there the various Parliaments debated the question and divided upon it, at least before contingents were sent, although not in all cases before they were offered. The Canadian Government was prorogued on August 8, 1899, and did not meet again until February 1, 1900. In the interval the question of giving aid in that particular case had been settled, and the troops had all been raised. In July, 1899, the attention of the House of Commons had been called by Lieut.-Col. Hughes to the offer of troops made by Queensland, and some two weeks later the resolutions of sympathy and moral support were passed by both Houses; but few then regarded the situation as really serious, and Sir Charles Tupper's remark, that he believed Canada should do everything in her power to assist the Mother

Country in the existing crisis, was perhaps the only statement so general in its nature that it might be regarded as including more than moral support. Only in so far as the Opposition might be pledged by this general remark of its leader, and in so far as the resolutions of sympathy might reasonably imply active interference when moral influence failed to effect the result, could either party, or Parliament as a whole, be said to have committed itself in advance of the sending of troops. In the session of 1900 Parliament could only review the conduct of the Government in the crisis and consider the voting of money to meet the expenditures the Government had authorised.

But while there is no Parliamentary history of the actual decision to send troops, the discussions that took place in Parliament after the event form an important part of the history of the whole movement. Even though it be admitted that the discussions did not often rise above partisan attacks and partisan defence, and that they were distinguished by few attempts at constructive statesmanship, yet this fact itself is important, and the explanation is more important still.

The general character of the debates on the subject of the contingents was determined by what had happened during the recess. Everything tended to put the Government on its defence. The disposition of Parliament toward all Imperial questions was well known, but the session of 1899 had closed before the necessity for definite action was recognised. When the necessity arose Sir Wilfrid Laurier announced

his opinion that the Government had no constitutional authority to act, and that, in any case, the Government would not be justified in undertaking the expenses involved without a vote of Parliament. But Parliament was not summoned, and within ten days after the publication of that opinion an Order-in-Council was passed authorising the raising, equipping, and transporting to South Africa of a battalion of 1,000 men. As other members of the Government had endorsed Sir Wilfrid Laurier's opinion, it was clear that the Government would be on its defence on the score of inconsistency, and, perhaps, of unconstitutionality.

Then it was certain to have to defend its rights to leadership. The Opposition had claim to the title, for Sir Charles Tupper had promptly put himself at the head of the agitation for the sending of the contingent, and, later, also of that for preserving the integrity of the Canadian corps in South Africa, and of that for meeting the total cost of the payment of the men while on service. The Government had taken no important step which had not previously been advocated by the leaders of the Opposition. It would consequently be called upon to defend itself against charges of adopting the policy of the Opposition, or of being forced against its inclinations into a course which it had to acknowledge was the popular one.

In all this its motives would be open to question. Why had it acted at variance with its own expressed opinions? If the views announced by one or two of its members were sincerely held at the time, why had

not these members resigned when a different course was followed? Were the dominant motives those of mere opportunism and love of office, or were they derived from worthier considerations? These were all points upon which explanations would be asked by the Opposition.

Again, the Government would be on its defence against a certain section of its own party, which continued to maintain that no action should have been taken until the representatives of the people had been formally consulted. The Opposition leaders blamed the Government for its wavering and delay, and for its half-heartedness; but some men in its own party blamed it for doing so much on its own responsibility. Mr. Bourassa and Mr. Monet were the chief representatives of this section, or perhaps it would be better to say, of this portion of the population, for these views were held by some in both parties.

On October 18th Mr. Bourassa, the member for Labelle in the Province of Quebec, resigned his seat in Parliament; and on the same day he wrote a letter to Sir Wilfrid Laurier explaining his action. After quoting a portion of the latter's statement that there was no constitutional provision for sending troops out of the country, and that the Government could do nothing, at least until Parliament had granted money, Mr. Bourassa said that in view of that statement he was expecting an immediate summoning of Parliament; but, instead, he had read of the Order-in-Council providing for the sending of a contingent. This action had been taken professedly

in accordance with a despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who had accepted offers of which the people of Canada knew nothing. It was useless to say that no precedent had been created, for the accomplished fact was the precedent. If, on the strength of a despatch from the Colonial Secretary, the people of Canada were thus called upon to take part in a war, the justice of which was questionable, without having representation in the Imperial Parliament and Cabinet, and without being consulted even by the Government of Canada, Mr. Bourassa believed constitutional liberty to be in danger. "A British citizen, proud of his rights and jealous of his liberty, loyal to England and to her noble Sovereign," his first duty was to Canada and to the fundamental spirit of its constitution. The action was the initial step of a new constitutional policy, which the majority of the supporters of the Liberal Government had always denounced, and upon which neither Parliament nor the electorate had ever been consulted. Deprived of the right to express these views in Parliament before action was taken, he had determined to adopt the only means left to him of asserting and justifying his opinions, and accordingly would appeal to his constituents for their judgment before again taking his seat in the House. He was re-elected by acclamation.

Mr. Monet, the member for Laprairie and Napierville in Quebec, wrote a letter to his constituents, in which he declared his opposition to the unconstitutional procedure, and professed himself opposed to taking part in the wars of the Empire, or expending

money for strengthening in any way the bonds, other than commercial bonds, between Canada and the rest of the Empire, since he looked forward to the ultimate independence of Canada. He said he believed these were the opinions of his constituents. If they were not, and any twenty-five electors, either Liberals or Conservatives, would sign a requisition asking him to resign, he would do so, and submit to the judgment of the majority at a new election. No such requisition was signed and he retained his seat.

The difficulties of the Government's position at the time a contingent was being agitated have already been indicated in previous chapters. All that is here intended is to present those aspects of the facts which would not unnaturally be seized upon by opponents, and which, because they were so seized upon, became the principal subject-matter of debate during the ensuing session of Parliament.

Attack and defence on motives and on the manner of conducting public business are always in danger of dropping to partisanship and personalities. Under such conditions one thing alone can keep debate on a uniformly high plane. That one thing is the consideration of principles. If the Liberal Government had explained its course in the light of a defined general policy for Canada, or if the Conservative Opposition had criticised it from the standpoint of a different general policy, equally clearly defined, important results might have been accomplished. But neither party was prepared to lay down a defined future policy for Canada, and both were, therefore,

shut in to the details of the particular instance of departure from the customary policy. No issue on principles was clearly drawn between the parties, because neither party had formulated its principles. The inevitable consequence was that the debates were barren of important results. When the session ended Canada's relationship to active Imperialism was still an unsettled question.

This has been essentially a transition period. It is no reflection on Canadian statesmen to say that they had found no solution for the new problem, for no solution has been suggested in any part of the Empire which has stood the test of criticism. And to say that during the session of 1900 discussion lingered among those aspects of the subject which were chiefly of party interest, is only to say that party rivalry did not subside in the presence of great, but vague, issues. In order to understand the proceedings during that session and the developments that followed, the central fact must, however, be borne constantly in mind, that neither party was ready with a chart of the future course.

Sir Charles Tupper, from the beginning, favoured participation in the South African war; but he could not say that he favoured Canada's taking part in every Imperial war, and he could not say what kind of wars she should take part in and what kind of wars she should not take part in. Certain possible forms of closer union within the Empire he did not approve of, as, for example, Parliamentary federation and regular levies upon the Colonies by the Imperial Government; but these were negative positions

he Conservative leaders, who all proclaimed their devotion to the idea of closer union and criticised the Liberal leaders for their lack of devotion, had yet no practical step in advance to suggest except mutual preference in trade.

An interesting incident occurred during the speech of Mr. Foster in the debate on the Address. In his speech were passages of exceptional force in favour of British connection. Toward the close Mr. Monet asked him suddenly if he did not believe that later on Canada would have to take rank among independent nations. Mr. Foster's answer was this: "That is a fair question; and, first, so far as I am concerned, I think we have enough to do to do the work that is presently before us. At this juncture I am absolutely opposed to independence, and I do not believe the time will ever come, unless the genius of things changes greatly from what the history of the past teaches me that it will, when independence away from Great Britain would be better than independence within the lap of the British Empire." He then proceeded to develop the reasons against independence; but starting out as he did with an uncertain note, any great effect was lost. This incident is typical. Perhaps no Canadian is more earnestly in favour of British Imperialism for Canada than Mr. Foster, and perhaps none has done more to influence public opinion on the subject, and yet even he, while making a point against those who have definitely opposed the idea, cannot say positively that the time may never come when Canada should be absolutely independent; and he had no scheme

to propose for consolidating still more firmly the British union.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier sent the contingents. He admitted that he did so in accordance with a popular demand, but on the general principles of the action he could say little more than was contained in his statement in England that the Colonies would go to the help of the Mother Country in a life-and-death struggle. On the other hand, and limiting even the indefinite principle, he maintained that Canada must judge every particular case on its own merits. The only practical step the Liberals took was to still further reduce the tariff on British goods.

Sir Richard Cartwright, the Minister of Trade and Commerce, voiced the almost universal attitude when he said: "The suggestion was made, I think, from the other side of the House—it may have been made by some of our own friends—that it was necessary for us, if we chose to send a contingent, that we should have defined our position first and ascertained what relation to the Empire we were to occupy in future, under circumstances of this kind. To my poor mind this is not the time for bargain-making; that question will be taken up in good time. The problem is a difficult and complicated one, but I have great faith indeed that what has happened before in so many cases in English history will happen again; I have every faith that the practical instinct of the English people will find a way to solve this problem, difficult as it may be. As the schoolmen say, the question is one *solvitur ambulando*."

To call the settlement of principles "bargain-



LORD MINTO ADDRESSING THE MOUNTED RIFLES BEFORE THE PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS, OTTAWA.

making" is, of course, to rule out the process by definition rather than by argument; but, aside from this personal or party interpretation, the position stated by Sir Richard Cartwright, that the time was not ripe for the consideration of ultimate questions, which must be left to be solved by the practical instinct of the people applied to each fresh development as it arose, was that virtually held by the majority of the members of both Houses. Mr. Foster expressed, in effect, the same idea when he said, "We have enough to do to do the work that is presently before us."

Now, however sound or however fallacious it may be thus to leave solutions to be hit upon by a sort of composite and unintentional wisdom, this was the position of the leaders of both parties. There was a national movement. Both parties were willing to hold office and so keep, or take, the nominal leadership, but neither was prepared to say by what exact road or toward what definite goal it would direct the movement. All were impressed by the importance of the occasion, and yet, by the force of circumstances, they contended principally about details and seemed to have in view the holding, or obtaining, of office rather than the elucidation of principles.

In the Speech from the Throne were the following four paragraphs relating to the general subject :—

"Hostilities having unfortunately broken out during the recess between Great Britain and the South African Republic, it appeared to my Ministers expedient to anticipate action of Parliament by equipping and forwarding two contingents of Volun-

teers to the seat of war, as a practical evidence of the profound devotion and loyalty of the entire people of Canada to the Sovereign and institutions of the British Empire.

"In this connection it is a matter of pride and gratification to the people of this Dominion that, in addition to the contingents sent by the Government, another Canadian force is being organised and despatched at the personal expense of the High Commissioner of Canada. This generous and patriotic action upon the part of Lord Strathcona reflects high honour on him and on the Dominion he represents.

"I have been instructed to convey to you Her Majesty's high appreciation of the loyalty and patriotism thus displayed, which, following the preference granted under the present tariff to articles of British manufacture, has had the happiest effect in cementing and intensifying the cordial relations subsisting between Canada and the Mother Country.

"A Bill will be submitted for your approval making provision for the cost of equipping and paying the Canadian contingents."

Two points in the above paragraphs deserve a moment's attention. It is stated that the contingents were sent "as a practical evidence of the profound devotion and loyalty of the entire people of Canada to the Sovereign and institutions of the British Empire." This wording is an evidence of the care taken not to lay down any advanced principle. As it stands, the statement is probably incontrovertible. There is no disloyalty in Canada toward the Queen nor toward the institutions of the British Empire. In one sense

also the contingents were sent because of such loyalty; but that was not their real significance. The sending of the contingents was regarded in Canada and received in England as the beginning of a new era. It was the initiation of a policy of active co-operation, and not merely evidence of devotion to anything that had existed before, such as the Sovereign or institutions. It was the working toward an ideal. As such it was favoured, and as such it was opposed. The true significance of the movement was expressly recognised in the debates that followed, and no speaker stopped at the literal meaning of the words used in the Speech from the Throne. Still those safe words stood as the Government's formal statement of principle.

The other point is the introduction, in the paragraph dealing with the Queen's appreciation of the spirit displayed, of reference to the Liberals' tariff preference to articles of British manufacture as one of the main causes of improved relations between Canada and the Mother Country. The association in that way of the tariff measure with the sending of the contingents was, naturally, strongly criticised; but it was done with deliberate purpose. The Government desired to keep well to the front whatever it had done that was "British," in order to overcome, if possible, the suspicion that it was not "British" enough. And a still further tariff reduction was to be, later in the session, one of its counter-strokes against the attacks of the Opposition.

After the moving and seconding of the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne, Sir Charles

Tupper rose to open the debate on behalf of the Opposition. He reviewed his own course from the beginning to show that he had treated the question of the sending of the contingents as above party politics. He devoted a considerable portion of his speech to a consideration of the position of Mr. Tarte as a member of the Government. On quotations from Mr. Tarte's public utterances and from articles in the paper which is supposed to be his organ, Sir Charles based his contention that Mr. Tarte could not possibly have that attitude toward the action the people had demanded which alone could justify his retention in a Ministry which honestly took that action. In this concrete way Sir Charles attacked the motives of the Government. It was the pressure of public opinion, and not free choice, that made Sir Wilfrid Laurier act. When he did act, he did not do enough. He had never offered to meet the whole expenses involved, although even on the principle he had accepted, that the Government should carry out the will of the people, this should have been done, since it was unmistakably the wish of the people that the total expenses should be borne by the Canadian Treasury. In a few eloquent passages Sir Charles dealt with the position of Canada in the world. "Will you show me any people in any country in the world," he said, "that enjoy these advantages on the terms that Canada enjoys them, with the most absolute, the most perfect, as the right honourable gentleman has stated, the most complete independence, enjoying everything that complete independence can give us and standing to-day as part of

the British Empire?" Other countries with the comparative resources and population of Canada were borne down with heavy taxation to sustain an army and navy. In the hour of her great prosperity no man should shrink for a single moment from standing by the great Empire from which these advantages were derived. He did not believe in allowing the Parliament of Great Britain to tax Canada, but he believed that the free Parliament of Canada should in such a case vote money, and vote all the money required to supply and support her Volunteers.

Sir Wilfrid Laurier, in his reply, said he understood Sir Charles Tupper had criticised the Government under two heads—they had been too slow in acting, and they had not done enough. He did not attempt to meet directly the principal part of Sir Charles's speech, which had dealt with Mr. Tarte's position and the questions it raised as to the sincerity of the Government. Instead, he made a counter attack on Sir Charles and quoted numerous extracts from the latter's writings and speeches to show that his present enthusiasm for a contribution to the defence of the Empire was hardly consistent with his previous attitude. If so, he had no right to be severe on others. As to the Government's delay in acting, Sir Wilfrid defended it on the ground that the Government had no other authority than that vested in it by the people—the people speaking through their representatives or speaking direct. The question of possible trouble in South Africa had been raised during the previous session of Parliament, but no one had then proposed a vote of

money nor had any mandate been given to the Government. Under such conditions, and particularly when the Government had no rights marked out in the Militia Act or in any other instrument, they could not do anything but wait for the popular judgment. When he had given the interview in which he had said that it would be unconstitutional for the Government to act without consulting Parliament, he had laid down a proposition from which he had departed, but the conditions had in the meantime been altered; for war had been declared; the British Government had arranged a plan by which they would take over the Canadian Volunteers as soon as they reached Africa, and, therefore, the Government of Canada would not really be sustaining men in a foreign country; and the people had spoken. But he admitted that the constitutional point was the weak point in the Government's case. Upon this point Sir Charles had made no attack.

With regard to the criticism that they had not done enough, inasmuch as they had not undertaken to pay the Volunteers while in South Africa, Sir Wilfrid showed that the Imperial Government had decided against such action on the part of any of the Colonies. He did not say that the Government had ever offered to pay the men, and the point was not raised as to whether the absence of any offer from Canada had influenced the Imperial Government in deciding that all Colonial troops should be put upon the same basis, and should be paid out of the Imperial treasury. But with the official correspondence before the House there was really little more to be said upon this ques-

tion. Sir Wilfrid said that they would ask for supplies sufficient to make up the pay of all the Volunteers to the standard pertaining in the Canadian Militia, and that this money should be kept in reserve as a fund for the benefit of any dependent upon the soldiers or be handed over to them on their return. He defended this funding of the money rather than the sending of it to Africa, there to be distributed, on the ground that the latter course might create jealousies on the part of the soldiers who were not receiving this extra amount; and he defended the policy of the Imperial Government in undertaking to put all soldiers upon the same basis, and also this policy of the Canadian Government, on high Imperial grounds.

He could not admit that Canada should take part in all the wars of the Empire; neither was he prepared to say that she should take part in any wars at all. Every case should be considered on its merits. He had not been enthusiastic over the war or over any war, but he believed justice to be on the side of the British and, from the stand taken by the people of the Transvaal, he had recognised that the only thing to do was to prosecute the war to the bitter end. With a grand confederation of South Africa, in which there should be a respecting of rights, sentiments and traditions, justice, freedom and equality as their ideals, aspirations and purposes, "the Colonies of Great Britain to-day stand behind her—not to give her any assistance—she does not need that—but to affirm to the world that the unity of the British Empire is a real and living fact; to

affirm to the world that the unity of the British Empire is based upon and derives its strength from the most ample local autonomy and the most unbounded respect for the rights and privileges of all its subjects. It is this that has inspired our policy, and that policy we submit with confidence for the approval of Parliament."

The shortcomings and the logical weaknesses of Sir Wilfrid's defence were taken up by following Conservative speakers, who continued to press the concrete case of Mr. Tarte. The Liberals worked hard to repair breaches and strengthen their defensive position, and replied continually upon the motives of the Opposition. Mr. Bourassa, Mr. Monet, and other French Canadian members opposed the course of the Government on constitutional grounds and on grounds of policy. It is not necessary, perhaps, to summarise the various speeches, for the reasons already given, that no principles were formulated, unless by the individuals who announced independence as their ideal, and no substantial results were accomplished. The discussion was renewed on all possible occasions and continued throughout the session.

One development must, however, be pointed out. The attacks on motives became, in effect, charges that the Conservatives, on the one hand, had taken an extreme stand in order to rally to their support the population of British descent; and that the Liberals, on the other hand, while trying by their explanations to hold the same element, were allowing measures to be used to organise and consolidate

behind them the population of French descent. The prominence thus given to race differences, which had been present from the beginning, was really the most important, as well as the most unfortunate, result of the discussions.

It was the presence of this disquieting element that gave the chief value to Sir Wilfrid Laurier's splendid speech on March 13th. The danger that existed was becoming apparent. It would be impossible to apportion the blame as between the parties or between individuals. However sound may be the principle that, in an important matter and when Parliament is not in session, the Government should wait until the people have spoken, that very principle must at times open the way to evils greater than those it seeks to avoid. By the time opinion in favour of sending a contingent had gained preponderance in Canada the beginnings of a division on race lines already existed, caused by the tone of public discussion. As the Government took its stand upon the principle of waiting for a majority voice, it must accept its share of the responsibility for any incidental evils. All thoughtful Canadians deplored the situation; and the whole nation had just been shocked by the riots in Montreal, which, although they were little more than student escapades, seemed portentous.

On March 13th Mr. Bourassa moved, seconded by Mr. Monet, the following resolutions: "That this House insists on the principle of the sovereignty and the independence of Parliament as the basis of British institutions and the safeguard of the civil

and political liberties of British citizens, and refuses consequently to consider the action of the Government in relation to the South African war as a precedent which should commit this country to any action in the future.

"That this House further declares that it opposes any change in the political and military relations which exist at present between Canada and Great Britain unless such change is initiated by the sovereign will of Parliament and sanctioned by the people of Canada."

In a clever speech Mr. Bourassa presented his views and supported his resolutions. He knew that his course was unpopular, and he spoke like a man at bay. He lost no opening for personal thrusts. Apart from these and the tone of some passages, and regarding only its logic, the speech was undoubtedly able. Every supporter of the Government had approached the work of defence from a somewhat different standpoint, and not only was there no logical consistency in the defence as a whole, but there was perhaps no single speech that was entirely self-consistent; and the Conservatives had equally lacked a common basis for attack. There was a fine chance for a bright logician. This was destructive work. In building up a case for his resolutions Mr. Bourassa took as his foundation the statement in the Order-in-Council that no precedent had been created. The action of the Government without consulting Parliament must not be regarded as a precedent. Yet the Colonial Secretary in acknowledging that Order-in-Council had ignored the

reservation and accepted it as the inauguration of a new policy ; and the British Press and part of the Canadian Press, and many Canadian public men, had taken the same view. Something more was needed to affirm the right of the people to be formally consulted before they were pledged by action forced upon the Government by an invitation or request from the Imperial authorities, and by the clamour of any portion of the population.

But the speech and the resolutions had one fatal fault—they were inopportune. The House was in no mood to debate academic questions relating to its own powers, and it was already abundantly evident that the members were not ready to vote on any broader questions.

To reintroduce the old, profitless discussions was useless, and to emphasise the unconsenting attitude of those for whom Mr. Bourassa professedly spoke was, at that juncture, worse than useless.

In urging the mover not to press his motion, Sir Wilfrid Laurier delivered a speech that met instantaneous approval among all classes in Canada, and was warmly commended, although not perhaps correctly interpreted, in England. It was not an Imperialist speech ; it was a Canadian speech. It was directed against the inopportunism of Mr. Bourassa and against the rising danger of race division, and was addressed more to French-Canadians than to any others. The Government could not be blamed for sending the contingents. If it had refused to send them a dangerous agitation would have arisen which, according to all human probability, would

have ended in a line of cleavage upon race differences. The majority must rule. For the consequences of the action or for what would occur in the future he could not answer. All he could say was that, if it was the will of the people to take part again in an Imperial war, the people would have its way. If as a consequence of this one action Canada must take part in every war, then he agreed that Canada must be called to British councils and share the responsibilities as well as the burdens. But there was no occasion to ask that to-day, for that condition of things did not exist. He closed with this splendid peroration: "My hon. friend reads the consequences of this action in sending out a military contingent to South Africa. Let me tell you from the bottom of my heart that my heart is full of the hopes I entertain of the beneficial results which will accrue from that action. When our young Volunteers sailed from our shores to join the British army in South Africa, great were our expectations that they would display on those distant battlefields the same courage which had been displayed by their fathers when fighting against one another in the last century. Again, in many breasts there was a fugitive sense of uneasiness at the thought that the first facing of musketry by raw recruits is always a severe trial. But when the telegraph brought us the news that such was the good impression made by our Volunteers that the Commander-in-Chief had placed them in the post of honour, in the first rank, to share the danger with that famous corps the Gordon Highlanders; when we heard that they had justified fully the confidence

placed in them, that they had charged like veterans, that their conduct was heroic and had won for them the encomiums of the Commander-in-Chief and the unstinted admiration of their comrades, who had faced death upon a hundred battlefields in all parts of the world—is there a man whose bosom did not swell with pride?—the pride of pure patriotism, the pride of consciousness of our rising strength, the pride of consciousness that that day it had been revealed to the world that a new power had arisen in the West.

"Nor is that all. The work of union and harmony between the chief races of this country is not yet complete. We know by the unfortunate occurrences that took place only last week that there is much to do in that way. But there is no bond of union so strong as the bond created by common dangers faced in common. To-day there are men in South Africa representing the two branches of the Canadian family, fighting side by side for the honour of Canada. Already some of them have fallen, giving to their country the last full measure of devotion. Their remains have been laid in the same grave, there to rest to the end of time in that last fraternal embrace. Can we not hope—I ask my hon. friend himself—that in that grave shall be buried the last vestiges of our former antagonism? If such shall be the result, if we can indulge that hope, if we can believe that in that grave shall be buried the former contentions, the sending of the contingents would be the greatest service ever rendered to Canada since confederation."

Ten French-Canadian members voted for Mr. Bourassa's motion.

The practical provision made by Parliament for the expenses of the contingents is set forth in the resolutions introduced on February 13th by Hon. Mr. Fielding, Minister of Finance :—

" 1. Resolved, that it is expedient to provide that from and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada there shall and may be paid and applied a sum, not exceeding in the whole the sum of eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars, being the sum of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars authorised under Order-in-Council, dated the fourth day of November, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine, and the sum of six hundred thousand dollars authorised by Order-in-Council, dated the fifth of January, one thousand nine hundred, towards the payment of the expenditure incurred, or to be incurred, in sending the contingents of the Canadian Volunteers to South Africa, or in connection therewith, and the members of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, and the officers and persons who authorised or made the expenditure of any of the said sums under the Order-in-Council above referred to, or under any warrant of His Excellency the Governor-General issued in consequence thereof, or on the authority thereof, are hereby indemnified and exonerated from all liability by reason of having used or authorised the use of the above-mentioned sums of money, or any portion thereof, without due legal authority, and all expenditure heretofore made of any of said sums shall be held to have been lawfully made.

"2. In addition to the said sum of eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars referred to in the preceding resolution, there shall and may be paid and applied, from and out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of Canada, a further sum not exceeding in the whole the sum of one million one hundred and fifty thousand dollars towards defraying any further expenditures that may be incurred in connection with the sending of Canadian volunteers for active service in South Africa, and for providing as hereinafter mentioned by way of allowance to such volunteers or their dependents.

"3. The word 'expenditures' in the foregoing resolutions includes the following:—

"(*a*) All expenses of every kind in connection with the raising, enrolling, arming, equipping, provisioning, despatching and transporting said contingents up to the time of their arrival at the place of debarkation in South Africa.

"(*b*) The payments of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men composing the said contingents up to the time of debarkation as aforesaid, at the rates authorised by the regulations and orders of the Department of Militia and Defence;

"(*c*) All separation allowances paid to the wives and children of the married non-commissioned officers and men at the rates laid down by the Imperial regulations;

"(*d*) The difference between the rates of pay of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men which they receive or are entitled to receive from Her Majesty's Government during their period of service

in South Africa—such difference not to be paid to such officers, non-commissioned officers and men while on such service, and the amount which would be payable to each such officer, non-commissioned officer or man to be placed to his credit, and to be applied in such manner as the Governor-in-Council may determine, for the benefit of the dependents upon him, or failing such application to be paid to him or his representatives at the close of his period of service."

Both Liberals and Conservatives believed that the electors were more interested in the new Imperialism than in anything else, and all through the session both were manœuvring, with the capture of the majority sentiment as their object. The further reduction of the tariff on British goods was one of the movements by which the Liberals attempted to offset any advantage the Conservatives might have gained. It cannot be said, of course, that this reduction was made only for its strategic advantages in a party contest. It was, however, a position of some strength, and the Liberals certainly availed themselves of its advantages during the party fight. The way in which the subject was introduced in the Speech from the Throne clearly showed that they intended so to use it. Before occupying it in force they moved to clear it entirely of the enemy. This was done by the following resolution introduced by Mr. Russell on March 15th: "That this House regards the principles of British preference in the Canadian customs tariff as one which in its application has already resulted, and will, in an increasing

measure, continue to result, in material benefit to the Mother Country and to Canada, and which has already aided in welding, and must still more firmly weld together the ties which now bind them, and desires to express its emphatic approval of such British preference having been granted by the Parliament of Canada."

The Conservative leaders believed in "mutual" preference, as opposed to "one-sided" preference, and they could not in any case support a resolution so palpably intended as a direct vote of confidence in the Government. The Liberals did not wish them to support it. They were trying to present in a strongly Imperialistic light something they had done and at the same time force the Conservatives into an opposite position. When the Conservatives voted against the resolution there was material for campaign arguments to the effect that the Conservatives, if elected to power, would be bound to repeal the present preference and then wait for a "bargain." Was this in accordance with the spirit of the time?

When the Liberals brought in their further reduction in favour of British goods, from 25 per cent. to $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent., it was open to their supporters to say that, whatever objections opponents might urge against their conduct of the contingent matter, it must be an entire mistake to suppose that their attitude toward closer Imperial union was not perfectly sound.

To meet this the Conservatives attempted to show that the Liberals were opposed to the only tariff policy that could really bind the Empire together,

and they made them vote against "mutual" preference. So was the warfare waged.

There is no need to trace more minutely the history of the session of 1900. Only its general results on the movement which was marked by the sending of the contingents is of interest here. The most important fact about it is that no clear issues on Imperialism were evolved upon which the judgment of the electors could be taken at the elections a few months later. Imperialism remained as confused an issue as it had been before. In place of any broad general principles, the exigencies of party warfare had brought into prominence personal differences, race differences, and tariff differences. A tendency was noticeable to confirm the policy of active co-operation within the Empire, but even the temperate and reasoned speeches of a few of the French-Canadian members could not attract general discussion beyond the particular facts then before Parliament. Many quotations might be given from speeches on both sides of the House, and from speeches both in French and in English, which were in perfect harmony with the most advanced sentiment of the day, but the debates as a whole were inconclusive.

CHAPTER XIII

THE ELECTIONS

WITH the elections held on November 7, 1900, ends the period of agitation on the subject of the Canadian contingents. That date forms the natural closing-point of a history of a movement which began with individual offers for service in June, 1899, and passed through the various phases of popular endorsation, governmental action, military effort, popular support, parliamentary debate, and electoral judgment. It cannot truthfully be said of many movements that they began at the precise moment at which they became prominent, or ended when absorbing interest subsided. For her participation in the South African war Canada had been prepared by all her previous history, and the accompanying phenomena were indications of character and conditions which had long been in the making. And far from ending when the soldiers had returned and the subject had dropped temporarily out of politics, the movement, in its effects, must continue indefinitely. As a distinctive movement, however, it had a beginning in June, 1899, and an ending at the close of the political campaign in November, 1900, the demonstrations

over the return of the last detachments of Volunteers some weeks later being an after-glow of enthusiasm.

The result of the elections was the returning of Sir Wilfrid Laurier and his Government to power by a majority of forty-one over Conservatives and Independents. His working majority will probably include most of the Independents, eight in number. In Quebec alone he obtained a majority of forty-nine out of a total representation of sixty-five, the Conservatives electing only seven members, and one being elected as an Independent member. Not only did he secure an overwhelming majority of the French-Canadian vote in Quebec, but he had also the almost solid support of the French-Canadians in the other Provinces, who are numerous enough in some twenty-five or thirty constituencies to be an appreciable factor. In Ontario he suffered a net loss of fourteen seats, his majority of eight over the Conservatives being converted into a minority of twenty. In the remaining Provinces his majority was nineteen over Conservatives and sixteen over Conservatives and Independents.

From these facts it is evident that the French-Canadian vote decided the elections. Had it been at all equally divided between the two parties it is almost certain the Conservatives would have had a slight majority. This unanimity among the French-Canadians and the division of opinion among the English-speaking majority, with a slight preponderance against the Government, call for explanation. How was the campaign conducted to produce such

results? And what is the real meaning, so far as Imperialism is concerned, of the verdict at the polls?

In the light of the election campaign the one clear fact about the French-Canadians is that they did not approve of being rushed into militant Imperialism without due reflection and regular constitutional procedure. This is not only an intelligible, but a sound position. How much farther they would go in their opposition to Imperialism has not been determined. The campaign conducted in Quebec by both parties was anti-Imperialistic. On the one side it was claimed that Sir Charles Tupper and his supporters were trying to use the English-speaking majority in the country to secure a snap-verdict; and, on the other side, it was claimed that Sir Wilfrid Laurier was prepared to go very much farther than Sir Charles Tupper, as shown by his "one-sided" preference, and by certain remarks which were interpreted to mean that he was ready to consider some scheme of federation. Neither party held up the sending of the contingents, nor any of the larger developments of Imperialism, as desirable things in themselves.

Even beyond the requirements of party tactics was the campaign against Imperialism carried. Men like Mr. Bourassa and Mr. Monet held meetings all through the Province of Quebec, and visited French-Canadians in other provinces to oppose the ideals of the new Imperialism, and resolutions were passed at some such meetings against "every scheme of Imperial federation and every contribution by Canada to wars of the Empire foreign to Canada." A

noticeable revival of racial spirit occurred among the French-Canadians. Racial or religious festivals were celebrated with more than usual fervour; the tricolour flag was more often and more conspicuously displayed perhaps than ever before; and many references were made to France as the Mother Country.

These facts must not be hastily assumed to reveal either an intention on the part of a few or a disposition on the part of the many to take up a position antagonistic to British connection. It is true that a fading ideal of a French-Canadian Republic on the banks of the St. Lawrence is still entertained by some, but there is little, if any, dissatisfaction with the existing status. They do not desire to be reunited to France. Above all else, they are Canadians; next, they are British. At the convention of Acadians in August, whose eventful past has handed down sad and unfavourable traditions, the following resolution was adopted by the raising of the hand to heaven: "We, the French Acadians, assembled in general convention at Arichat, Cape Breton, protest our unfailing loyalty to the British Crown, and as a token of our love for Her Majesty, offer her our condolence on the recent death of His Royal Highness the Prince of Saxe-Coburg."

There is no reason to doubt that any general assembly of French-Canadians would with equal sincerity protest their devotion to the British Crown and to British institutions. But if any change of status is to occur, they must have time to weigh the respective merits of British Imperialism and independence. In any case they are willing and anxious to

work with their fellow-Canadians of British descent for the best interests of Canada. Too much must not be taken for granted; a common meeting-ground must be found, and advances must then be properly proposed and reasonably undertaken.

The stimulation of the racial feeling among the French-Canadians, with its manifestations during the months preceding the elections, was not, however, due solely to the revolt against the impetuousness of the Imperialists. It was partly the result of deliberate incitement by partisans for party purposes.

If both parties conducted an anti-Imperialistic campaign in Quebec it may be asked why the French-Canadians chose that of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. All their racial feeling inclined them toward a French-Canadian premier. In 1896 they had supported him against powerful influences so that one of themselves might be the leader of a Government. In 1900 the same motives operated. Besides this, Sir Wilfrid Laurier was their logical choice. Many accused him of going too far and of sacrificing the constitutional and sentimental rights of the French-Canadians; but, as against this, his course was represented as a wise compromise between that of the Conservatives in other Provinces, and that the French-Canadians would have preferred. Between the compromise and the headlong Imperialism of some of the Conservatives they chose the compromise. Even though Sir Charles Tupper had more definite views on some negative points, he had not been the more cautious of the two in this particular

case; and whether he had been or not, they felt safer under one of their own race and religion.

The meaning of the vote in the other Provinces is not so easily read. Why did not the great popular majority, which had insisted on the sending of a contingent and would listen to no formal objections and consider no compromise, vote as solidly against Sir Wilfrid Laurier as the French-Canadians had voted for him? If the number of those who unquestionably took this stand in the autumn of 1899 was really as great as it appeared to be, which there is no means of deciding, then the principal reason must be that the Conservatives had no defined and consistent Imperial policy to present to the electors. Their case was still further weakened by what Conservatives were saying in Quebec. Another reason was that the Liberals did not, outside of Quebec, represent their course as a compromise, but as the carrying out of the will of the people just as fast as the constitution would permit. They had sent the contingents. Who could have done more? For their attitude they referred the people to their British tariff preference. Under such conditions the electorate was bewildered. Indeed, so confused was the Imperialistic issue, that in many constituencies the local candidates conducted their campaigns with scarcely an allusion to it, but sought votes almost entirely on domestic issues. The new enthusiasms and new ideals had no chance to express themselves at the polls.

This was the situation from the standpoint of the people. It must be supplemented by a review of

the developments among those who conducted the campaign on both sides. The excesses of both Liberals and Conservatives may, for the sake of convenience of characterisation, be ascribed to the partisans in the ranks of both parties.

When Sir Charles Tupper returned from England in September, 1899, he announced himself as emphatically in favour of an offer of a contingent by the Government, and promised his support to the Government for any legislation necessary to give effect to such an offer. By that time the popular movement had assumed such proportions that public men could not overlook it. If Sir Charles Tupper believed that in the particular crisis Canada should come forward with assistance, no valid objection can be raised to the first steps he took. In urging the matter upon the attention of the Government he was voicing the opinion of a large section of the population. Had the Government then been ready to announce its position, few of the future complications could have arisen. Had the Government even made a statement to the effect that it was carefully considering the matter and would do what in its best judgment was best for Canada, the growing impatience would have been allayed. But the Government said nothing, and was evidently hesitating. This made an opportunity which Conservative partisans would not allow to pass by.

The Conservative party is historically the British or Imperial party in Canada. Until their advent to power in 1896 the leaders of the Liberal party represented rather the pro-United States or independent

attitude. When they did not continue to advocate in power the doctrines they had preached in opposition, the Liberal leaders were accused by the Conservative partisans of so sudden a conversion upon such matters as tariff protection and British Imperialism that the change of views could neither be sincere nor lasting. At the time of the Jubilee the Liberal Premier had represented Imperialism, although he had been a frank believer in independence; and for their tariff reduction on British goods the Liberals had received credit for Imperialistic designs, although the Conservative partisans claimed that the exclusive reduction was the accidental outcome of a tariff measure that was offered as a sop to the consistent free-trade wing of the party, and was intended to apply to every country offering low tariff rates to Canada, and in particular to be used as a lever in effecting an arrangement with the United States whereby a larger share of that market should fall to Canada. The Government's hesitation over the matter of a contingent and the presence of strong public feeling made an opportunity for these partisans to put to the test the real attitude of the Liberal leaders. As the Government continued to hesitate, the partisans continued to urge immediate action, with little thought for effects in other directions. They desired to convict the Government of having paraded for nearly four years under false colours.

When Sir Wilfrid Laurier gave out his statement that there were constitutional difficulties in the way, and that because of these the Government had not

seriously entertained the idea of sending a contingent even up to the 3rd of October, the case seemed already won. But when Mr. Tarte and other French-Canadian politicians, and many French-Canadian newspapers, warmly backed up the stand Sir Wilfrid Laurier had taken, the attack was unfortunately extended by some individuals to include these politicians and editors personally, and one or two indiscreet remarks were made with reference to the attitude of the French-Canadians as a whole. These were the excesses of the Conservative partisans in the opening stages of the movement. Their course may be reprehensible even under the ethics of the party system of government, and their advocacy of a contingent may have been unbalanced by a proper concern for national harmony, or even dignity; but perhaps it is only fair to remember that the Imperialistic position was theirs naturally as a legacy from the dominant section of the Conservative party in times past, and that they were probably all honestly anxious that a Canadian contingent should be offered.

What shall be said of the Government and its partisans? While extremists on the other side were shaping the movement into an extreme movement, the Government temporarily abdicated its leadership. It said nothing and did nothing. Racial irritation has often been provoked in Canada, and it required no peculiar prescience to foresee what must happen in this case unless either action or argument took the place of agitation; and yet the Government for some time maintained silence, and then interposed

formal constitutional objections in the way of action. These constitutional objections were important, but inasmuch as they could be overcome by the simple expedient of calling Parliament, they cannot be regarded as more than formal objections. As it is hard to believe that any Government, seeing how things were tending, would deliberately choose to let them go on until a popular majority was created by agitation, in order in that way to meet formal constitutional objections rather than settle them regularly by a session of Parliament, it must be assumed that the defence afterward entered on this ground was an afterthought, and that the real reasons for hesitation were to be found in divisions within the Cabinet, or in doubts on the part of a united Cabinet as to the desirability of the advanced Imperialism. If either of these latter conditions existed, it is easy to understand that it would have been dangerous for the Government to meet Parliament. At least, it is evident that the Government had no policy on which it was prepared to meet Parliament. Its hesitation on grounds of policy commands respect, and, as has already been said, the pause of deliberation may be one of the most important precedents created ; but the question then arises whether the Government should not sooner have made up its mind. It knew of the efforts made for years by influential men in England to bring about co-operative Imperial defence ; there had been plenty of opportunity for observing the tendencies in this country ; and it had had weeks to study the particular influences at work over the situation arising from the impending war in

South Africa. Its course may in the end be found to have been best for Canada; this is a question for the future to settle; but if it had been different, partisans would have had less chance to do immediate mischief.

During this time the Liberal partisans were not idle. They claimed that the Conservatives were aiming to arouse British racial prejudices, and by thus defining the issue helped to give it reality; and, in Quebec, they gave altogether unwarranted prominence to the few indiscreet references to the French-Canadians. There may have been a little genuine alarm in Quebec, but as those who repeated and enlarged upon these indiscretions were old politicians, who had had experience enough to put a correct estimate upon them, they cannot be excused of blame for deliberately attempting to rally behind them the French-Canadian population.

By the time the Government were ready to act, or, as its defenders would put it, when the right time for action had come, a danger of cleavage on race lines was recognised. This danger was probably more apparent than real, for Canadians do not admit the possibility of a fatal breach between the chief branches of a firmly united people, and if things had gone much farther a reaction would have set in on both sides. But where there is difference all danger cannot be absent.

At the extreme on one side was intolerance, and at the extreme on the other was resentment. The intolerance was directed against all, without distinction of race, who opposed the sending of a

contingent or who questioned the justice of the war. In Ontario and other English-speaking provinces there were individual cases of boycotting or more forcible manifestations of displeasure against the few who boldly expressed their opposition. Disloyal was a word much too frequently used. In

STRATHCONAS MARCHING THROUGH MONTREAL.

Quebec the students of McGill translated an exaggerated vocabulary into action in so naïvely literal a manner that the whole country was startled into a realisation of its absurdity. Marching out without premeditation on March 1st to celebrate the relief of Ladysmith and noticing that flags were not flying

on the offices of one or two of the French-Canadian newspapers, the students rashly undertook to compel the outward signs of "loyalty," and then proceeded to Laval University intending to hoist flags there, but they were repelled by streams of water on an icy day. Counter-demonstrations and reprisals followed, and for two or three days Montreal was threatened with a conflict between mobs. As soon as the first excitement had subsided honest regret was expressed on both sides, and the whole population united a few days afterward in a reception to Strathcona's Horse, and later in welcomes to the returning soldiers.

During the session of Parliament, in the absence of broad principles, the members marshalled the incidents of partisan conduct, which thus gained still more importance. As the session failed to produce any great issues, but rather put in the foreground such secondary issues as the excesses of partisans and whether or not one clause in a tariff measure was good business and good Imperialism, no guiding or restraining influence was provided for the campaign in the country. With no clear goal of public policy in sight, the inevitable tendency on both sides was to wander in whatever direction the proximate good of party advantage appeared. In the then state of public feeling no party advantage was to be gained by advocating co-operative Imperial defence in Quebec, and neither party was led in that direction. But there was a party advantage in exposing the over-eagerness or mistakes of the other side. In Ontario and some of the other Provinces, on the other hand, each party was attracted

toward the advantage to be secured by explaining its action as more in accordance with the Imperialistic sentiment there prevailing than were the actions of its opponents. Thus the election campaign was fought on different planes in different parts of the country, and mutual charges of double-dealing in policy formed a large part of the campaign ammunition.

Even the leaders did not escape the universal tendency to present different sides to different audiences. In Quebec city Sir Charles Tupper restated his grounds for opposing Imperial federation, which Sir Wilfrid Laurier in some of his speeches, particularly in England in 1897, had seemed to favour, and attacked the Liberals' tariff preference because it had not benefited England and was injurious to Canada, and because it was calculated to prevent the adoption of the principle of mutual preference which would develop the commerce of the whole Empire. Canada was loyal to the Empire, and French-Canadians were as loyal as any other part of the population. Of her own free will and on her own judgment Canada would contribute her portion whenever the necessities of the Empire required it. The spontaneousness of the gift of contingents for South Africa was its chief merit. But Sir Charles omitted his strictures upon the Government for not being prompt enough and hearty enough in contributing these contingents.

What he omitted in Quebec he dwelt upon in Toronto. Local Conservatives in Quebec took up the criticisms of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's ideas or hints

of federation, and some of them vigorously opposed everything about the new Imperialism. A pamphlet issued by them embodying this position was immediately repudiated by Sir Charles Tupper, but despite this repudiation it was charged against the Conservative party.

In Toronto, Sir Wilfrid Laurier devoted considerable time to exposing the differences in the views expressed by the Conservatives. This was good tactics, for the chief thing the Liberals had to fear outside of Quebec was a consistent Conservative policy on advanced Imperialism. If the Conservatives had no such policy the Liberals were largely relieved from the necessity for forming one. He defended their tariff measure, which had been prompted by "gratitude" to England. He also defended the taking of due time for deliberation over the offering of a contingent on the ground that it was not right to spend the people's money without authority and on the ground that precautions had to be taken to guide public opinion in Quebec. The general inference on this point seemed to be that the Government was ready enough, but was prevented from acting sooner. He closed with an eloquent appeal for a united Canadianism.

In Quebec he interpreted the Government's action rather as the allowing of Volunteers to reach the front at the Government's expense, and claimed, as he had done in opposing Mr. Bourassa's resolution in the House, that the Government should not be blamed for acceding to the majority. An inference, opposite

to that drawn by many from his speech in Toronto, was doubtless drawn by many in Quebec from his treatment of this point in his speeches in that Province. Before Quebec audiences he appeared as one of their own race and religion, and although he expressly claimed no credit for this, he very clearly emphasised the facts. He spoke there just as eloquently for a united Canada.

His supporters in Quebec made much of the facts about race and religion, some of them going so far as to say that little else should be considered. In speeches, in articles, and in cartoons, they misrepresented, in some instances grossly, the attitude of the Conservatives as being hostile to the French-Canadians and their religion. Appeals like this can be most effectively used among minorities; and although some Conservative partisans may have yielded to the temptation to approach English-speaking Protestants on opposite grounds, they certainly did not do so in the same general way or with the same visible results.

Only those features of the campaign which had to do with Imperialism have been mentioned. The actual issues were numerous, and were all discussed. What was the effect of each issue, or each group of issues, it is impossible to estimate. On the subject of Imperialism all that can safely be said is that, as between Sir Wilfrid Laurier and the Conservatives the French-Canadians voted their confidence in Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and that a few constituencies elsewhere voted against him and some members of his Government because of their questionable Imperialism.

Out of the Imperialistic fog one object tended to appear, Canadianism. Because of the insistence of the Conservatives that any tariff arrangement must be based on business principles, and must provide for proper protection or proper compensation for Canadian industries, and from the appeals of the Liberals for "union, peace, friendship, and fraternity" at home, it is probably true that before the campaign was over Canadians were thinking more about the necessity for practically sound and economically safe conditions in their own country, as a preliminary to any advance whatever, than they had thought for years, if ever, before.

The results of the elections, as compared with the distribution of membership at the time of the dissolution of Parliament, were as follows :—

	Elections of November, 1900.			Previous Representation.		
	Lib.	Con.	Ind.	Lib.	Con.	Ind.
Ontario	34	54	4	48	40	4
Quebec	57	7	1	51	14	0
P. E. Island	3	2	0	3	2	0
Nova Scotia	15	5	0	11	9	0
New Brunswick	9	5	0	6	8	0
Manitoba	2	3	2	4	2	1
N. T. Terr.	4	0	0	3	1	0
British Columbia	3	2	1	4	2	0
Totals	127	78	8	130	78	5

Lib. maj. over Con.	49	Lib. maj. over Con.	52
,, ,, Con. & Ind.	41	,, ,, Con. & Ind.	47

The party that won the elections is not historically the Imperialist party, although it has approved and carried out many measures that are calculated to promote British Imperialism; it did not win on an

Imperialist platform, although, outside of Quebec, none of its supporters opposed Imperialism; and the most solid body of its adherents is not Imperialist, although it is open to conviction on the policy that is best for Canada as a whole. The Conservative party did not lose because it was not Imperialist enough, but it could not gain the confidence of the French-Canadians against a leader from among themselves, whose course was presented as a compromise, and its Imperialism was not defined enough or consistent enough to gain the solid support of the advanced Imperialists who on other questions had strong party feelings. With all the effects of the recent prosperity on the side of the Liberals, the Conservatives required some clear and popular policy to turn the scale. The limitations of a transition period prevented their obtaining this policy on the subject of Imperialism. On that subject the verdict of the elections is ambiguous.

CHAPTER XIV

EFFECTS IN CANADA

In the atmosphere of political contention vision was distorted and perspective lost. The atmosphere has not yet sufficiently cleared to be able to see things in their proper proportions and relations. It is yet too soon to tell what will be the permanent general effect in Canada of the new ideas, the new emotions, and the new active experiences. In the subsidence of enthusiasm much may be stranded that now floats high ; and the true level can be measured only after the ebbing and flowing has ceased.

Although at the present time the permanent general effect can only be guessed at, it is possible to set down many of the immediate effects of particular events or particular developments. Human nature does not wait until a movement is completed before it is influenced by it ; nor is it always logical enough to revise its impressions in the light of an impartial retrospect. Rather each separate effect, produced at different stages or by different aspects, tends to continue in its own course until it meets other effects, and the final effect is the resultant of many different and even opposite effects.

Various kinds and qualities of actions made up that aggregate which may be called the contingent movement. There were acts by Imperial statesmen and by Canadian statesmen, acts by officers and men, popular actions and acts by political partisans. Each one of these constituent elements, each phase of the general activity, must have had certain effects. These separate, immediate effects had only to be noted when they occurred; but the resultant effect or effects, the permanent general results, have yet to reveal their force and direction.

No matter what the ultimate general results may be, it cannot be without instruction or interest to mark a few of the more easily observable immediate effects. Some were apparently favourable to the new Imperialism and some were not. The same thing may even have produced effects of both kinds. If the diplomatic methods of the Imperial authorities in dealing with the Colonies be taken as an example, it will probably be found that while they were successful in bringing about united Imperial action, they caused also some slight local irritation. A semblance of order may be given to a record of some of these effects by beginning with those not clearly favourable to the new Imperialism and passing on to those that are favourable.

Co-operation by the Colonies in the defence of Imperial interests has been one of the objects of Imperial statesmanship for some years. The negotiations begun with this object in view, the proposals made, the correspondence which passed between the Imperial Government and the Canadian Government

concerning the offer of troops for South Africa, and the messages sent by members of the Imperial Government or its representatives to the Government or people of Canada, may all be regarded as coming under the term diplomatic methods. As has been said, these methods were successful, and by the majority they were never questioned. If any questioned them in minor particulars, however, and if any effect was produced thereby, the matter properly comes under notice. To put these objections clearly, even at the risk of exaggeration, it might be well to make out of all Canadians who found anything to question one imaginary individual and attribute all the captiousness to him. This composite individual is the radical Colonial whom people in Mother Countries never can understand.

This radical Colonial is now an idealist and now an iconoclast, and he may change from one mood to the other with less provocation than would any type in older countries. Long before the South African war he had thought not a little about defence and about Imperial defence ; but the dangers that are so real to statesmen in the United Kingdom are not so real to him. Some day he intended to take up the question seriously, but that day had not come. He saw the progress of the movement for co-operative Imperial defence, but he was aware that the steady force back of it was supplied from the centre of the Empire and not from the Colonies. Yet, while definite steps were continually being taken along this line, as along other lines, he was being told, as he freely translated the language used, that everything was waiting for sug-

gestions from him. Although susceptible to compliments of deference, he rather prides himself on clear-sightedness, and this tends to make him assume a defensive attitude, even without cause. He became critical of the methods employed, when he should, perhaps, have been wholly sympathetic toward the object. It was by some such process as this that he came to object so strongly to General Hutton, who, while nominally the servant of the Canadian Government to carry out its policy, was discovered to be intent on plans, which might have received English official sanction, but had never been formally adopted in Canada. With suspicions thus aroused, he discounted the praise given him for so spontaneously coming to the assistance of the Mother Country in the South African trouble, because he thought the officials so praising him were not taking due credit to themselves for their part in the matter. In other words, and on no better grounds than these, he began to wonder if he was being treated with absolute frankness and directness.

Another thing he objected to was the apparent disposition on the part of some Imperial leaders or representatives to go back of Colonial Governments to the people themselves. Lord Minto congratulated the people of Canada on their insisting that their loyal offer should be made known, and his references to the "quibbles of Colonial responsibility" was an evident criticism of the Government before the people as a jury. He knew also that Mr. Chamberlain's eulogistic references to the spontaneity, &c., of Canada's offer could not apply to the Government's

offer, which had been decidedly deliberate, and he knew that Mr. Chamberlain must be aware that the adjectives were inapt if nothing more than an acknowledgment of that offer was intended; so he came to the conclusion that Mr. Chamberlain was talking over the Government's head. Now, this radical Colonial is ready to take care of his own Government. He will see that it carries out his wishes, and he would prefer not to have any assistance. He would be better satisfied if officials elsewhere went no farther than officials here. He remembered that when the Commonwealth of Australia Bill was introduced into the British House of Commons, it was pointed out that the people of Australia had not been unanimous in favour of some clauses, and that, therefore, an amendment might receive support there. This was a looking beyond, and even questioning, the official action of Australia. Putting everything together, he wondered if British statesmen were going to enter Colonial politics, to which he would emphatically object. Unless and until federation was effected, and members of the common House of Parliament had a right to appeal to the universal constituency, he preferred that official appeals from one part of the Empire direct to the people of another part, and over the heads of the local official representatives, should be as few as possible.

Then, even though he might have been most anxious, personally, that a contingent should be offered, he did not like that one should be accepted before he had arranged with his Government to offer

it. He would have fixed all that in good time. He may have been opposed to the Government, and may have smiled to see them put in a difficult position; but he did not like it all the same. It did not seem to be showing proper respect for the Government which he had put in power and was allowing to stay there.

When the rumour was circulated that Lord Minto would have felt it to be his duty to ask for the resignations of the Ministers if they had not acted on the "acceptance," he was rather indignant. It was only a rumour, but it was circulated, and it produced this effect. In justice to Lord Minto it should be said that no evidence has been forthcoming to show that he ever entertained such a notion, and many of those who thought they had ground for accusing him at the time came to believe they had quite misjudged him.

This Colonial has the proper feelings and attitude toward the Mother Country, but he is decidedly opposed to direct parental government. His suspicions on this point made him question the action of the Imperial authorities in the matter of the forty-four commissions in the Imperial army offered, in March, 1900, to Canadian soldiers. Lord Minto was given the nomination of candidates and yet the Canadian Government was asked to act as an unofficial advisory committee. When the Government declined to recommend "subject to final approval" by the Governor-General, and held that if they were to be responsible at all the usual rule governing Ministerial responsibility should prevail, he thought they

were right. He had no very serious objection to the Imperial representative distributing Imperial favours, but he is inclined to watch closely any growth of direct Imperial power, and he did not wish his Government to establish a precedent by accepting any unauthoritative position.

Strange as it may seem, he began in time to dislike the fuss made over what he had done. He sincerely appreciated the hearty acknowledgment that came so spontaneously from the English people, but when English statesmen and representatives in England, Canada, and South Africa, kept repeating the praises over and over, and kept telling him every time they sent a despatch to his Government and every time they sent despatches to each other just why he had done it, he did not like it. If there had been any despatches which did not call him "loyal and patriotic," and which did not tell him that he had acted "for the Empire"; if there had been any deed of bravery, any heroism, any suffering or death, on the part of his friends in the contingents, which had not been "for the Empire"; if only once in a while some one of these men could have been given credit for a plain bit of manliness or daring, without any particular motives; if the label had not been pasted over every gem—he would have felt better. He knew the men who went to South Africa, and he understood their motives. He knew they would think of the Empire, but he knew also that they would not think of it all the time, or most of the time; and even when they did not think of it they would not let any other regiment outdo them, and

certainly would not show their heels to the Boers.

As for his own motives, they were vague and had a good deal of idealism about them. The Empire for him was either some great consummation or some important means by which he could assert greater influence in the wide field of world politics. If he believed in it at all, he did not feel like talking about it all the time. There is some fine reticence about his patriotism; and in so far as the Empire entered into his patriotic ideals he felt reticence about parading the idea. The South African war had nothing ideal about it. He saw it was a hard job and would be a creditable thing to carry through. But the defeating of a people situated as the Boers were had no elements of romance. It opened no vistas. If the war had been against some Great Power he might have imagined results reaching on through the ages, but defeat of the Boers was in comparison a blank wall. And no other ideals of Empire were held out to him at the same time. Perhaps the time had not come for that. He could appreciate that this might be so, and could wait. But why drag the Empire, which to him had been an ideal thing, into every outpost affair in South Africa? In a revulsion from his idealism he tried to imagine the attitude of the men who were sending these messages all the time. Had they so different a feeling about the Empire that they could put it into every despatch and every speech? In framing their messages to each other, which were intended for publication, did they forget that those they addressed were aware that the whole thing was

"for the Empire," and was it to remind them they spoke as they did? Why then did they do it? He could think of nothing else than that they were deliberately trying to advertise the idea. That was the word that came to him. He was used to advertising and understood something of its methods. Or was it not so much for the ultimate thing, the Empire, they were acting, as for the appearance of overwhelming approval of the particular policy? When the Queen's message which awaited the return of the first detachment of the Canadian Infantry, and when her address to the second detachment at Windsor made no mention of the Empire, but simply thanked the soldiers for what they had done, he felt like raising an extra cheer for the Queen.

The eccentricities and vagaries of this composite radical Colonial must not be taken too seriously. He did not take them too seriously himself. But in considering immediate and ultimate effects of the movement, conducted as it was, he can no more be left out than can the composite of another type who was perfectly satisfied. In passing his criticisms he called individuals by their names, but he did this only for the sake of definiteness. He has not come to the point where individuals are objectionable.

Like the diplomatic methods, the British military methods had some incidental effects that made for caution. The frequent lack of success, particularly in the opening stages of the campaign, and its revelations of the fallibility of the methods of military administrators and generals, were a painful shock to the pride Canadians had felt in their ideal of the

British army. Nurtured on popular accounts of British wars, and apparently confirmed in their most generous conceptions by the impressive accuracy and irresistibleness of the late Sudan campaign, average Canadians did not entertain a doubt that the British War Office, British generals, and British soldiers would be found equal to any emergency that could possibly arise in South Africa. And what heightened the effect of the news of frequent disasters was the fact that Canadians, because of the conditions of Colonial life, thought they could understand the processes of reasoning and the general methods of the Boers. With hunting experiences or traditions, and stories, if not history, of Indian fighting in their minds, they could not understand how any one could think of approaching any place that could possibly conceal a man without proper precaution. They thought they saw that British generals were reasoning according to text-book rules, and were unable to adapt themselves to methods the rationale of which seemed so simple. Since adaptability is a primary necessity in their own lives, Colonials must hesitate to accept the opinions or direction in any matters of those who have little or none. The effect was profound, and the mistakes were referred to by the young and thoughtless with a tone almost of satire. These are facts of the first effects of British reverses.

Lord Roberts's first brilliant success caused a welcome reaction. What he did for Imperialism is far greater than conquering a province or two in Africa. But even so, an idol was shattered. One further effect of this will probably be to cause Canadians to

resist any attempt at too great centralisation of the military system of the Empire. They have observed the desire to centralise all naval and military control in London, as was evidenced in the discussion over the proposed Australian branch of the Royal Naval Reserve, and by less distinct signs in military matters. Before the Boer War, Canadians had formulated few arguments against this principle, but now it is probable they will contend that Colonial ideas should be cultivated and worked out independently; and as it has been shown that there can be co-operation without previous centralisation, it would be unwise to centralise. In this way they will be able to give point to what they might in any case have said, that they would prefer to keep control of their own resources.

On the other hand, however, the very fact that the professionals in the United Kingdom were shown to be more fallible than had been supposed, and the fact that Tommy Atkins could not take every position he went up against, and would at times listen to the dictates of common sense and surrender, while they did not fit in with a foolish romance, had the effect of bringing about a recognition of common humanity and equality. A belief in superior wisdom or courage is not the firmest basis for co-operation. Any unjustifiable ideal is well out of the way. Its removal enabled Canadians to admire more than ever the grand qualities of pluck and perseverance and the splendid powers of endurance of the men of the parent stock.

The ability of the Boers to resist so successfully

and so long was another of the aspects that produced effects. If undisciplined men, animated by a common purpose, could hold out so effectively against greatly superior numbers of well-drilled men, belonging to a nation holding command of the sea, Canadians re-

FOUR MEN OF THE 1ST BATTALION C.M.R.

ceived a new idea of their own powers of defence. They were not so defenceless as they had feared they might be. They knew also that every nation would draw a lesson from Britain's difficulties, and would be less inclined than ever before to attack a country which was determined to resist. If other Powers

were less inclined to attack, and they themselves had unrealised powers of defence, they were less dependent upon outside assistance than they had thought; they were more nearly self-sufficient.

Not only did the Boers fight well against the British, but the Canadians fought well against the Boers, even when compared with other British troops. If the truth were told, most Canadians would admit that because of their preconceptions of British soldiers and of the British military system they had secret misgivings that the Canadian Volunteers might reveal deficiencies, not in animal courage or ambition, but as fighting machines. When reports of the successive engagements at Paardeberg were received satisfaction was tempered for some days by a fear lest those in authority had kindly exaggerated what the Canadians had done in order to encourage the Colonies. The disposition to make too much of things had for some time been apparent. When, however, there could no longer be a doubt that Canadian Volunteers had really done well, and had proved their worthiness to hold their place in the fighting-line beside tried and historic regiments of regulars; when, after that, in marches, in skirmishes, and in general engagements, the Canadians of all arms of the service added to the list of praiseworthy achievements, then Canadians at home allowed themselves to indulge their pride. They did so with little external demonstration previous to the return of their heroes, but none the less were they deeply moved. Their Volunteers had done even better than was hoped. They at least were no disappointment. In-

the circumstances it would not be surprising if national pride went to excess.

There is a newspaper story to the effect that a person high in viceregal circles visited a school in one of the Canadian cities, and while speaking to the children of the war, asked the question, "Why were not the British successful at first?" The answer came promptly, "Because the Canadians had not arrived."

The chord of Canadianism had been set vibrating in every heart. Whatever other effect there may have been, a gain in national self-confidence was unmistakable. It meant much that men who represented the average youth and strength and character of the Dominion could on their first trial claim quality with men whom all the world respected. In the new assurance of worthiness there were no distinctions of race or creed. From all parts of Canada and from all elements of its population had the men gone who had stood this testing. When the young soldier, before his fatal advance at Paardeberg, touched his maple-leaf badge and said, "If I die it will help this to live," he spoke a deeper truth than probably he knew.

While this stimulation of Canadianism made for greater and more stable union in this country, other unfortunate developments accentuated differences and threatened division. In estimating the effects on the race problem of the whole affair, what occurred in South Africa and what occurred in the political arena at home cannot be separated. To a great extent they offset each other; and the memories of common

bravery and common death may remain when many causes of difference are forgotten. It would be unwise, however, to close the eyes to the harm done. What happened before the elections was, perhaps, not so dangerous as the discussions in cold blood on the significance of the distribution of the votes cast. What Conservative partisans said was dilated upon and voluminously answered by Liberal partisans, when the matter should have been allowed to drop. But no disastrous results are to be anticipated, because so many in this country are determined that there shall be no disastrous issue. The quarrels are like family quarrels, carried on under the conviction that everything will be made up again. The common ground of Canadianism has been broadened, and on this all can meet. The people of French descent do not call themselves French-Canadians, but Canadians. From the common Canadianism the forward movement must begin. This principle must be accepted and acted upon, even though the patience of some of the new Imperialists is tried.

Of the effects more distinctly favourable to the growth of the new Imperialism several may be mentioned. Ultimate success, though dearly bought, is one of them. With a majority success is apt to be regarded as a conclusive endorsation. The sincere appreciation manifested by the people of the Mother Country was a reward that will prompt fresh efforts to win. The gratification of the national pride, first by the creditable achievements of the Volunteers and secondly by the general applause, was another influence making for repetition.

Then there was the realisation of relationship with the other parts of the Empire. The language of relationship had been used for generations, but on the battlefield there was such a personal meeting as there had not been before. An individual may be proud to number reputable men among his relatives whom he has barely met and who are to him rather names than persons. When he actually comes into contact with them under conditions that try the essential manhood of each and produce, as a consequence, a respect independent of relationship, the sense of relationship becomes a new and precious thing.

Even the jealousies of the other Powers acted in the same direction. They tended to make all the parts of the Empire feel isolated from the rest of the world and thrown more upon each other's society and support. That other Powers did not interfere, although inclined to do so, gave a new appreciation of the importance of a united Empire.

The very idea entertained by the other Powers, as well as by a majority within the Empire, that a permanent union has been cemented and illustrated by the particular act of co-operation, will prove a powerful influence. The general expectation entertained all over the world that hereafter the different parts of the Empire will act together, will help to bring about future united action, since expectations on the part of others are among the strongest of influences.

Again, even though preferential trade, Imperial penny postage, the Pacific cable, and other practical

matters, may be surer bonds of Empire, none of these things touched the imagination like this war; and the imagination of the Empire has been engaged on the side of union. Against this must be set any effects from excessive exhortations. There was not material enough in the South African war to make the exclusive food for the imagination of the Empire. Canada was ambitious for wider activity, quite independently of the fact that she was a part of the Empire; but this gratification of the ambition was obtained by co-operating with the other parts of the Empire, and ambition and Imperialism are seen to be not incompatible.

Canada can never forget the graves of her dead that lie between Cape Town and Komati Poort That one part of the Empire can never be alien to her sentiments; and the ladies of South Africa who tend these graves will keep fresh, also, feelings and thoughts of sympathy.

In a more general way there is the effect of the precedent established. Underlying everything else is the general fact that all Canadians have been made familiar with the idea of active Imperialism. What was before a more or less vague dream with some, and an unconsidered condition with others, was suddenly made a reality. It was not a cold reality but was glowing with all the enthusiasms of war. It was not a dull, hard fact, but was an inciter of hopes, fears, exultations, sorrows, and final rejoicings. No such reality can enter into the life of a people and remain long enough to become familiar, without powerfully affecting that people. Many will accept

it as the inevitable, and will continue to desire it. For all it has passed from the stage of theory to the stage of the practicable. This is not to say that it will not in future be opposed, but it cannot longer be opposed as an uncertainty. There will no longer be the effective appeal against it that its workings in practice cannot be foretold. All classes in Canada must have been affected in much the same way by this actualisation of the idea of co-operation. Even the French-Canadians, who were the most solid body in opposition, could not view a second proposal with the same kind of distrust as that with which they viewed the first. Objections from any quarter must henceforth be upon principles or practical points and not upon the possible evils of the untried.

A more active participation in the world's affairs has become familiar and has been seen to be practicable. More definite inferences must be carefully drawn. That Canadians would again consent to take part in an Imperial war on the same conditions is not settled by the discovery that they can take part on those conditions. Independence of spirit may centre itself upon terms instead of exhibiting itself in aloofness. It must not be forgotten that the Colonies did not join in until the stage of force was reached. They had had no voice in the ante-bellum diplomacy, and, without full responsibility, they ought not, for their own sakes, to make a practice of entering on war.

What is to be the single resultant of all these effects? Or into what two or three general results will they be temporarily combined? No satisfactory

answers to these questions can yet be given. It may safely be said that British Imperialism has been strengthened; but it is also true that the other great element in the national life, Canadianism, has been at least as greatly strengthened; and a new element, anti-Imperialism, has been brought into existence. Anti-Imperialism is a matter of mental and moral constitution rather than of experience or argument. In all communities there is a large percentage which is distrustful of expansion. In business and in every other form of human activity, as well as in national concerns, the line is drawn between those who are disposed continually to accept new responsibilities and those whose clear perception of the dangers or difficulties of new undertakings, or whose unimaginativeness so disinclines them to a departure that they resist. Imperialists and anti-Imperialists, in the general sense of these words, there will always be. Up to this time in Canada anti-Imperialism has not been a factor, because active Imperialism has not been a practical question. Now, however, some protests are heard against the policy of active Imperial co-operation, not because it is British co-operation, but because it is the assuming of new burdens and new responsibilities. As in England, not a few can find no sufficient justification for the war against the Boers; and they can find still less for Canada's participation. If there is such a justification, it will be recognised by men of a certain type of mind, but its force will just as surely escape those of an opposite type. If Canada contemplates other steps similar to this last, the anti-Imperialism

in Canadians must inevitably begin to assert itself. And it will find arguments that will give pause to those who are not constitutionally or temperamentally its natural adherents. Already it has those based upon expenditure, race troubles at home, and the glorification of war. The coincidence of the strong campaign in the United States against Imperialism with the appearance of a like problem before the Canadian people, has quickened the process of division on these lines by furnishing to both sides examples and arguments.

The growth and solidification of a body of anti-Imperialists is to be expected. The important question then arises whether on some occasions, or even permanently, Canadianism and anti-Imperialism may not become allies against British Imperialism. A great part of the Canadianism in the country has always flowed with the British Imperialism, and the streams mingled much of their waters during the months between June, 1899, and November, 1900; but assimilation has not yet occurred. Canadianism has been fed by fresh and distinctive springs, and flows stronger than ever.

Judging by what appears on the surface the Imperialists will prove to be the more numerous body, and British Imperialism their dominant ideal. Those who know Canada only from the outside, or who cannot feel as born Canadians feel, find no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that Canada has committed herself to a complete acceptance of the doctrines of the advanced school, and that all serious obstacles have been overcome. They may be right,

and their confident assertion of their views may help to make them right, by causing a wider adoption of their interpretation. But others, no less qualified to form a judgment, see a much more complicated situation and can pass no easy prophecies. They know that much of Canadian life has always been below the surface, where it could not be properly observed or estimated. They point out, for example, that Imperialism, or even British Imperialism, has never been debated in this country. It has been advocated; but, with few exceptions, no views but those of advocates have been heard. It is unnatural to suppose there are no other views. A shrinking from publicly opposing anything to which the terms belonging to loyalty and patriotism had been applied, honestly from their own feelings by some, and dishonestly from party motives by a few; a fear on the part of natural leaders to take sides on the question, when their utterances might be used against them or the party to which they belonged, before the question had become a practical one affecting the immediate interests of the people; and a certain carefulness about finally making up the mind on so important a subject; have operated to delay the inevitable debate. They point out that the political leaders, even after the contingents had been despatched with much enthusiasm, felt so uncertain about the real significance of the movement that not one would stake his future on a defined general policy. They point out, also, that not all the immediate effects of the first experiment were favourable to inconsiderate advance. They see that

the preponderance of sentiment and of argument is at present on the side of the Imperialists; but they see that mistakes might possibly turn the scale.

What exists to-day is rather the raw material of statesmanship than a finished product. No time in the history of this country, not even the period when Confederation was the grand problem, had greater need of enlightened and temperate statesmanship. That is the great need of the Empire to-day. The proselytising zeal of those who see but one possible outcome and admit but one interpretation of what has occurred is not the desideratum; nor is the subtle and insistent diplomacy of more masterful men. Frankness, directness, mutual consideration and moderation will take Canada safely through the period of discussion which will dissipate the mists and the false sanctities and let in the daylight, in which men see where they walk and walk because they see.

CHAPTER XV

POSTSCRIPTUM

An after-word may not be out of place on a point that does not strictly belong to the history of what Canadians did and thought and felt on the occasion of the South African war. We have seen the extent and nature of the activities. Is the present constitutional structure properly adjusted for such activities? Lacrosse might possibly be played with tennis-rackets or cricket with baseball bats; but the games would be far less scientific and less brilliant, and no one would so play them if more suitable instruments were obtainable. Is the existing machinery for the management of Canada's external activities and of its co-operation with the other parts of the Empire wholly satisfactory? Can Canadians play with skill and safety the game of Imperialism with the instruments they now possess? The game need not be played aggressively; Canada may decide merely to stand on her defence; but perfect instruments are necessary for successful defence.

New plans for the organisation of the Empire have been mooted for years. This very fact argues a belief that the present form of organisation might

not meet all possible requirements. Has any light been thrown upon the question by the late experiences? A study of all the facts and developments outlined in the previous pages has convinced me that defects or deficiencies have been disclosed and that certain additions or readjustment must be made. The most economical and safest machinery does not exist in Canada for managing its external interests; and there are defects in the connections with the other parts of the Empire and with foreign countries, which impair efficiency through an unsteady transmission or waste of power.

We have seen that because of the manner in which the agitation for co-operation was conducted in Canada there was danger of serious division between sections of the people. I believe that the lack of a centre of responsibility in such affairs is one of the reasons for the unfortunate developments. There is no one agency in Canada to which the work of managing Imperial activities has been definitely entrusted. Private individuals in Canada offered contingents directly to the British Government; the Government of the Dominion offered contingents; and the Government of the Province of British Columbia offered a contingent. The Imperial authorities accepted a contingent from Lord Strathcona, although they referred other offers from individuals to the Dominion Government; they accepted two contingents from the Dominion Government; and they expressed their willingness to accept a contingent from the Government of British Columbia if an increase was made in the number of

men offered, and volunteered to pay for the transportation of the men to South Africa. Here were three distinct sources from which offers came. Which was the right source? Private individuals will always be at liberty to offer, but can the Government of a Province enter on active Imperialism on its own account? The Imperial authorities evidently believed it could, and there was no clear provision in Canadian constitutional law or practice against it. No one raised the objection that the Government of a Province was usurping functions that properly belonged to some other body. Apparently British Columbia had as much right to make an offer as had the Dominion. It was not the peculiar business of anybody to make such an offer.

This illustrates my point that to no one agency has been definitely assigned the management of Canada's external activities—at least in the important respect of participation in Imperial wars. The Dominion Government is, of course, the proper body to be given control of these affairs, but this has not yet become settled in practice. The sending of men by a Provincial Government would have been little short of a national calamity. It would have been a precedent for independent action by the Provinces, and a few cases of such action would disrupt the Dominion. There is little doubt that the Dominion Government recognised this danger, and used diplomacy to prevent the creation of a precedent.

A majority of the people looked to the Dominion Government to make the offer; but the Government was able to say at once that it had not the constitu-

tional power to take action. Not only had it no exclusive right to make the offer, but it was questionable whether it had any right at all. With the Dominion Government, even, the action was exceptional and unprovided for. It is not the business of any man in the Government, nor even expressly of the Government as a whole, to prepare for just such contingencies as the South African war. The people apprehended this, and did not feel that they could hold the Government responsible, as they would in other matters; and, having no specified man or men to hold responsible, one section of the people began to place the responsibility upon another. A majority looked to Quebec as responsible for the delay, and Quebec looked to the other Provinces as responsible for the haste. Seeing the situation, the Government evaded as far as possible all responsibility, which they threw upon the "majority." In effect, the people of Quebec were told not to blame the Government, because the "majority" was responsible, and the people elsewhere were told that if they had only demonstrated sooner that they were a majority the offer would have been sooner made. Between the constitution and the majority the Government escaped. There was evidently some incompleteness or misadjustment in the machinery for managing a participation in an Imperial war.

It is, of course, out of the question that the Colonies could make it a practice to take part in Imperial wars on the terms and under the conditions of this South African war. For their own good they must be consulted at an earlier stage in the negotia-

tions that may lead up to war, or they must establish a better system for independent deliberation. At present there are neither the proper connections for easy consultation nor the proper provisions for careful deliberation. No system is to be desired which, for example, would make it difficult for the Colonies to act promptly in an emergency like the South African crisis, even though there was about the action more of an impulsive springing forward along lines of habitual tendency than of deliberate reasoning on the merits or necessities of the particular occasion. But impulsiveness should be treated as a reserve, and should be sparingly called upon. If it can be imagined that statesmen could ever hold power in England who would be so unscrupulous, the present lack of system might enable them to make tools of the Colonies. If they waited until the very eve of the declaration of war they might, by a little manipulation and a skilful use of the catch-words of patriotism, play upon local partisanship, upon an honourable dread of appearing to falter before the world, or upon generosity of sentiment, and gain their point. Those who desire the continuance of the Empire, no less than those who hold strong views on the rights of the Colonies, and particularly of minorities within the Colonies, must wish to prevent the possibility of abuse. Precautions must be taken against an even improbable resort to the expedient of a stampede.

If the Colonies did not offer assistance on any rightful occasion, or if they did not respond to any appeal made, a general danger would be incurred.

Let us fill out a case with suppositions. The people of Canada had not been sounded on the question of participation in the South African war, and their Government had not been consulted about the policy from which the war resulted. Suppose when Mr. Chamberlain's despatch of October 3rd was received the Government had decided that it would not give it effect. Such a thing might have happened from a variety of causes. Suppose then that the Governor-General had dismissed the Government, as any Governor-General might do, because they refused to allow him to give effect to instructions he had received from the Government he was sent to represent. Suppose, still further, that the people of Canada, in their indignation at such a step, had so loudly protested that no other Government would dare to act. Canada would not have participated. Not only would any effect on the world from the spectacle of Imperial co-operation have been lost, but Canada's defection would have fatally damaged the prestige of a united Empire. Other nations would cease to count on it as a certain factor. The Empire would not hold the place it does to-day, and the result of the internal dissensions none can estimate. Whatever views may be held of the status the Colonies should have, it is certain that their interests cannot be forwarded by anything which lowers the prestige of the British communities or creates ill-feeling.

This may seem a remote and improbable case, but it is not an impossible one. Any one of many different imaginable things might happen to prevent

the response of a Colony suddenly appealed to, or, if not appealed to, its response in a sudden emergency. The only way to prevent mistakes is to have some machinery for properly approaching the Colonies.

In addition to remedying defects such as these some arrangement must be made whereby these Imperial questions can be brought to the Colonies to be discussed. If the Colonies are going to take part in such affairs it is a duty they owe themselves to thoroughly discuss them, just as the people of the United Kingdom do. A popular Council meeting in London would not supply what is needed. If Colonials are to make such questions their own they must have them brought home for discussion. They must be made a part of their politics.

What is needed, then, is some system by which the dealing with questions of active Imperialism shall be centred in the Dominion Government. These questions should be understood to belong as exclusively to the Dominion Government as the tariff does. It must never be possible for Ontario to send a contingent or vote money for a battleship while Quebec holds aloof; and it must never be so uncertain who is responsible that different sections of the people, at a loss for a definite object, will accuse and attack each other. Every argument in favour of the system of responsible government in any matters applies with full force in favour of the centralising upon an individual or individuals of responsibility for the steps taken in active Imperialism. Again, what is needed is a system by which Imperial questions shall be considered just as every other question is

considered. They must have no special sanctity, and nothing that removes them above the same kind of discussion that is given to any other important issue. If Imperialism is to mean anything to Canada it must enter into the life and thought of Canada, and it must be discussed in Canada. Before Canada can profit by Imperialism Canadians must become an Imperial race, and they can grow to be that only by working out in their own midst all the separate problems of Imperialism, and not by delegating this working out to a few nominal representatives who meet with others like themselves in London. Imperialism must come before the people of Canada just as it now does before the people of the United Kingdom. They should not be informed of impending negotiations if publicity might imperil them. The people of the United Kingdom are not in such cases informed. But they must have just as direct and just as immediate power over the man or men who are conducting the negotiations on their behalf as have the people of the United Kingdom.

These considerations lead up to the solution I venture to suggest for the immediate difficulties. There must be in the Dominion Government a minister who is as distinctly and definitely responsible for the external activities of Canada as is the Colonial Secretary in England for Colonial Affairs, or the Foreign Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

This solution is so simple that it has no doubt suggested itself to many others, but, so far as I am aware, it has not been publicly discussed. In a word, the particular defects in the Imperial machi-

nery revealed by the late events can be most easily and most effectively remedied by the creation in Canada, and in each of the other self-governing Colonies, of a Ministry of Imperial and Foreign Affairs. The portfolio might, of course, be held conjointly with another, but it should be as distinct from any other as the portfolio of Agriculture from that of Finance. Lord Salisbury combined the Premiership with the Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs; and Colonial Premiers might be the most suitable Ministers of Imperial and Foreign Affairs; although if many questions were up for settlement, and particularly if many conferences were necessary, it might be better to add one to the present number of ministers and let the new department engage the whole attention of one man.

For the Colonies, Imperial affairs and foreign affairs would naturally come under one department. From the local standpoint they are both external relations, and under present conditions they have both an Imperial side, because the Colonies can settle foreign questions only through, or in co-operation with, the Imperial Government. Yet a double title for the office would be preferable to a single one.

If there is thus a distinct class of most important questions, that class should be made a distinct department of Governmental thought and activity. Only in this way can unity, definiteness, and effectiveness be secured, and only in this way can these questions be given unity and definiteness in the minds of the people.

It may perhaps be said that the Premiers of the

Colonies now practically fill this position. Even if this were so, it would still be advisable to name and definitely locate this part of their functions. As a matter of fact, however, they have never expressly assumed any such functions, and the people of the Colonies do not look to them as primarily responsible.

The advantages of placing a distinct and important class of public interests under a single responsible head need not be enlarged upon. The principle is everywhere acknowledged; and the practice by which a responsible minister proves a benefit is familiar to all British countries.

One most important point is that a minister upon whom responsibility has been fixed must have a policy, must find something to stand upon. He cannot avoid laying down a policy, as the Canadian Government did over the South African contingents, because he would have no one else upon whom to lay the responsibility. He would have to defend his course in Parliament, and the subject would thus be brought to the only place where it could really be argued. True, Imperial matters would thus come into party politics and be liable to the abuses of partisanship; but they will get into party politics in any case, and even though they are handled somewhat roughly at times they will get justice in the end.

This minister would keep thoroughly posted on Imperial and foreign affairs and would be ready for issues before they arose. To have some one man whose business it was to keep thus posted would

alone commend the scheme to acceptance. And he would be obliged for his own sake to see that the people were put in possession of all the facts that could be disclosed, and were prepared for whatever policy he might think it wise to adopt.

What the existence of such ministers could do toward supplying the need for proper consultation between the parts of the Empire may, however, be treated in a little fuller outline.

With a Minister of Imperial and Foreign Affairs in every self-governing Colony, and a Premier, a Foreign Secretary, and a Colonial Secretary in London, we would have the ex-officio members of the best possible Council of the Empire. It would not be a council in the sense in which a number elected or appointed for the special purpose of meeting together would be a council, but a scheme could easily be devised by which these ministers could meet together in London, or any other place, at stated intervals, or upon the call of the British Government, or of a certain number of themselves, and sit as a Council of the Empire. They would be a council of envoys.

It would be the best kind of a council because it could really settle things. Each man would be a responsible minister, who would be instructed by his Cabinet, which in turn would give only such instructions as it was confident would be endorsed by a majority in Parliament or in the country. Whatever was agreed to at such a Council meeting could therefore be carried out. It would be best because it would be the least complicated and least expensive,

as well as the most efficient. It would be best because its meetings could be in secret.

Except in the case of responsible ministers it is repugnant to British institutions that public business should be secretly conducted. If there were any joint Parliament or representative Council constituted otherwise than above, its meetings would have to be as open as are the meetings of Parliament to-day. This would mean that the most serious questions would never come before it, because secrecy is so often essential to safety or success; and a Cabinet formed out of members of such a Parliament or Council would be too far removed from responsibility to the people, and it would probably be found either to absorb the business or to be impracticable in the absence of clearly divided parties within the Council. On the other hand, a Council of Ministers, each of whom is directly responsible to his local Parliament for the conduct of Imperial and foreign relations, could meet in secret, whenever necessary, and then could make public at the right moment its decisions. In the meantime the Cabinets in the various parts of the Empire could have elaborated such plans or completed such arrangements as the situation required. No time would be lost, no effort wasted, and yet there would be no departure from the satisfactory and familiar system of responsible government.

Another advantage of secret discussion would be that differences of opinion among the constituent units in the Empire could be adjusted, or a way found around a difficulty, without the friction that

might be caused if popular majorities made the decisions, or if a popular Council discussed them. And if any of the Colonies dissented from any proposition or was unready to take part in any enterprise, either the proposed action could be dropped or an expedient hit upon, by which it need not appear before the world that difference existed. If, for example, the Home Government saw that the holding to a certain policy might produce war with some foreign Power, and desired the assistance of the Colonies if war was declared, it would be most desirable to find out beforehand, and without exciting public attention or public passion, what the attitude of each Colony was likely to be. There are possible wars, which, at least until they reach a stage where the very existence of the Empire was threatened, Canada could not well undertake to engage in, if she considered her domestic peace and harmony. Perhaps the British statesmen could change their policy in consequence, or, if not, a compromise might easily be arranged, and when the crisis was reached Canada might be asked to do only what she could safely do. If a minor war was of particular interest only to the United Kingdom, and if the Colonies were not in a position to take a needless burden, it could be announced as a police war in which the Colonies would not be asked to take part; or in which only those Colonies would be asked which had interests directly involved. These would be expedients for avoiding certain evils of inevitable differences in interests, but they would be statesmanlike. The Colonies must be free to influence Imperial policy,

or impose limitations, without endangering even apparent harmony.

From the standpoint of the Colonies there are two classes of Imperial questions—those in which a Colony is interested chiefly because the United Kingdom or some other Colony is interested, and those in which it is interested as a principal. As an example of the former class, Canada was interested in the South African crisis chiefly because the South African Colonies and the United Kingdom were interested. As an example of the latter, Canada is seeking an adjustment with the United States of territorial claims in the Alaskan district. The United Kingdom itself is much more directly interested in some questions than others. Again there may be questions at issue between two Colonies, in which the United Kingdom and the remaining Colonies have little interest. Canada and Newfoundland have the question of fisheries. Since grades or differences of interest exist, there is need for constant watchfulness, constant consultation and constant adjustment. Responsible Ministers whose duty it is to watch, who are free to consult, and who are empowered to adjust, can alone meet the requirements of the situation.

It has happened on more than one occasion that the interests of a Colony have been overlooked, or sacrificed, because it was not informed of negotiations and had no easy and regular method of letting its views be known. Some years ago the British Government gave permission to Newfoundland to make a bargain with the United States in which the

fisheries were involved. On his way to Washington, Newfoundland's representative was interviewed by a Boston reporter. From a press report of this interview Sir John Macdonald first learned that Canada's large interest in the fisheries was about to be damaged. The interest in fisheries is indivisible; it cannot be cut into halves like territory; and neither Canada nor Newfoundland can ever bargain with its share without the knowledge and acquiescence of the other. Yet this fact was overlooked in London. There is need for a Minister of Imperial and Foreign Affairs who shall be thoroughly acquainted with, and shall represent, the peculiar interests of each Colony, and whose right it shall be to receive notification of every pending negotiation in which his Colony can be even remotely interested.

There are desirable and important objects which can be attained only by a series of approximations. A Cabinet plans in such cases rather than a Parliament or a people. Suppose, for example, and without prejudice, that a real Imperial Zollverein is a desirable and important object. It could be attained only by a series of approximations. The steps might have to be very gradual and some of them apparently very indirect. A committee of Cabinet Ministers, a Cabinet of Cabinets, could better plan for such an object and make less fitful and surer progress than could an open and popular general Council or Parliament; or than could the separate Parliaments working independently by resolutions or special acts, which might or might not fit in with similar action elsewhere. What the Cabinet of Cabinets planned

would be carried out through the separate Parliaments, but all the efforts would be systematised.

In the formation of every policy and in the stand taken at every meeting for consultation, each Minister would be guided or held in check by a regard for the majority opinion and sentiment of his own people, which would be expressed, not in mob fashion at the moment of the crisis, but later in calmer times, when all the facts were made known. The same influences which now prevent domestic legislation from going too fast for the people would prevent premature Imperial undertakings, and there would be less likelihood of the waste of reaction.

A supreme advantage is that by an arrangement like this there would be preserved to each component part of the Empire, as a unit, independence of action upon every separate question. If the Colonies agree to the creation of a representative Imperial Council they commit themselves in advance to accept a majority vote of that Council on all of a large class of questions. Their representatives might always be in a minority, and yet they would be bound to act with the majority. If they did not, the Council would be a farce. But with a Council of responsible Ministers, a Council of Envoys, no Colony would be bound unless its Minister agreed, and it would be bound only to the extent to which he agreed. There would be no majority vote in such a Council. The fact that a majority was of one opinion might influence others to coincide, but it would be the final acceptance by these others, and not the existence of an original majority, that would bind their respec-

tive parts of the Empire. Then every particular agreement or disagreement of one of these Ministers would be discussed in his home Parliament, and the people would pass upon every separate action. Thus would the rights of individuality be preserved to the Colonies.

It may be objected by some that we would by such an arrangement pledge ourselves to active Imperialism, which we are not ready to do. This does not necessarily follow. On the other hand, we would, by this means, have an opportunity of protesting, and of presenting our views at the very initiation of every movement, and would have a check interposed between any demagogues outside our own country and the mob at home. Our own demagogues we can attend to ourselves. We would be protected against the evils of wholesale commitment and impulsiveness.

Besides, we have external relations. This is the primary fact. No matter what our political status may be at any time we hope always to have relations with every British country, and with as many other countries as possible. If we are to be a country worth living in, or living for, we will always have external relations which will be so important that they deserve organised and distinctive treatment. The creation of a Ministry whose business it is to promote our external interests would merely show our intention to treat an important part of our interest seriously. It would be a development of control over our own affairs, and not a giving away of anything we have still reserved. Under present con-

ditions, our Minister of external relations could not manage any foreign affairs on his own initiative, because the management of our foreign relations belongs by constitution to the British Government. But we are now generally consulted in matters where our interests are involved, and in the Joint High Commission, sitting on the Alaskan boundary and other questions at issue with the United States, we have been allowed a majority of the British representation. We will always hereafter have a voice in the settlement of our own foreign relations. It will be the policy of the United Kingdom to grant it, and in any case we shall demand it. But satisfactory as the representation allowed us on any commissions may be, that representation is now a matter of grace, and not a matter of system. The existence of a Minister who is responsible to Canadians for the conduct of foreign affairs, in as far as Canada has a voice in them, would merely be supplying the machinery by which Canada could, in a regular and systematic way, express her views. It would be a movement toward the rounding-off of our system of self-government, and yet would be neither a challenge for independence in these matters, nor a submission to continual dependence. It would simply be the supplying of defects in the present machinery.

Another point that may be raised against the suggestion is, that if a Minister was appointed for such a department he would, from a common weakness of human nature, be anxious always to have something to show as a proof of his energy or wisdom, and that, as a consequence, new obligations

would continually be forced upon us; he might become a busybody. If enough legitimate and necessary business cannot now be found for the constant employment of a Minister, then join the portfolio to some other. But with preferential trade, the Pacific cable, the Alaskan boundary, and other issues with the United States, our interests in an American trans-isthmian canal, German discrimination against our goods, the desirability of securing more favourable terms from many other countries, and the South African War, we have surely had problems enough during the past few months to have kept a Minister out of mischief. And there is not likely to be any lack in the future. Our external relations have not been cultivated as they might have been, and the ambition of a Minister, whom we could call to account when we would, might not be an unmixed evil.

As a result of a study of the conditions under which Canada took part in the South African War, I have been convinced that our system has weaknesses and defects, and the remedy I have suggested is the one that has seemed to me at once most simple and most practicable. It is a development of the Cabinet principle, and not of the Representative principle. Aside from the limitations under which a new popular or an appointive representative body would suffer, we have Parliaments enough and popular Councils enough in the Empire already. What I have proposed provides a Committee that can better than any other body do the work of a Council; but it provides more than a Council. From the standpoint

of the Colonies it is the centralising in the hands of one man, who can be held to strict accountability, of the management of its external relations; whose personal responsibility will tend to prevent that confusion in which, on the ground of previous suspicions or of isolated indiscretions, one section may attack another; whose very existence will impose the check of system upon any attempt to snatch a verdict from the passions of an hour; and who can consult, with what frankness or secrecy may be desirable, those with whom he must co-operate for his country's good.

This simple arrangement provides facilities for co-operation. There is nothing in it to make more rigid or more complicated the formal ties of Empire, or prevent in any way the growth of the substantial independence of the Colonies and the localising of responsibility which are vital to true development.

It places no obstacle in the way of those whose devotion to the Mother Country, and to the ideal of union, is their chief political inspiration; and it allows room for the normal evolution of those Canadians, some called French-Canadians and some called English-Canadians, who, born since Confederation, have never known anything but a united Canada, great enough in extent and resources and in the capacity of its people to be an independent nation; who have all the feelings natural to such conditions; whose readings in history and whose reflections have persuaded them that the principle of nationality is sound; who have always been sincere admirers of the character, of the ideals, and in general, of the methods of the

people of the United Kingdom, with whom, as against the rest of the world, they sentimentally identify themselves, but whose very appreciation has rather led them to consider how we in Canada could play our part in the world with like strength and success than created a desire to be taken up more completely into the successful life others had achieved ; and who have, yet, gradually come to recognise the parallelism, if not identity, of the interests of Canada with those of the other parts of the Empire, and who are now intellectually prepared to consider methods of co-operation, if such methods and such co-operation do not destroy the individualism, and the increasing opportunity for individual initiative, and the increasing sense of individual responsibility, which develop the man as a man and lay the only sure foundation for enduring greatness.

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

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